# POLITICAL DISCOURSES.

BY

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M.DCC.LII.

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# *ERRATA.*

PAGE 9. line 18. read, *He takes the field in his turn; and during his ſervice, is chiefly maintain'd by himſelf.* P. 49. add to the note, *And as a recoinage of our ſilver begins to be requiſite by the continual wearing of our ſhillings and ſixpences, 'tis doubtful, whether we ought to imitate the example in king* William's *reign, when the clipt money was rais'd to the old ſtandard.* P. 72. l. 11. r. *the price.* P. 76. l. 14. for *occaſion* r. *acceſſion.* P. 89. l. 7. r. *the entry of thoſe wines of* Languedoc, Guienne *and other Southern provinces.* P. 183. l. 11. r. *of the government.* P. 267. l. 3. for *their* r. *the.* P. 274. l. 6. r. *exclude all high claims like thoſe of their father and grandfather.*

# Political Diſcourſes.

## DISCOURSE I.

### *Of Commerce.*

THE greateſt part of mankind may be divided into two claſſes; that of *ſhallow* thinkers, who fall ſhort of the truth, and that of *abſtruſe* thinkers, who go beyond it. The latter claſs are by far the moſt uncommon, and I may add, by far the moſt uſeful and valuable. They ſuggeſt hints, at leaſt, and ſtart difficulties, which they want, perhaps, ſkill to purſue, but which may produce very fine diſcoveries, when handled by men who have a more juſt way of thinking. At worſt, what they ſay is uncommon; and if it ſhould coſt ſome pains to comprehend it, one has, however, the pleaſure of hearing ſomething that is new. An author is little to be valu'd, who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-houſe converſation.

ALL people of *ſhallow* thought are apt to decry even thoſe of *ſolid* underſtanding as *abſtruſe* think-

ers and metaphyſicians and refiners; and never will allow any thing to be juſt, which is beyond their own weak conceptions. There are ſome caſes, I own, where an extraordinary refinement affords a ſtrong preſumption of falſhood, and where no reaſoning is to be truſted but what is natural and eaſy. When a man deliberates concerning his conduct in any *particular* affair, and forms ſchemes in politics, trade, oeconomy, or any buſineſs in life, he never ought to draw his arguments too fine, or connect too long a chain of conſequences together. Something is ſure to happen, that will diſconcert his reaſoning, and produce an event different from what he expected. But when we reaſon upon *general* ſubjects, one may juſtly affirm, that our ſpeculations can ſcarce ever be too fine, provided they be juſt; and that the difference betwixt a common man and a man of genius, is chiefly ſeen in the ſhallowneſs or depth of the principles, upon which they proceed. General reaſonings ſeem intricate, merely becauſe they are general; nor is it eaſy for the bulk of mankind to diſtinguiſh, in a great number of particulars, that common circumſtance, in which they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixt, from the other ſuperfluous circumſtances. Every judgment or concluſion, with them, is particular. They cannot enlarge their view to thoſe univerſal propoſitions, which comprehend under them an infinite number of individuals, and include a whole

ſcience

ſcience in a ſingle theorem. Their eye is confounded with ſuch an extenſive proſpect, and the concluſions deriv'd from it, even tho' clearly expreſt, ſeem intricate and obſcure. But however intricate they may ſeem, 'tis certain, that general principles, if juſt and ſound, muſt always prevail in the general courſe of things, tho' they may fail in particular caſes; and 'tis the chief buſineſs of philoſophers to regard the general courſe of things. I may add, that 'tis alſo the chief buſineſs of politicians; eſpecially in the domeſtic government of the ſtate, where the public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a multitude of caſes; not, as in foreign politics, upon accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few perſons. This therefore makes the difference betwixt *particular* deliberations and *general* reaſonings, and renders ſubtilty and refinement much more ſuitable to the latter than to the former.

I THOUGHT this introduction neceſſary before the following diſcourſes on *commerce*, *luxury*, *money*, *intereſt*, &c. where, perhaps, there will occur ſome principles, which are uncommon, and which may ſeem too refin'd and ſubtile for ſuch vulgar ſubjects. If falſe, let them be rejected: but no one ought to entertain a prejudice againſt them, merely becauſe they are out of the common road.

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THE greatneſs of a ſtate and the happineſs of its ſubjects, however independent they may be ſuppos'd in ſome reſpects, are commonly allow'd to be inſeparable with regard to commerce; and as private men receive greater ſecurity, in the poſſeſſion of their trade and riches, from the power of the public, ſo the public becomes powerful in proportion to the riches and extenſive commerce of private men. This maxim is true in general; tho' I cannot forbear thinking, that it may poſſibly admit of ſome exceptions, and that we often eſtabliſh it with too little reſerve and limitation. There may be ſome circumſtances, where the commerce and riches and luxury of individuals, inſtead of adding ſtrength to the public, may ſerve only to thin its armies, and diminiſh its authority among the neighbouring nations. Man is a very variable being and ſuſceptible of many different opinions, principles, and rules of conduct. What may be true while he adheres to one way of thinking, will be found falſe, when he has embrac'd an oppoſite ſet of manners and opinions.

THE bulk of every ſtate may be divided into *husbandmen* and *manufacturers*. The former are employ'd in the culture of the land. The latter work up the materials furniſh'd by the former, into all the commodities, which are neceſſary or ornamental to human life. As ſoon as men quit their ſavage ſtate, where they live chiefly by hunting

ing and fiſhing, they muſt fall into theſe two claſſes; tho' the arts of agriculture employ *at firſt* the moſt numerous part of the ſociety *. Time and experience improve ſo much theſe arts, that the land may eaſily maintain a much greater number of men, than thoſe who are immediately employ'd in its cultivation, or who furniſh the more neceſſary manufactures to ſuch as are ſo employ'd.

If theſe ſuperfluous hands be turn'd towards the finer arts, which are commonly denominated the arts of *luxury*, they add to the happineſs of the ſtate; ſince they afford to many the opportunity of receiving enjoyments, with which they would otherways have been unacquainted. But may not another ſcheme be propos'd for the employment of theſe ſuperfluous hands? May not the ſovereign lay claim to them, and employ them in fleets and armies, to increaſe the dominions of the ſtate abroad, and ſpread its fame over diſtant nations? 'Tis certain, that the fewer deſires and wants are found in the proprietors and labourers of land, the fewer hands do they employ; and conſequently the

* Monſ. *Melon* in his political eſſay on commerce aſſerts, that even at preſent, if you divide *France* into 20 parts, 16 are labourers or peaſants, 2 only artizans, one belonging to the law, church and military, and one merchants, financiers and bourgeois. This calculation is certainly very erroneous. In *France*, *England*, and indeed moſt parts of *Europe*, half of the inhabitants live in cities, and even of thoſe who live in the country, a very great number are artizans, perhaps above a third.

the ſuperfluities of the land, inſtead of maintaining tradeſmen and manufacturers, may ſupport fleets and armies to a much greater extent, than where a great many arts are requir'd to miniſter to the luxury of particular perſons. Here therefore ſeems to be a kind of oppoſition betwixt the greatneſs of the ſtate and the happineſs of the ſubjects. A ſtate is never greater than when all its ſuperfluous hands are employ'd in the ſervice of the public. The eaſe and convenience of private perſons require, that theſe hands ſhould be employ'd in their ſervice. The one can never be ſatisfied, but at the expence of the other. As the ambition of the ſovereign muſt entrench on the luxury of individuals; ſo the luxury of individuals muſt diminiſh the force, and check the ambition of the ſovereign.

NOR is this reaſoning merely chimerical; but is founded on hiſtory and experience. The republic of *Sparta* was certainly more powerful than any ſtate now in the world, conſiſting of an equal number of people; and this was owing entirely to the want of commerce and luxury. The *Helotes* were the labourers: The *Spartans* were the ſoldiers or gentlemen. 'Tis evident, that the labour of the *Helotes* could not have maintain'd ſo great a number of *Spartans*, had theſe latter liv'd in eaſe and delicacy, and given employment to a great variety of trades and manufactures. The like policy may be remark'd in *Rome*; and indeed, thro' all

all antient hiſtory, 'tis obſervable, that the ſmalleſt republics rais'd and maintain'd greater armies than ſtates, conſiſting of triple the number of inhabitants, are able to ſupport at preſent. 'Tis computed that, in all *European* nations, the proportion betwixt ſoldiers and people does not exceed one to a hundred. But we read, that the city of *Rome* alone, with its ſmall territory, rais'd and maintain'd, in early times, ten legions againſt the *Latins*. *Athens*, whoſe whole dominions were not larger than *Yorkſhire*, ſent to the expedition againſt *Sicily* near forty thouſand men *. *Dionyſius* the elder, 'tis ſaid, maintain'd a ſtanding army of a hundred thouſand foot and ten thouſand horſe, beſide a large fleet of four hundred ſail; † tho' his territories extended no farther than the city of *Syracuſe*, about a third part of the iſland of *Sicily*, and ſome ſea-port towns or garriſons on the coaſt of *Italy* and *Illyricum*. 'Tis true, the antient armies, in time of war, ſubſiſted much upon plunder: But did not the enemy plunder in their turn? which was a more ruinous way of levying a tax, than any other that could be devis'd. In ſhort, no probable reaſon can be given for the great power of the more antient ſtates above the modern, but their want

* *Thucydides*, lib. 7.

† *Diod. Sic.* lib. 2. This account, I own, is ſomewhat ſuſpicious, not to ſay worſe; chiefly becauſe this army was not compoſed of citizens, but of mercenary forces. See diſcourſe X.

want of commerce and luxury. Few artizans were maintain'd by the labour of the farmers, and therefore more ſoldiers might live upon it. *Titus Livius* ſays, that *Rome*, in his time, would find it difficult to raiſe as large an army as that which, in her early days, ſhe ſent out againſt the *Gauls* and *Latins* *. Inſtead of thoſe ſoldiers who fought for liberty and empire in *Camillus*'s time, there were, in *Auguſtus*'s days, muſicians, painters, cooks, players and taylors. And if the land was equally cultivated at both periods, 'tis evident it could maintain equal numbers in the one profeſſion as in the other. They added nothing to the mere neceſſaries of life, in the latter period more than in the former.

'Tis natural on this occaſion to ask, whether ſovereigns may not return to the maxims of antient policy, and conſult their own intereſt, in this reſpect, more than the happineſs of their ſubjects? I anſwer, that it appears to me almoſt impoſſible; and that becauſe antient policy was violent, and contrary to the more natural and uſual courſe of things. 'Tis well known with what peculiar laws *Sparta* was govern'd, and what a prodigy that republic is juſtly eſteem'd by every one, who has conſider'd human nature, as it has diſplay'd itſelf in other nations and other ages. Were the teſtimony

* *Titi Livii* lib. 7. cap. 25. *Adeo in quæ laboramus*, ſays he, *ſola crevimus, divitias luxuriemque.*

mony of hiſtory leſs poſitive and circumſtantial, ſuch a government wou'd appear a mere philoſophical whim or fiction, and impoſſible ever to be reduc'd to practice. And tho' the *Roman* and other antient republics were ſupported on principles ſomewhat more natural, yet was there a very extraordinary concurrence of circumſtances to make them ſubmit to ſuch grievous burthens. They were free ſtates; they were ſmall ones; and the age being martial, all the neighbouring ſtates were continually in arms. Freedom naturally begets public ſpirit, eſpecially in ſmall ſtates; and this public ſpirit, this *amor patriæ*, muſt increaſe, when the public is almoſt in continual alarm, and men are oblig'd, every moment, to expoſe themſelves to the greateſt dangers for its defence. A continual ſucceſſion of wars makes every citizen a ſoldier: They take the field in their turn; and during their ſervice are chiefly maintain'd by themſelves. And, notwithſtanding that this ſervice is equivalent to a very ſevere tax, 'tis leſs felt by a people addicted to arms, who fight for honour and revenge more than pay, and are unacquainted with gain and induſtry as well as pleaſure.* Not to mention the



* The more antient *Romans* liv'd in perpetual war with all their neighbours, and in old *Latin*, the term, *hoſtis*, expreſt both a ſtranger and an enemy. This is remark'd by *Cicero*; but by him is aſcribed to the humanity of his anceſtors, who ſoftened, as much as poſſible, the denomination of an enemy, by calling him by the ſame appellation which ſignified a ſtranger: *De off.* lib. 2.

'Tis

great equality of fortunes amongſt the inhabitants of the antient republics, where every field, belonging to a different proprietor, was able to maintain a family, and render'd the numbers of citizens very conſiderable, even without trade and manufactures.

BUT tho' the want of trade and manufactures, amongſt a free and very martial people, may *ſometimes* have no other effect than to render the public more powerful; 'tis certain, that, in the common courſe of human affairs, it will have a quite contrary tendency. Sovereigns muſt take mankind as they find them, and cannot pretend to introduce any violent change in their principles and ways of thinking. A long courſe of time, with a variety of accidents and circumſtances, are requiſite to produce thoſe great revolutions, which ſo much diverſify the face of human affairs. And the leſs natural any ſet of principles are, which ſupport a particular ſociety, the more difficulty will a legiſlator meet

'Tis however much more probable, from the manners of the times, that the ferocity of thoſe people was ſo great as to make them regard all ſtrangers as enemies, and call them by the ſame name. It is not, beſides, conſiſtent with the moſt common maxims of policy or of nature, that any ſtate ſhou'd regard its public enemies with a friendly eye, or preſerve any ſuch ſentiments for them as the *Roman* orator would aſcribe to his anceſtors. Not to mention, that the early *Romans* really exerciſed piracy, as we learn from their firſt treaties with *Carthage*, preſerved by *Polybius*, lib. 3. and conſequently, like the *Sallee* and *Algerine* rovers, were actually at war with moſt nations, and a ſtranger and an enemy were with them almoſt ſynonimous.

meet with in raiſing and cultivating them. 'Tis his beſt policy to comply with the common bent of mankind, and give it all the improvements, of which it is ſuſceptible. Now, according to the moſt natural courſe of things, induſtry and arts and trade increaſe the power of the ſovereign as well as the happineſs of the ſubjects; and that policy is violent, which aggrandizes the public by the poverty of individuals. This will eaſily appear from a few conſiderations, which will preſent to us the conſequences of ſloth and barbarity.

WHERE manufactures and mechanic arts are not cultivated, the bulk of the people muſt apply themſelves to agriculture; and if their skill and induſtry increaſe, there muſt ariſe a great ſuperfluity from their labour beyond what ſuffices to maintain them. They have no temptation, therefore, to increaſe their ſkill and induſtry; ſince they cannot exchange that ſuperfluity for any commodities, which may ſerve either to their pleaſure or vanity. A habit of indolence naturally prevails. The greater part of the land lyes uncultivated. What is cultivated, yields not its utmoſt, for want of ſkill or aſſiduity in the farmers. If at any time, the public exigencies require, that great numbers ſhou'd be employed in the public ſervice, the labour of the people furniſhes now no ſuperfluities, by which theſe numbers can be maintain'd. The labourers cannot increaſe their ſkill and induſtry on a ſudden.

Lands

Lands uncultivated cannot be brought into tillage for ſome years. The armies, mean while, muſt either make ſudden and violent conqueſts, or diſband for want of ſubſiſtence. A regular attack or defence, therefore, is not to be expected from ſuch a people, and their ſoldiers muſt be as ignorant and unſkilful as their farmers and manufacturers.

EVERY thing in the world is purchas'd by labour; and our paſſions are the only cauſes of labour. When a nation abounds in manufactures and mechanic arts, the proprietors of land, as well as the farmers, ſtudy agriculture as a ſcience, and redouble their induſtry and attention. The ſuperfluity, which ariſes from their labour, is not loſt; but is exchang'd with the manufacturers for thoſe commodities, which mens luxury now makes them covet. By this means, land furniſhes a great deal more of the neceſſaries of life, than what ſuffices for thoſe who cultivate it. In times of peace and tranquillity, this ſuperfluity goes to the maintenance of manufacturers and the improvers of liberal arts. But 'tis eaſy for the public to convert many of theſe manufacturers into ſoldiers, and maintain them by that ſuperfluity, which ariſes from the labour of the farmers. Accordingly we find, that this is the caſe in all civiliz'd governments. When the ſovereign raiſes an army, what is the conſequence? He impoſes a tax. This tax obliges all the people to retrench what is leaſt neceſſary to their ſubſiſtence.

Thoſe,

Thoſe, who labour in ſuch commodities, muſt either enliſt in the troops, or turn themſelves to agriculture, and thereby oblige ſome labourers to enliſt for want of buſineſs. And to conſider the matter abſtractly, manufactures increaſe the power of the ſtate only as they ſtore up ſo much labour, and that of a kind, which the public may lay claim to, without depriving any one of the neceſſaries of life. The more labour, therefore, is employ'd beyond mere neceſſaries, the more powerful is any ſtate; ſince the perſons engag'd in that labour may eaſily be converted to the public ſervice. In a ſtate without manufactures, there may be the ſame number of hands; but there is not the ſame quantity of labour, nor of the ſame kind. All the labour is there beſtow'd upon neceſſaries, which can admit of little or no abatement.

THUS the greatneſs of the ſovereign and the happineſs of the ſtate are, in a great meaſure, united with regard to trade and manufactures. 'Tis a violent method, and in moſt caſes impracticable, to oblige the labourer to toil, in order to raiſe from the land more than what ſubſiſts himſelf and family. Furniſh him with manufactures and commodities, and he will do it of himſelf. Afterwards, you will find it eaſy to ſeize ſome part of his ſuperfluous labour, and employ it in the public ſervice, without giving him his wonted return. Being accuſtom'd to labour, he will think this leſs

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grievous, than if, at once, you oblig'd him to an augmentation of labour without any reward. The caſe is the ſame with regard to the other members of the ſtate. The greater is the ſtock of labour of all kinds, the greater quantity may be taken from the heap, without making any ſenſible alteration upon it.

A PUBLIC granary of corn, a ſtore-houſe of cloth, a magazine of arms; all theſe muſt be allow'd to be real riches and ſtrength in any ſtate. Trade and induſtry are really nothing but a ſtock of labour, which, in time of peace and tranquillity, is employ'd for the eaſe and ſatisfaction of individuals, but in the exigencies of ſtate, may, in part, be turn'd to public advantage. Could we convert a city into a kind of fortified camp, and infuſe into each breaſt ſo martial a genius, and ſuch a paſſion for public good as to make every one willing to undergo the greateſt hardſhips for the ſake of the public; theſe affections might now, as in antient times, prove alone a ſufficient ſpur to induſtry, and ſupport the community. It would then be advantageous, as in camps, to baniſh all arts and luxury; and, by reſtrictions on equipage and tables, make the proviſions and forage laſt longer than if the army were loaded with a number of ſuperfluous retainers. But as theſe principles are too diſintereſted and too difficult to ſupport, 'tis requiſite to govern men by other paſſions, and animate them with

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a ſpirit of avarice and induſtry, art and luxury. The camp is, in this caſe, loaded with a ſuperfluous retinue; but the proviſions flow in proportionably larger. The harmony of the whole is ſtill ſupported; and the natural bent of mens minds being more complied with, individuals, as well as the public, find their account in the obſervance of thoſe maxims.

THE ſame method of reaſoning will let us ſee the advantage of *foreign* commerce, in augmenting the power of the ſtate, as well as the riches and happineſs of the ſubjects. It increaſes the ſtock of labour in the nation; and the ſovereign may convert what ſhare of it he finds neceſſary to the ſervice of the public. Foreign trade, by its imports, furniſhes materials for new manufactures. And by its exports, it produces labour in particular commodities, which could not be conſum'd at home. In ſhort, a kingdom, that has a large import and export, muſt abound more with labour, and that upon delicacies and luxuries, than a kingdom, which reſts contented with its native commodities. It is, therefore, more powerful, as well as richer and happier. The individuals reap the benefit of theſe commodities, ſo far as they gratify the ſenſes and appetites. And the public is alſo a gainer, while a greater ſtock of labour is, by this means, ſtor'd up againſt any public exigency; that is, a greater number of laborious men are main-

maintain'd, who may be diverted to the public ſervice, without robbing any one of the neceſſaries, or even the chief conveniencies of life.

If we conſult hiſtory, we ſhall find, that in moſt nations foreign trade has preceded any refinement in home manufactures, and given birth to domeſtic luxury. The temptation is ſtronger to make uſe of foreign commodities, which are ready for uſe, and which are entirely new to us, than to make improvements on any domeſtic commodity, which always advance by ſlow degrees, and never affect us by their novelty. The profit is alſo very great, in exporting what is ſuperfluous at home, and what bears no price, to foreign nations, whoſe ſoil or climate is not favourable to that commodity. Thus men become acquainted with the *pleaſures* of luxury and the *profits* of commerce; and their *delicacy* and *induſtry*, being once awaken'd, carry them to farther improvements, in every branch of domeſtic as well as foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage, which ariſes from a commerce with ſtrangers. It rouſes men from their lethargic indolence; and preſenting the gayer and more opulent part of the nation with objects of luxury, which they never before dream'd of, raiſes in them a deſire of a more ſplendid way of life than what their anceſtors enjoy'd. And, at the ſame time, the few merchants, who poſſeſs the ſecret of this importation and exportation, make exorbitant pro-

profits; and becoming rivals in wealth to the antient nobility, tempt other adventurers to become their rivals in commerce. Imitation ſoon diffuſes all thoſe arts; while domeſtic manufacturers emulate the foreign in their improvements, and work up every home-commodity to the utmoſt perfection, of which it is ſuſceptible. Their own ſteel and iron, in ſuch laborious hands, become equal to the gold and rubies of the *Indies*.

When the affairs of the ſociety are once brought to this ſituation, a nation may loſe moſt of its foreign trade, and yet continue a great and powerful people. If ſtrangers will not take any particular commodity of ours, we muſt ceaſe to labour in it. The ſame hands will turn themſelves towards ſome refinement in other commodities, which may be wanted at home. And there muſt always be materials for them to work upon; till every perſon in the ſtate, who poſſeſſes riches, poſſeſſes as great plenty of home-commodities, and thoſe in as great perfection, as he deſires; which can never poſſibly happen. *China* is repreſented as one of the moſt flouriſhing empires in the world; tho' it has very little commerce beyond its own territories.

It will not, I hope, be conſidered as a ſuperfluous digreſſion, if I here obſerve, that, as the multitude of mechanical arts is advantageous, ſo is the great number of perſons, to whoſe ſhare the pro-

ductions of theſe arts fall. A too great diſproportion among the citizens weakens any ſtate. Every perſon, if poſſible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full poſſeſſion of all the neceſſaries, and many of the conveniencies of life. No-one can doubt, but ſuch an equality is moſt ſuitable to human nature, and diminiſhes much leſs from the *happineſs* of the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It alſo augments the *power of the ſtate*, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impoſitions be paid with much more chearfulneſs. Where the riches are engroſs'd by a few, theſe muſt contribute very largely to the ſupplying the public neceſſities. But when the riches are diſperſt among multitudes, the burthen feels light on every ſhoulder, and the taxes make not a very ſenſible difference on any one's way of living.

ADD to this, that where the riches are in few hands, theſe muſt enjoy all the power, and will readily conſpire to lay the whole burthen on the poor, and oppreſs them ſtill farther, to the diſcouragement of all induſtry.

IN this circumſtance conſiſts the great advantage of *England* above any nation at preſent in the world, or that appears in the records of any ſtory. 'Tis true, the *Engliſh* feel ſome diſadvantages in foreign trade by the high price of labour, which is in part the effect of the riches of their artizans, as well as of the

the plenty of money: But as foreign trade is not the moſt material circumſtance, 'tis not to be put in competition with the happineſs of ſo many millions. And if there were no more to endear to them that free government, under which they live, this alone were ſufficient. The poverty of the common people is a natural, if not an infallible conſequence of abſolute monarchy; tho' I doubt, whether it be always true, on the other hand, that their riches are an infallible conſequence of liberty. That ſeems to depend on particular accidents and a certain turn of thinking, in conjunction with liberty. My lord *Bacon*, accounting for the great advantages obtain'd by the *Engliſh* in their wars with *France*, aſcribes them chiefly to the ſuperior eaſe and plenty of the common people, amongſt the former; yet the governments of the two kingdoms were, at that time, pretty much alike. Where the labourers and artizans are accuſtom'd to work for low wages, and to retain but a ſmall part of the fruits of their labour, 'tis difficult for them, even in a free government, to better their condition, or conſpire among themſelves to heighten their wages. But even where they are accuſtom'd to a more plentiful way of life, 'tis eaſy for the rich, in a deſpotic government, to conſpire againſt *them*, and throw the whole burthen of the taxes on their ſhoulders.

It may ſeem an odd poſition, that the poverty of the common people in *France*, *Italy*, and *Spain* is, in ſome meaſure, owing to the ſuperior riches of the ſoil and happineſs of the climate; and yet there want not many reaſons to juſtify this paradox. In ſuch a fine mold or ſoil as that of thoſe more ſouthern regions, agriculture is an eaſy art; and one man, with a couple of ſorry horſes, will be able, in a ſeaſon, to cultivate as much land as will pay a pretty conſiderable rent to the proprietor. All the art, which the farmer knows, is to leave his ground fallow for a year, as ſoon as it is exhauſted; and the warmth of the ſun alone and temperature of the climate enrich it, and reſtore its fertility. Such poor peaſants, therefore, require only a ſimple maintenance for their labour. They have no ſtock nor riches, which claim more; and at the ſame time, they are for ever dependent on their landlord, who gives no leaſes, nor fears that his land will be ſpoil'd by the ill methods of cultivation. In *England*, the land is rich, but coarſe; muſt be cultivated at a great expence; and produces ſlender crops, when not carefully manag'd, and by a method, which gives not the full profit but in a courſe of ſeveral years. A farmer, therefore, in *England* muſt have a conſiderable ſtock and a long leaſe; which beget proportional profits. The fine vineyards of *Champagne* and *Burgundy*, that oft yield to the landlord above five pounds *per* acre,

acre, are cultivated by peaſants, who have ſcarce bread: And the reaſon is, that ſuch peaſants need no ſtock but their own limbs, along with inſtruments of husbandry, which they can buy for 20 ſhillings. The farmers are commonly in ſome better circumſtances in thoſe countries. But the graziers are moſt at their eaſe of all thoſe, who cultivate the land. The reaſon is ſtill the ſame. Men muſt have profits proportionable to their expence and hazard. Where ſo conſiderable a number of the labouring poor as the peaſants and farmers, are in very low circumſtances, all the reſt muſt partake of their poverty, whether the government of that nation be monarchical or republican.

We may form a ſimilar remark with regard to the general hiſtory of mankind. What is the reaſon, why no people living betwixt the tropics cou'd ever yet attain to any art or civility, or reach even any police in their government and any military diſcipline; while few nations in the temperate climates have been altogether depriv'd of theſe advantages? 'Tis probable, that one cauſe of this phænomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the torrid zone, that render cloaths and houſes leſs requiſite for the inhabitants, and thereby remove, in part, that neceſſity, which is the great ſpur to induſtry and invention. *Curis acuens mortalia corda.* Not to mention, that the fewer goods or poſſeſſions of this kind any people enjoy, the

the fewer quarrels are likely to arise amongst them; and the less necessity will there be for a settled police or regular authority to protect and defend them from foreign enemies or from each other.

DIS-

# DISCOURSE II.

## *Of Luxury.*

LUXURY is a word of a very uncertain ſignification, and may be taken in a good as well as a bad ſenſe. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the ſenſes; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age or country or condition of the perſon. The bounds betwixt the virtue and the vice cannot here be fixt exactly, more than in other moral ſubjects. To imagine, that the gratifying any of the ſenſes, or the indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel is, of itſelf, a vice, can never enter into any head, that is not diſorder'd by the frenzies of a fanatical enthuſiaſm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, becauſe the windows of his cell open'd upon a very noble proſpect, made a *covenant with his eyes* never to turn that way, or receive ſo ſenſual a gratification. And ſuch is the crime of drinking *Champagne* or *Burgundy*, preferably to ſmall beer or porter. Theſe indulgences are only vices, when they are purſu'd at the expence of ſome virtue, as liberality or charity: In like manner, as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himſelf to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon

no

no virtue, but leave ample ſubject, whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generoſity or compaſſion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledg'd ſuch by almoſt all moraliſts. To be entirely occupy'd with the luxury of the table, for inſtance, without any reliſh for the pleaſures of ambition, ſtudy or converſation, is a mark of groſs ſtupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius. To confine one's expence entirely to ſuch a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart entirely devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man reſerve time ſufficient for all laudable purſuits, and money ſufficient for all generous purpoſes, he is free from every ſhadow of blame or reproach.

SINCE luxury may be conſider'd, either as innocent or blameable, one may be ſurpris'd at thoſe prepoſterous opinions, which have been entertain'd concerning it; while men of libertine principles beſtow praiſes even on vitious luxury, and repreſent it as highly advantageous to ſociety; and on the other hand, men of ſevere morals blame even the moſt innocent luxury, and repreſent it as the ſource of all the corruptions, diſorders, and factions, incident to civil government. We ſhall here endeavour to correct both theſe extremes, by proving, *firſt*, that the ages of refinement and luxury are both the happieſt and moſt virtuous; *ſecondly*, that

that wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial, and when carry'd a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, tho' perhaps not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

To prove the firſt point, we need but conſider the effects of luxury both on *private* and on *public* life. Human happineſs, according to the moſt receiv'd notions, ſeems to conſiſt in three ingredients, action, pleaſure, and indolence; and tho' theſe ingredients ought to be mixt in different proportions, according to the particular diſpoſitions of the perſon, yet no one ingredient can be entirely wanting, without deſtroying, in ſome meaſure, the reliſh of the whole compoſition. Indolence or repoſe, indeed, ſeems not, of itſelf, to contribute much to our enjoyment; but like ſleep, is requiſite as an indulgence to the weakneſs of human nature, which cannot ſupport an uninterrupted courſe of buſineſs or pleaſure. That quick march of the ſpirits, which takes a man from himſelf, and chiefly gives ſatisfaction, does in the end exhauſt the mind, and requires ſome intervals of repoſe, which, tho' agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolong'd, beget a languor and lethargy, that deſtroy all enjoyment. Education, cuſtom, and example have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of theſe purſuits; and it muſt be own'd, that, where they promote a reliſh for action and pleaſure, they are ſo far favourable to human happineſs. In times,

when induſtry and arts flouriſh, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the occupation itſelf, as well as thoſe pleaſures, which are the fruits of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by an aſſiduity in honeſt induſtry, both ſatisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly ſpring up, when nouriſh'd with eaſe and idleneſs. Baniſh thoſe arts from ſociety, you deprive men both of action and of pleaſure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even deſtroy the reliſh of indolence, which never is agreeable, but when it ſucceeds to labour, and recruits the ſpirits, exhauſted by too much application and fatigue.

ANOTHER advantage of induſtry and of refinements in the mechanical arts is, that they commonly produce ſome refinements in the liberal arts; nor can the one be carried to perfection, without being accompany'd, in ſome degree, with the other. The ſame age, which produces great philoſophers and politicians, renown'd generals and poets, uſually abounds with ſkilful weavers and ſhip-carpenters. We cannot reaſonably expect, that a piece of woolen cloth will be wrought to perfection in a nation, that is ignorant of aſtronomy, or where ethics are neglected. The ſpirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once rous'd from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation,

tation, turn themſelves on all ſides, and carry improvements into every art and ſcience. Profound ignorance is totally baniſh'd, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleaſures of the mind as well as thoſe of the body.

THE more theſe refin'd arts advance, the more ſociable do men become; nor is it poſſible, that, when enrich'd with ſcience, and poſſeſt of a fund of converſation, they ſhould be contented to remain in ſolitude, or live with their fellow citizens in that diſtant manner, which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to ſhow their wit or their breeding; their taſte in converſation or living, in cloaths or furniture. Curioſity allures the wiſe: Vanity the fooliſh: And pleaſure both. Particular clubs and ſocieties are every where form'd: Both ſexes meet in an eaſy and ſociable manner, and mens tempers, as well as behaviour, refine a-pace. So that beſide the improvements they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, 'tis impoſſible but they muſt feel an increaſe of humanity, from the very habit of converſing together, and contributing to each other's pleaſure and entertainment. Thus *induſtry*, *knowledge*, and *humanity* are linkt together by an indiſſoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well

well as reaſon, to be peculiar to the more poliſh'd and luxurious ages.

NOR are theſe advantages attended with diſadvantages, that bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleaſure, the leſs will they indulge in exceſſes of any kind; becauſe nothing is more deſtructive to true pleaſure than ſuch exceſſes. One may ſafely affirm, that the *Tartars* are oftner guilty of beaſtly gluttony, when they feaſt on their dead horſes, than *European* courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed, be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry, drunkenneſs, on the other hand, is much leſs common: A vice more odious and more pernicious both to mind and body. And in this matter I would appeal not only to an *Ovid* or a *Petronius*, but to a *Seneca* or a *Cato*. We know, that *Cæſar*, during *Cataline*'s conſpiracy, being neceſſitated to put into *Cato*'s hands a *billet-doux*, which diſcover'd an intrigue with *Servilia*, *Cato*'s own ſiſter, that ſtern philoſopher threw it back to him with indignation, and in the bitterneſs of his wrath gave him the appellation of drunkard, as a term more opprobrious than that with which he cou'd more juſtly have reproach'd him.

BUT induſtry, knowledge, and humanity are not advantageous in private life alone: They diffuſe their beneficial influence on the *Public*, and render the

the government as great and flouriſhing as they make individuals happy and proſperous. The encreaſe and conſumption of all the commodities, which ſerve to the ornament and pleaſure of life, are advantageous to ſociety; becauſe at the ſame time that they multiply thoſe innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of *ſtore-houſe* of labour, which, in the exigencies of ſtate, may be turn'd to the public ſervice. In a nation, where there is no demand for ſuch ſuperfluities, men ſink into indolence, loſe all the enjoyment of life, and are uſeleſs to the public, which cannot maintain nor ſupport its fleets and armies, from the induſtry of ſuch ſlothful members.

THE bounds of all the *European* kingdoms are, at preſent, pretty near the ſame they were two hundred years ago: But what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of thoſe kingdoms? Which can be aſcrib'd to nothing but the encreaſe of art and induſtry. When *Charles* the VIII. of *France* invaded *Italy*, he carry'd with him about 20,000 men: And yet this armament ſo exhauſted the nation, as we learn from *Guicciardin*, that for ſome years it was not able to make ſo great an effort. The late king of *France*, in time of war, kept in pay above 400,000 men;* tho' from *Mazarine*'s death to his own he was engag'd in a courſe of wars, that laſted near thirty years.

THIS

* The inſcription on the *Place-de-Vendome* ſays 440,000.

THIS induſtry is much promoted by the knowledge, inſeparable from the ages of arts and luxury; as on the other hand, this knowledge enables the public to make the beſt advantage of the induſtry of its ſubjects. Laws, order, police, diſcipline; theſe can never be carry'd to any degree of perfection, before human reaſon has refin'd itſelf by exerciſe, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at leaſt, of commerce and manufactures. Can we expect, that a government will be well model'd by a people, who know not how to make a ſpinning wheel, or to employ a loom to advantage? Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infeſted with ſuperſtition, which throws the government off its bias, and diſturbs men in the purſuit of their intereſt and happineſs.

KNOWLEDGE in the arts of government naturally begets mildneſs and moderation, by inſtructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and ſeverity, which drive ſubjects into rebellion, and render the return to ſubmiſſion impracticable, by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When mens temper is ſoften'd as well as their knowledge improv'd, this humanity appears ſtill more conſpicuous, and is the chief characteriſtic, that diſtinguiſhes a civiliz'd age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then leſs inveterate; revolutions leſs tragical; authority leſs ſevere; and

and ſeditions leſs frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and intereſt ſteel men againſt compaſſion as well as fear, the combatants diveſt themſelves of the brute, and reſume the man.

Nor need we fear, that men, by loſing their ferocity, will loſe their martial ſpirit, or become leſs undaunted and vigorous in defence of their country or their liberty. The arts have no ſuch effect in enervating either the mind or body. On the contrary, induſtry, their inſeparable attendant, adds new force to both. And if anger, which is ſaid to be the whetſtone of courage, loſes ſomewhat of its aſperity, by politeneſs and refinement; a ſenſe of honour, which is a ſtronger, more conſtant, and more governable principle, acquires freſh vigour by that elevation of genius, which ariſes from knowledge and a good education. Add to this, that courage can neither have any duration, nor be of any uſe, when not accompany'd with diſcipline and martial ſkill, which are ſeldom found among a barbarous people. The antients remark'd that *Datames* was the only barbarian that ever knew the art of war. And *Pyrrhus* ſeeing the *Romans* marſhal their army with ſome art and ſkill, ſaid with ſurprize *Theſe barbarians have nothing barbarous in their diſcipline!* 'Tis obſervable, that as the old *Romans*, by applying themſelves ſolely to war, were the only unciviliz'd people that ever

ever poſſeſt military diſcipline; ſo the modern *Italians* are the only civiliz'd people, among *Europeans*, that ever wanted courage and a martial ſpirit. Thoſe who wou'd aſcribe this effeminacy of the *Italians* to their luxury or politeneſs, or application to the arts, need but conſider the *French* and *Engliſh*, whoſe bravery is as unconteſtable as their love of luxury, and their aſſiduity in commerce. The *Italian* hiſtorians give us a more ſatisfactory reaſon for this degeneracy of their countrymen. They ſhew us how the ſword was dropt at once by all the *Italian* ſovereigns; while the *Venetian* ariſtocracy was jealous of its ſubjects, the *Florentine* democracy apply'd itſelf entirely to commerce; *Rome* was govern'd by prieſts, and *Naples* by women. War then became the buſineſs of ſoldiers of fortune, who ſpar'd one another, and to the aſtoniſhment of the world, cou'd engage a whole day in what they call'd a battle, and return at night to their camps without the leaſt bloodſhed.

WHAT has chiefly induc'd ſevere moraliſts to declaim againſt luxury and refinement in pleaſure is the example of antient *Rome*, which, joining, to its poverty and ruſticity, virtue and public ſpirit, roſe to ſuch a ſurpriſing height of grandeur and liberty; but having learn'd from its conquer'd provinces the *Grecian* and *Aſiatic* luxury, fell into every kind of corruption; whence aroſe ſedition and civil wars, attended at laſt with the total loſs of liberty.

berty. All the *Latin* claſſics, whom we peruſe in our infancy, are full of theſe ſentiments, and univerſally aſcribe the ruin of their ſtate to the arts and riches imported from the Eaſt: inſomuch that *Salluſt* repreſents a taſte for painting as a vice no leſs than lewdneſs and drinking. And ſo popular were theſe ſentiments during the latter ages of the republic, that this author abounds in praiſes of the old rigid *Roman* virtue, tho' himſelf the moſt egregious inſtance of modern luxury and corruption; ſpeaks contemptuouſly of *Grecian* eloquence, tho' the moſt elegant writer in the world; nay, employs prepoſterous digreſſions and declamations to this purpoſe, tho' a model of taſte and correctneſs.

But it would be eaſy to prove, that theſe writers miſtook the cauſe of the diſorders in the *Roman* ſtate, and aſcrib'd to luxury and the arts what really proceeded from an ill model'd government, and the unlimited extent of conqueſts. Luxury or refinement on pleaſure has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The value, which all men put upon any particular pleaſure, depends on compariſon and experience; nor is a porter leſs greedy of money, which he ſpends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier, who purchaſes champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times and to all men, becauſe they always purchaſe pleaſures, ſuch as men are accuſtom'd to and deſire; nor can any thing reſtrain or regulate the love of money but

a ſenſe of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound moſt in ages of luxury and knowledge.

OF all *European* kingdoms, *Poland* ſeems the moſt defective in the arts of war as well as peace, mechanical as well as liberal; and yet 'tis there that venality and corruption do moſt prevail. The nobles ſeem to have preſerv'd their crown elective for no other purpoſe, but regularly to ſell it to the higheſt bidder. This is almoſt the only ſpecies of commerce, with which that people are acquainted.

THE liberties of *England*, ſo far from decaying ſince the origin of luxury and the arts, have never flouriſh'd ſo much as during that period. And tho' corruption may ſeem to encreaſe of late years; this is chiefly to be aſcrib'd to our eſtabliſh'd liberty, when our princes have found the impoſſibility of governing without parliaments, or of terrifying parliaments by the fantom of prerogative. Not to mention, that this corruption or venality prevails infinitely more among the electors than the elected; and therefore cannot juſtly be aſcrib'd to any refinements in luxury.

IF we conſider the matter in a proper light, we ſhall find, that luxury and the arts are rather favourable to liberty, and have a natural tendency to preſerve, if not produce a free government. In rude

rude unpoliſh'd nations, where the arts are neglected, all the labour is beſtow'd on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole ſociety divides into two claſſes, proprietors of land, and their vaſſals or tenants. The latter are neceſſarily dependent and fitted for ſlavery and ſubjection; eſpecially where they poſſeſs no riches, and are not valu'd for their knowledge in agriculture; as muſt always be the caſe where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themſelves into petty tyrants; and muſt either ſubmit to an abſolute maſter for the ſake of peace and order; or if they will preſerve their independency, like the *Gothic* barons, they muſt fall into feuds and conteſts amongſt themſelves, and throw the whole ſociety into ſuch confuſion as is perhaps worſe than the moſt deſpotic government. But where luxury nouriſhes commerce and induſtry, the peaſants, by a proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradeſmen and merchants acquire a ſhare of the property, and draw authority and conſideration to that middling rank of men; who are the beſt and firmeſt baſis of public liberty. Theſe ſubmit not to ſlavery, like the poor peaſants, from poverty and meanneſs of ſpirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the ſake of that gratification, to ſubmit to the tyranny of their ſovereign. They covet equal laws, which may ſecure their property,

ty, and preſerve them from monarchical, as well as ariſtocratical tyranny.

THE houſe of commons is the ſupport of our popular government; and all the world acknowledge, that it ow'd its chief influence and conſideration to the encreaſe of commerce, which threw ſuch a balance of property into the hands of the commons. How inconſiſtent, then, is it to blame ſo violently luxury, or a refinement in the arts, and to repreſent it as the bane of liberty and public ſpirit!

To declaim againſt preſent times, and magnify the virtue of remote anceſtors, is a propenſity almoſt inherent in human nature; and as the ſentiments and opinions of civiliz'd ages alone are tranſmitted to poſterity, hence it is that we meet with ſo many ſevere judgments pronounc'd againſt luxury and even ſcience, and hence it is that at preſent we give ſo ready an aſſent to them. But the fallacy is eaſily perceiv'd from comparing different nations that are contemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better ſet in oppoſition thoſe manners with which we are ſufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the moſt pernicious and moſt odious of all vices, ſeem peculiar to unciviliz'd ages; and by the refin'd *Greeks* and *Romans* were aſcrib'd to all the barbarous nations, which ſurrounded them. They might

might juſtly, therefore, have preſum'd, that their own anceſtors, ſo highly celebrated, poſſeſt no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their poſterity in honour and humanity as in taſte and ſcience. An antient *Frank* or *Saxon* may be highly extoll'd: But I believe every man would think his life or fortune much leſs ſecure in the hands of a *Moor* or *Tartar*, than in thoſe of a *French* or *Engliſh* gentleman, the rank of men the moſt civiliz'd, in the moſt civiliz'd nations.

We come now to the *ſecond* poſition, which we propos'd to illuſtrate, *viz.* that as innocent luxury or a refinement in pleaſure is advantageous to the public; ſo wherever luxury ceaſes to be innocent, it alſo ceaſes to be beneficial, and when carry'd a degree farther, begins to be a quality pernicious, tho', perhaps, not the moſt pernicious, to political ſociety.

Let us conſider what we call vicious luxury. No gratification, however ſenſual, can, of itſelf, be eſteem'd vicious. A gratification is only vicious, when it engroſſes all a man's expence, and leaves no ability for ſuch acts of duty and generoſity as are requir'd by his ſituation and fortune. Suppoſe, that he correct the vice, and employ part of his expence in the education of his children, in the ſupport of his friends, and in relieving the poor; would any prejudice reſult to ſociety? On the contrary,

trary, the ſame conſumption would ariſe; and that labour, which, at preſent, is employ'd only in producing a ſlender gratification to one man, would relieve the neceſſitous, and beſtow ſatisfaction on hundreds. The ſame care and toil, which raiſe a diſh of peas at *Chriſtmas*, would give bread to a whole family during ſix months. To ſay, that, without a vicious luxury, the labour would not have been employ'd at all, is only to ſay, that there is ſome other defect in human nature, ſuch as indolence, ſelfiſhneſs, inattention to others, for which luxury, in ſome meaſure, provides a remedy; as one poiſon may be an antidote to another. But virtue, like wholeſome food, is better than poiſons, however corrected.

SUPPOSE the ſame number of men, that are, at preſent, in *Britain*, with the ſame ſoil and climate; I ask, is it not poſſible for them to be happier, by the moſt perfect way of life, that can be imagin'd, and by the greateſt reformation, which omnipotence itſelf could work in their temper and diſpoſition? To aſſert, that they cannot, appears evidently ridiculous. As the land is able to maintain more than all its inhabitants, they cou'd never, in ſuch an *Utopian* ſtate, feel any other ills, than thoſe which ariſe from bodily ſickneſs; and theſe are not the half of human miſeries. All other ills ſpring from ſome vice, either in ourſelves or others; and even many of our diſeaſes proceed from the ſame origin,

origin. Remove the vices, and the ills follow. You muſt only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you may render the matter worſe. By baniſhing *vicious* luxury, without curing ſloth and an indifference to others, you only diminiſh induſtry in the ſtate, and add nothing to mens charity or their generoſity. Let us, therefore, reſt contented with aſſerting, that two oppoſite vices in a ſtate may be more advantageous than either of them alone; but let us never pronounce vice, in it ſelf, advantageous. Is it not very inconſiſtent for an author to aſſert in one page, that moral diſtinctions are inventions of politicians for public intereſt; and in the next page maintain, that vice is advantageous to the public? * And indeed, it ſeems, upon any ſyſtem of morality, little leſs than a contradiction in terms, to talk of a vice, that is in general beneficial to ſociety.

I THOUGHT this reaſoning neceſſary, in order to give ſome light to a philoſophical queſtion, which has been much diſputed in *Britain*. I call it a *philoſophical* queſtion, not a *political* one. For whatever may be the conſequence of ſuch a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them with every ſpecies of virtue, and free them from every vice, this concerns not the magiſtrate, who aims only at poſſibilities. He cannot cure every vice, by ſubſtituting a virtue in its place. Very

* Fable of the bees.

ry often he can only cure one vice by another; and in that caſe, he ought to prefer what is leaſt pernicious to ſociety. Luxury, when exceſſive, is the ſource of many ills; but is in general preferable to ſloth and idleneſs, which wou'd commonly ſucceed in its place, and are more pernicious both to private perſons and to the public. When ſloth reigns, a mean uncultivated way of life prevails amongſt individuals, without ſociety, without enjoyment. And if the ſovereign, in ſuch a ſituation, demands the ſervice of his ſubjects, the labour of the ſtate ſuffices only to furniſh the neceſſaries of life to the labourers, and can afford nothing to thoſe, who are employ'd in the public ſervice.

# DISCOURSE III.

## *Of Money.*

MONEY is not, properly ſpeaking, one of the ſubjects of commerce; but only the inſtrument, which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. 'Tis none of the wheels of trade: 'Tis the oil, which renders the motion of the wheels more ſmooth and eaſy. If we conſider any one kingdom by itſelf, 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs plenty of money is of no conſequence; ſince the prices of commodities are always proportion'd to the plenty of money, and a crown in *Harry* the VII's. time ſerv'd the ſame purpoſe as a pound does at preſent. 'Tis only the *public*, that draws any advantage from the greater plenty of money; and that only in its wars and negociations with foreign ſtates. And this is the reaſon, why all rich and trading countries, from *Carthage* to *Britain* and *Holland*, have employ'd mercenary troops, which they hir'd from their poorer neighbours. Were they to make uſe of their native ſubjects, they would find leſs advantage from their ſuperior riches, and from their great plenty of gold and ſilver; ſince the pay of all their ſervants muſt riſe in proportion to the public opulence. Our ſmall army in *Britain*

of 20,000 men are maintain'd at as great expence as a *French* army thrice as numerous. The *Engliſh* fleet, during the late war, requir'd as much money to ſupport it as all the *Roman* legions, which kept the whole world in ſubjection, during the time of the emperors *.

THE greater number of people and their greater induſtry are ſerviceable in all caſes; at home and abroad, in private and in public. But the greater plenty of money is very limited in its uſe, and may even ſometimes be a loſs to a nation in its commerce with foreigners.

THERE

* A PRIVATE ſoldier in the *Roman* infantry had a denarius a day, ſomewhat leſs than 8 pence. The *Roman* emperors had commonly 25 legions in pay, which, allowing 5000 men to a legion, makes 125,000. *Tacit. ann. lib.* 4. 'Tis true, there were alſo auxiliaries to the legions; but their numbers are uncertain as well as their pay. To conſider only the legionaries, the pay of the private men could not exceed 1600,000 pound. Now the parliament in the laſt war commonly allow'd for the fleet 2500,000. We have therefore 900,000 over for the officers and other expences of the *Roman* legions. There ſeem to have been but few officers in the *Roman* armies, in compariſon of what are employ'd in all our modern troops, except ſome *Swiſs* corps: And theſe officers had very ſmall pay: A centurion, for inſtance, only double a common ſoldier. And as the ſoldiers from their pay (*Tacit. ann. lib.* 1.) bought their own cloaths, arms, tents and baggage; this muſt alſo diminiſh conſiderably the other charges of the army. So little expenſive was that mighty government, and ſo eaſy was its yoke over the world. And indeed, this is the more natural concluſion from the foregoing calculations. For money, after the conqueſt of *Egypt*, ſeems to have been nearly in as great plenty at *Rome*, as it is at preſent in the richeſt of the *European* kingdoms.

THERE ſeems to be a happy concurrence of cauſes in human affairs, which check the growth of trade and riches, and hinder them from being confin'd entirely to one people; as might naturally at firſt be dreaded from the advantages of an eſtabliſh'd commerce. Where one nation has got the ſtart of another in trade, 'tis very difficult for the latter to regain the ground it has loſt; becauſe of the ſuperior induſtry and skill of the former, and the greater ſtocks, which its merchants are poſſeſt of, and which enable them to trade for ſo much ſmaller profits. But theſe advantages are compenſated, in ſome meaſure, by the low prices of labour in every nation, that has not an extenſive commerce, and does not very much abound in gold and ſilver. Manufactures, therefore, gradually ſhift their places, leaving thoſe countries and provinces, which they have already enrich'd, and flying to others, whither they are allur'd by the cheapneſs of proviſions and labour; till they have enrich'd theſe alſo, and are again baniſh'd by the ſame cauſes. And in general, we may obſerve, that the dearneſs of every thing, from plenty of money, is a diſadvantage, that attends an eſtabliſh'd commerce, and ſets bounds to it in every country, by enabling the poorer ſtates to underſell the richer in all foreign markets.

THIS has made me entertain a great doubt concerning the benefit of *banks* and *paper credit*, which are

are ſo generally eſteem'd advantageous to every nation. That proviſions and labour ſhou'd become dear by the encreaſe of trade and money, is, in many reſpects, an inconvenience; but an inconvenience that is unavoidable, and the effect of that public wealth and proſperity, which are the end of all our wiſhes. 'Tis compenſated by the advantages we reap from the poſſeſſion of theſe precious metals, and the weight which they give the nation in all foreign wars and negotiations. But there appears no reaſon for encreaſing that inconvenience by a counterfeit money, which foreigners will never accept of, and which any great diſorder in the ſtate will reduce to nothing. There are, 'tis true, many people in every rich ſtate, who, having large ſums of money, wou'd prefer paper with good ſecurity; as being of more eaſy tranſport and more ſafe cuſtody. If the public provide not a bank, private bankers will take advantage of this circumſtance; as the goldſmiths formerly did in *London*, or as the bankers do at preſent in *Dublin*: And therefore 'tis better, it may be thought, that a public company ſhould enjoy the benefit of that paper credit, which always will have place in every opulent kingdom. But to endeavour artificially to encreaſe ſuch a credit, can never be the intereſt of any trading nation; but muſt lay them under diſadvantages, by encreaſing money beyond its natural proportion to labour and commodities, and thereby heightening their price to the merchant

and

and manufacturer. And in this view, it muſt be allow'd, that no bank cou'd be more advantageous than ſuch a one as lockt up all the money it receiv'd, and never augmented the circulating coin, as is uſual, by returning part of its treaſure into commerce. A public bank, by this expedient, might cut off much of the dealings of private bankers and money jobbers; and tho' the ſtate bore the charge of ſalaries to the directors and tellers of this bank, (for according to the preceeding ſuppoſition, it would have no profit from its dealings) the national advantage, reſulting from the low price of labour and the deſtruction of paper credit, would be a ſufficient compenſation. Not to mention, that ſo large a ſum, lying ready at command, would be a great convenience in times of public danger and diſtreſs; and might be replac'd at leiſure, when peace and tranquillity were reſtor'd to the nation.

BUT of this ſubject of paper credit, we ſhall treat more largely hereafter. And I ſhall finiſh this eſſay of money, by propoſing and explaining two obſervations, which may, perhaps, ſerve to employ the thought of our ſpeculative politicians. For to theſe only I all along addreſs myſelf. 'Tis enough that I ſubmit to the ridicule ſometimes, in this age, attach'd to the character of a philoſopher, without adding to it that which belongs to a projector.

I. 'TWAS

I. 'TWAS a ſhrewd obſervation of *Anacharſis** the *Scythian*, who had never ſeen money in his own country, that gold and ſilver ſeem'd to him of no uſe to the *Greeks*, but to aſſiſt them in numeration and arithmetic. 'Tis indeed evident, that money is nothing but the repreſentation of labour and commodities, and ſerves only as a method of rating or eſtimating them. Where coin is in greater plenty; as a greater quantity of it is then requir'd to repreſent the ſame quantity of goods; it can have no effect, either good or bad, taking a nation within itſelf: no more than it wou'd make any alteration on a merchant's books, if inſtead of the *Arabian* method of notation, which requires few characters, he ſhou'd make uſe of the *Roman*, which requires a great many. Nay the greater plenty of money, like the *Roman* characters, is rather inconvenient and troubleſome; and requires greater care to keep and tranſport it. But notwithſtanding this concluſion, which muſt be allowed juſt, 'tis certain, that ſince the diſcovery of the mines in *America*, induſtry has encreas'd in all the nations of *Europe*, except in the poſſeſſors of thoſe mines; and this may juſtly be aſcrib'd, amongſt other reaſons, to the encreaſe of gold and ſilver. Accordingly we find, that in every kingdom, into which money begins to flow in greater abundance than formerly, every thing takes a new face; labour and induſtry

* Plut. *Quomodo quis ſuos profectus in virtute ſentire poſſit.*

induſtry gain life; the merchant becomes more enterprizing; the manufacturer more diligent and ſkillful; and even the farmer follows his plough with greater alacrity and attention. This is not eaſily to be accounted for, if we conſider only the influence, which a greater abundance of coin has in the kingdom itſelf, by heightening the price of commodities, and obliging every one to pay a greater number of theſe little yellow or white pieces for every thing he purchaſes. And as to foreign trade, it appears, that great plenty of money is rather diſadvantageous, by raiſing the price of every kind of labour.

To account, then, for this phænomenon, we muſt conſider, that tho' the high price of commodities be a neceſſary conſequence of the encreaſe of gold and ſilver, yet it follows not immediately upon that encreaſe; but ſome time is requir'd before the money circulate thro' the whole ſtate, and make its effects be felt on all ranks of people. At firſt, no alteration is perceiv'd; by degrees, it raiſes the price firſt of one commodity, then of another; till the whole at laſt riſes to a juſt proportion, with the new quantity of ſpecie, which is in the kingdom. In my opinion, 'tis only in this interval or intermediate ſituation, betwixt the acquiſition of money and riſe of prices, that the encreaſing quantity of gold and ſilver is favourable to induſtry. When any quantity of money is imported into a nation, it is not

not at firſt diſperſt into many hands; but is confin'd to the coffers of a few perſons, who immediately ſeek to employ it to the beſt advantage. Here are a ſet of manufacturers or merchants, we ſhall ſuppoſe, who have receiv'd returns of gold and ſilver for goods, which they ſent to *Cadiz*. They are thereby enabled to employ more workmen than formerly, who never dream of demanding higher wages, but are glad of employment from ſuch good paymaſters. If workmen become ſcarce, the manufacturer gives higher wages; but at firſt requires an encreaſe of labour, and this is willingly ſubmitted to by the artizan, who can now eat and drink better to compenſate his additional toil and fatigue. He carries his money to market, where he finds every thing at the ſame price as formerly, but returns with greater quantity and of better kinds, for the uſe of his family. The farmer and gardener, finding that all their commodities are taken off, apply themſelves with alacrity to the raiſing of more; and at the ſame time, can afford to take better and more cloaths from their tradeſmen, whoſe price is the ſame as formerly, and their induſtry only whetted by ſo much new gain. 'Tis eaſy to trace the money in its progreſs thro' the whole commonwealth; where we ſhall find, that it muſt firſt quicken the diligence of every individual, before it encreaſe the price of labour.

And that the ſpecie may encreaſe to a conſiderable pitch, before it have this latter effect, appears, amongſt other reaſons, from the frequent operations of the *French* king on the money; where it was always found, that the augmenting the numerary value did not produce a proportional riſe of the prices, at leaſt for ſome time. In the laſt year of *Louis* the XIV. money was rais'd three ſevenths, but prices augmented only one. Corn in *France* is now ſold at the ſame price, or for the ſame number of livres, it was in 1683, tho' ſilver was then at 30 livres the mark, and is now at 50.* Not to mention, the



* These facts I give upon the authority of *Monſ. de Tot* in his *Reflections politiques*, an author of reputation. Tho' I muſt confeſs, that the facts, which he advances on other occaſions, are often ſo ſuſpicious as to make his authority leſs in this matter. However, the general obſervation, that the augmenting the money in *France* does not at firſt proportionably augment the prices, is certainly juſt.

By the bye, this ſeems to be one of the beſt reaſons for a gradual and univerſal augmentation of the money, which can be given, tho' it has been entirely overlook'd in all thoſe volumes, which have been wrote on that queſtion by *Melon*, *Du Tot*, and *Paris de Verney*. Were all our money, for inſtance, recoin'd, and a penny's worth of ſilver taken from every ſhilling, the new ſhilling wou'd probably purchaſe every thing that cou'd have been bought by the old; the prices of every thing wou'd thereby be inſenſibly diminiſh'd; foreign trade enliven'd; and domeſtic induſtry, by the circulation of a greater number of pounds and ſhillings, wou'd receive ſome encreaſe and encouragement. In executing ſuch a project, 'twou'd be better to make the new ſhilling paſs for 24 half-pence, in order to preſerve the illuſion, and make it be taken for the ſame.

great addition of gold and ſilver, which may have come into that kingdom, ſince the former period.

FROM the whole of this reaſoning we may conclude, that 'tis of no manner of conſequence, with regard to the domeſtic happineſs of a ſtate, whether money be in a greater or leſs quantity. The good policy of the magiſtrate conſiſts only in keeping it, if poſſible, ſtill encreaſing; becauſe, by that means, he keeps a ſpirit of induſtry alive in the nation, and encreaſes the ſtock of labour, wherein conſiſts all real power and riches. A nation, whoſe money decreaſes, is actually, at that time, much weaker and more miſerable, than another nation, who poſſeſſes no more money, but is on the encreaſing hand. This will be eaſily accounted for, if we conſider, that the alterations in the quantity of money, either on the one ſide or the other, are not immediately attended with proportionable alterations in the prices of commodities. There is always an interval before matters be adjuſted to their new ſituation; and this interval is as pernicious to induſtry, when gold and ſilver are diminiſhing, as it is advantageous, when theſe metals are encreaſing. The workman has not the ſame employment from the manufacturer and merchant; tho' he pays the ſame price for every thing in the market. The farmer cannot diſpoſe of his corn and cattle; tho' he muſt pay the ſame rent to his landlord. The poverty

poverty and beggary and ſloth, which muſt enſue, are eaſily foreſeen.

II. The *ſecond* obſervation I propos'd to make with regard to money, may be explain'd after the following manner. There are ſome kingdoms, and many provinces in *Europe*, (and all of them were once in the ſame condition) where money is ſo ſcarce, that the landlord can get none at all from his tenants; but is oblig'd to take his rent in kind, and either to conſume it himſelf, or tranſport it to places, where he may find a market. In thoſe countries, the prince can levy few or no taxes, but in the ſame manner: And as he will receive very ſmall benefit from impoſitions ſo pay'd, 'tis evident, that ſuch a kingdom has very little force even at home; and cannot maintain fleets and armies to the ſame extent, as if every part of it abounded in gold and ſilver. There is ſurely a greater diſproportion betwixt the force of *Germany* at preſent and what it was three centuries ago, * than there is in its induſtry, people and manufactures. The *Auſtrian* dominions in the empire are in general well peopled and well cultivated, and are of great extent, but have not a proportionable weight in the balance of *Europe*; proceeding, as is commonly ſuppos'd, from their ſcarcity of money. How do all theſe facts agree with that principle of reaſon,

* The *Italians* gave to the emperor *Maximilian*, the nickname of *Pocchi-danari*. None of the enterpriſes of that prince ever ſucceeded, for want of money.

reaſon, that the quantity of gold and ſilver is in itſelf altogether indifferent? According to that principle, wherever a ſovereign has numbers of ſubjects, and theſe have plenty of commodities, he ſhou'd, of courſe, be great and powerful, and they rich and happy, independent of the greater or leſſer abundance of the precious metals. Theſe admit of diviſions and ſub-diviſions to a great extent; and where they wou'd become ſo ſmall as to be in danger of being loſt, 'tis eaſy to mix them with a baſer metal, as is practis'd in ſome countries of *Europe*; and by that means raiſe them to a bulk more ſenſible and convenient. They ſtill ſerve the ſame purpoſes of exchange, whatever their number may be, or whatever colour they may be ſuppos'd to have.

To theſe difficulties I anſwer, that the effect, here ſuppos'd to flow from ſcarcity of money, really ariſes from the manners and cuſtoms of the inhabitants, and that we miſtake, as is uſual, a collateral effect for a cauſe. The contradiction is only apparent; but it requires ſome thought and reflection to diſcover the principles, by which we can reconcile *reaſon* to *experience*.

It ſeems a maxim almoſt ſelf-evident, that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion betwixt commodities and money, and that any conſiderable alteration on either of theſe has the ſame effect

effect either of heightening or diminiſhing the prices. Encreaſe the commodities, they become cheaper: Encreaſe the money, they riſe in their value. As on the other hand, a diminution of the former, and that of the latter have contrary tendencies.

'Tis alſo evident, that the prices do not ſo much depend on the abſolute quantity of commodities and of money, which are in a nation; as on that of the commodities, which come or may come to market, and of the money, which circulates. If the coin be lockt up in cheſts, 'tis the ſame thing with regard to prices, as if it were annihilated: If the commodities be hoarded in granaries, a like effect follows. As the money and commodities, in theſe caſes, never meet, they cannot affect each other. Were we, at any time, to form conjectures concerning the prices of proviſions, the corn, which the farmer muſt reſerve for the maintenance of himſelf and family, ought never to enter into the eſtimation. 'Tis only the overplus, compar'd to the demand, that determines the value.

To apply theſe principles, we muſt conſider, that in the firſt and more uncultivated ages of any ſtate, e're fancy has confounded her wants with thoſe of nature, men, contented with the productions of their own fields, or with thoſe rude preparations, which they themſelves can work upon them,

them, have little occaſion for exchange, or at leaſt for money, which, by agreement, is the common meaſure of exchange. The wool of the farmer's own flock, ſpun in his own family, and wrought by a neighbouring weaver, who receives his payment in corn or wool, ſuffices for furniture and cloathing. The carpenter, the ſmith, the maſon, the taylor are retain'd by wages of a like nature; and the landlord himſelf, dwelling in the neighbourhood, is contented to receive his rent in the commodities rais'd by the farmer. The greateſt part of theſe he conſumes at home, in ruſtic hoſpitality: The reſt, perhaps, he diſpoſes of for money to the neighbouring town, whence he draws the materials of his expence and luxury.

But after men begin to refine on all theſe enjoyments, and live not always at home, nor are contented with what can be rais'd in their neighbourhood, there is more exchange and commerce of all kinds, and more money enters into that exchange. The tradeſmen will not be paid in corn; becauſe they want ſomething more than barely to eat. The farmer goes beyond his own pariſh for the commodities he purchaſes, and cannot always carry his commodities to the merchant, who ſupplies him. The landlord lives in the capital or in a foreign country; and demands his rent in gold and ſilver, which can eaſily be tranſported to him. Great undertakers and manufacturers and merchants

chants ariſe in every commodity; and theſe can conveniently deal in nothing but in ſpecie. And conſequently, in this ſituation of ſociety, the coin enters into many more contracts, and by that means is much more employ'd than in the former.

THE neceſſary effect is, that provided the money does not encreaſe in the nation, every thing muſt become much cheaper in times of induſtry and refinement, than in rude, uncultivated ages. 'Tis the proportion betwixt the money, that circulates, and the commodities in the market, that determines the prices. Goods, that are conſum'd at home, or exchang'd with other goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they affect not, in the leaſt, the current ſpecie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and conſequently this method of uſing them ſinks the proportion on the ſide of the commodities, and encreaſes the prices. But after money enters into all contracts and ſales, and is every where the meaſure of exchange, the ſame national caſh has a much greater task to perform; all commodities are then in the market; the ſphere of circulation is enlarg'd; 'tis the ſame caſe as if that individual ſum were to ſerve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here diminiſh'd on the ſide of the money, every thing muſt become cheaper, and the prices gradually fall.

By the moſt exact computations, that have been form'd all over *Europe*, after making allowance for the change in the numerary value or the denomination, 'tis found, that the prices of all things have only riſen three, or at moſt four times ſince the diſcovery of the *Weſt Indies*. But will any one aſſert, that there is no more than four times the coin in *Europe*, that was in the fifteenth century and the centuries preceding it? The *Spaniards* and *Portugueſe* from their mines, the *Engliſh*, *French* and *Dutch*, by their *African* trade, and by their interlopers in the *Weſt Indies*, bring home about ſeven millions a year, of which not above a tenth part goes to the *Eaſt Indies*. This ſum alone in five years would probably double the antient ſtock of money in *Europe*. And no other ſatisfactory reaſon can be given, why all prices have not riſen to a much more exorbitant height, except that deriv'd from a change of cuſtoms and manners. Beſides, that more commodities are produc'd by additional induſtry, the ſame commodities come more to market, after men depart from their antient ſimplicity of manners. And tho' this encreaſe has not been equal to that of money, it has, however, been conſiderable, and has preſerv'd the proportion betwixt coin and commodities nearer the antient ſtandard.

Were the queſtion propos'd, which of theſe methods of living in the people, the ſimple or the refin'd,

refin'd, is the moſt advantageous to the ſtate or public, I ſhou'd, without much ſcruple, prefer the latter, in a view to politics at leaſt; and ſhould produce this as an additional reaſon for the encouragement of trade and manufactures.

When men live in the antient ſimple manner, and ſupply all their neceſſities from their domeſtic induſtry or from the neighbourhood, the ſovereign can levy no taxes in money from a conſiderable part of his ſubjects; and if he will impoſe on them any burthens, he muſt take his payment in commodities, with which alone they abound; a method attended with ſuch great and obvious inconveniencies, that they need not here be inſiſted on. All the money he can pretend to raiſe muſt be from his principal cities, where alone it circulates; and theſe, 'tis evident, cannot afford him ſo much as the whole ſtate cou'd, did gold and ſilver circulate thro' the whole. But beſides this obvious diminution of the revenue, there is alſo another cauſe of the poverty of the public in ſuch a ſituation. Not only the ſovereign receives leſs money, but the ſame money goes not ſo far as in times of induſtry and general commerce. Every thing is dearer, where the gold and ſilver are ſuppos'd equal; and that becauſe fewer commodities come to market, and the whole coin bears a higher proportion to what is to be purchas'd by it;

whence alone the prices of every thing are fix'd and determin'd.

HERE then we may learn the fallacy of the remark, often to be met with in hiſtorians, and even in common converſation, that any particular ſtate is weak, tho' fertile, populous, and well cultivated, merely becauſe it wants money. It appears, that the want of money can never injure any ſtate within itſelf: For men and commodities are the real ſtrength of any community. 'Tis the ſimple manner of living which here hurts the public, by confining the gold and ſilver to few hands, and preventing its univerſal diffuſion and circulation. On the contrary, induſtry and refinements of all kinds incorporate it with the whole ſtate, however ſmall its quantity may be: They digeſt it into every vein, ſo to ſpeak; and make it enter into every tranſaction and contract. No hand is entirely empty of it; and as the prices of every thing fall by that means, the ſovereign has a double advantage: He may draw money by his taxes from every part of the ſtate, and what he receives goes farther in every purchaſe and payment.

WE may infer, from a compariſon of prices, that money is not more plentiful in *China*, than it was in *Europe* three centuries ago: But what immenſe power is that empire poſſeſt of, if we may judge by the civil and military liſt, maintain'd by it?

it? *Polybius* * tells us, that proviſions were ſo cheap in *Italy* during his time, that in ſome places the ſtated club in the inns was a *ſemis* a head, little more than a farthing: Yet the *Roman* power had even then ſubdu'd the whole known world. About a century before that period, the *Carthaginian* ambaſſadors ſaid, by way of raillery, that no people liv'd more ſociably amongſt themſelves than the *Romans*; for that in every entertainment, which, as foreign miniſters, they receiv'd, they ſtill obſerv'd the ſame plate at every table.† The abſolute quantity of the precious metals is a matter of great indifference. There are only two circumſtances of any importance, *viz.* their gradual encreaſe, and their thorough concoction and circulation thro' the ſtate; and the influence of both theſe circumſtances has been here explained.

In the following diſcourſe we ſhall ſee an inſtance of a like fallacy, as that above mention'd; where a collateral effect is taken for a cauſe, and where a conſequence is aſcrib'd to the plenty of money; tho' it be really owing to a change in the manners and cuſtoms of the people.

DIS-

* Lib. 2. cap. 15. † *Plin.* lib. 33. cap. 11.

# DISCOURSE IV.

## *Of Intereſt.*

NOTHING is eſteem'd a more certain ſign of the flouriſhing condition of any nation than the lowneſs of intereſt: And with reaſon; tho' I believe the cauſe is ſomewhat different from what is commonly apprehended. The lowneſs of intereſt is generally aſcrib'd to the plenty of money. But money, however plentiful, has no other effect, *if fixt*, than to raiſe the price of labour. Silver is more common than gold; and therefore you receive a greater quantity of it for the ſame commodities: But do you pay leſs intereſt for it? Intereſt in *Batavia* and *Jamaica* is at 10 *per cent.* in *Portugal* at 6; tho' theſe places, as we may learn from the prices of every thing, abound much more in gold and ſilver than either *London* or *Amſterdam.*

WERE all the gold in *England* annihilated at once, and one and twenty ſhillings ſubſtituted in the place of every guinea, wou'd money be more plentiful or intereſt lower? No ſurely: We ſhou'd only uſe ſilver inſtead of gold. Were gold render'd as common as ſilver, and ſilver as common as copper; would money be more plentiful or intereſt

tereſt lower? We may aſſuredly give the ſame anſwer. Our ſhillings would then be yellow, and our half-pence white; and we ſhou'd have no guineas. No other difference wou'd ever be obſerv'd. No alteration on commerce, manufactures, navigation, or intereſt; unleſs we imagine, that the colour of the metal is of any conſequence.

Now what is ſo viſible in theſe greater variations of ſcarcity or abundance of the precious metals, muſt hold in all inferior changes. If the multiplying gold and ſilver fifteen times makes no difference, much leſs can the doubling or tripling them. All augmentation has no other effect than to heighten the price of labour and commodities; and even this variation is little more than that of a name. In the progreſs towards theſe changes, the augmentation may have ſome influence, by exciting induſtry; but after the prices are ſettled, ſuitable to the new abundance of gold and ſilver, it has no manner of influence.

An effect always holds proportion with its cauſe. Prices have riſen about four times, ſince the diſcovery of the *Indies*; and 'tis probable gold and ſilver have multiply'd much more: But intereſt has not fallen much above half. The rate of intereſt, therefore, is not deriv'd from the quantity of the precious metals.

MONEY having merely a fictitious value, ariſing from the agreement and convention of men, the greater or leſs plenty of it is of no conſequence, if we conſider a nation within itſelf; and when once fixt, tho' in never ſo great abundance, it has no other effect, than to oblige every one to tell out a greater number of thoſe ſhining bits of metal, for cloaths, furniture, or equipage, without encreaſing any one convenience of life. If a man borrows money to build a houſe, he then carries home a greater load; becauſe the ſtone, timber, lead, glaſs, *&c.* with the labour of the maſons and carpenters, are repreſented by a greater quantity of gold and ſilver. But as theſe metals are conſider'd merely as repreſentations, there can no alteration ariſe, from their bulk or quantity, their weight or colour, either upon their real value or their intereſt. The ſame intereſt, in all caſes, bears the ſame proportion to the ſum. And if you lent me ſo much labour and ſo many commodities; by receiving five *per cent.* you receive always proportional labour and commodities, however repreſented, whether by yellow or white coin, whether by a pound or an ounce. 'Tis in vain, therefore, to look for the cauſe of the fall or riſe of intereſt in the greater or leſs quantity of gold and ſilver, which is fixt in any nation.

HIGH

HIGH intereſt ariſes from *three* circumſtances: A great demand for borrowing; little riches to ſupply that demand; and great profits ariſing from commerce: And theſe circumſtances are a clear proof of the ſmall advance of commerce and induſtry, not of the ſcarcity of gold and ſilver. Low intereſt, on the other hand, proceeds from the three oppoſite circumſtances: A ſmall demand for borrowing; great riches to ſupply that demand; and ſmall profits ariſing from commerce: And theſe circumſtances are all connected together, and proceed from the encreaſe of induſtry and commerce, not of gold and ſilver. We ſhall endeavour to prove theſe points as fully and diſtinctly as poſſible, and ſhall begin with the cauſes and the effects of a great or ſmall demand for borrowing.

WHEN a people have emerg'd ever ſo little from a ſtate of barbarity, and their numbers have encreas'd beyond the original multitude, there muſt immediately ariſe an inequality of property; and while ſome poſſeſs large tracts of land, others are confin'd within narrow limits, and ſome are entirely without any landed property. Thoſe, who poſſeſs more land than they can labour, employ thoſe who poſſeſs none, and agree to receive a determinate part of the product. Thus the *landed* intereſt is immediately eſtabliſh'd; nor is there any ſettled government, however rude, wherein affairs

affairs are not on this footing. Of theſe proprietors of land, ſome muſt preſently diſcover themſelves to be of different tempers from others; and while one wou'd willingly ſtore up the product of his land for futurity, another deſires to conſume at preſent what ſhou'd ſuffice for many years. But as the ſpending a ſettled revenue is a way of life entirely without occupation; men have ſo much need of ſomewhat to fix and engage them, that pleaſures, ſuch as they are, will be the purſuit of the greateſt part of the landholders, and the prodigals amongſt them will always be more numerous than the miſers. In a ſtate, therefore, where there is nothing but a landed intereſt, as there is little frugality, the borrowers muſt be very numerous, and the rate of intereſt muſt hold proportion to it. The difference depends not on the quantity of money, but on the habits and manners which prevail. By this alone the demand for borrowing is encreas'd or diminiſh'd. Were money ſo plentiful as to make an egg be ſold for ſix-pence; as long as there are only landed gentry and peaſants in the ſtate, the borrowers muſt be numerous, and intereſt high. The rent for the ſame farm wou'd be heavier and more bulky: But the ſame idleneſs of the landlord, with the higher prices of commodities, wou'd diſſipate it in the ſame time, and produce the ſame neceſſity and demand for borrowing.*



* I HAVE been inform'd by a very eminent lawyer and a man of great knowledge and obſervation, that it appears from antient papers

NOR is the caſe different with regard to the *ſecond* circumſtance we propos'd to conſider, *viz.* the great or little riches to ſupply this demand. This effect alſo depends on the habits and ways of living of the people, not on the quantity of gold and ſilver. In order to have, in any ſtate, a great number of lenders, 'tis not ſufficient nor requiſite, that there be great abundance of the precious metals. 'Tis only requiſite, that the property or command of that quantity, which is in the ſtate, whether great or ſmall, ſhould be collected in particular hands, ſo as to form conſiderable ſums, or compoſe a great money'd intereſt. This begets a number of lenders, and ſinks the rate of uſury; and this, I ſhall venture to affirm, depends not on the quantity of ſpecie, but on particular manners and cuſtoms, which make the ſpecie gather into ſeparate ſums or maſſes of conſiderable value.

FOR ſuppoſe, that, by miracle, every man in *Britain* ſhou'd have five pounds ſlipt into his pocket in one night; this wou'd much more than double

papers and records, that, about four centuries ago, money, in *Scotland*, and probably in other parts of *Europe*, was only at five *per cent.* and afterwards roſe to ten before the diſcovery of the *Weſt Indies*. This fact is curious; but might eaſily be reconcil'd to the foregoing reaſoning. Men, in that age, liv'd ſo much at home, and in ſo very ſimple and frugal a manner, that they had no occaſion for money; and tho' the lenders were then few, the borrowers were ſtill fewer. The high rate of intereſt among the early *Romans* is accounted for by hiſtorians from the frequent loſſes ſuſtain'd by the inroads of the enemy.

double the whole money that is at preſent in the kingdom, and yet there would not next day, nor for ſome time, be any more lenders, nor any variation on the intereſt. And were there nothing but landlords and peaſants in the ſtate, this money, however abundant, cou'd never gather into ſums, and wou'd only ſerve to encreaſe the prices of every thing, without any farther conſequence. The prodigal landlord diſſipates it, as faſt as he receives it; and the beggarly peaſant has no means nor view nor ambition of obtaining above a bare livelihood. The overplus of borrowers above that of lenders continuing ſtill the ſame, there will follow no reduction of intereſt. That depends upon another principle, and muſt proceed from an encreaſe of induſtry and frugality, of arts and commerce.

EVERY thing, uſeful to the life of man, ariſes from the ground; but few things ariſe in that condition, which is requiſite to render them uſeful. There muſt, therefore, beſide the peaſants and the proprietors of land, be another rank of men, who, receiving from the former the rude materials, work them into their proper form, and retain part for their own uſe and ſubſiſtence. In the infancy of ſociety, theſe contracts betwixt the artizans and the peaſants, and betwixt one ſpecies of artizan and another, are commonly enter'd into immediately, by the perſons themſelves, who, being neighbours, are readily acquainted with each other's neceſſities, and

and can lend their mutual aſſiſtance to ſupply them. But when mens induſtry encreaſes, and their views enlarge; 'tis found, that the moſt remote parts of the ſtate can aſſiſt each other as well as the more contiguous, and that this intercourſe of good offices may be carry'd on to the greateſt extent and intricacy. Hence the origin of *merchants*, the moſt uſeful race of men in the whole ſociety, who ſerve as agents betwixt thoſe parts of the ſtate, that are wholly unacquainted, and are ignorant of each other's neceſſities. Here are in a city fifty workmen in ſilk and linen and a thouſand cuſtomers; and theſe two ranks of men, ſo neceſſary to each other, can never rightly meet, 'till one man erects a ſhop, to which all the workmen, and all the cuſtomers repair. In this province, graſs riſes in abundance: The inhabitants abound in cheeſe and butter and cattle; but want bread and corn, which, in a neighbouring province, are in too great abundance for the uſes of the inhabitants. One man diſcovers this. He brings corn from the one province, and returns with cattle; and ſupplying the wants of both, he is, ſo far, a common benefactor. As the people encreaſe in numbers and induſtry, the difficulty of their mutual intercourſe encreaſes: The buſineſs of the agency or merchandize becomes more intricate; and divides, ſub-divides, compounds, and mixes to a greater variety. In all theſe tranſactions, 'tis neceſſary and reaſonable, that a conſiderable part of the commodities and labour ſhou'd belong

long to the merchant, to whom, in a great meaſure, they are owing. And theſe commodities he will ſometimes preſerve in kind, or more commonly convert into money, which is their common repreſentation. If gold and ſilver have encreas'd in the ſtate along with induſtry, it will require a great quantity of theſe metals to repreſent a great quantity of commodities and labour. If induſtry alone has encreas'd, the prices of every thing muſt ſink, and a very ſmall quantity of ſpecie will ſerve as a repreſentation.

THERE is no craving or demand of the human mind more conſtant and inſatiable than that for exerciſe and employment; and this deſire ſeems the foundation of moſt of our paſſions and purſuits. Deprive a man of all buſineſs and ſerious occupation, he runs reſtleſs from one amuſement to another; and the weight and oppreſſion, which he feels from idleneſs, is ſo great, that he forgets the ruin, which muſt follow from his immoderate expences. Give him a more harmleſs way of employing his mind or body, he is ſatisfied, and feels no longer that inſatiable thirſt after pleaſure. But if the employment you give him be profitable, eſpecially if the profit be attach'd to every particular exertion of induſtry, he has gain ſo often in his eye, that he acquires, by degrees, a paſſion for it, and knows no ſuch pleaſure as that of ſeeing the daily encreaſe of his fortune. And this is the reaſon why

trade

trade encreaſes frugality, and why, among merchants, there is the ſame overplus of miſers above prodigals, as, among the poſſeſſors of land, there is the contrary.

COMMERCE encreaſes induſtry, by conveying it readily from one member of the ſtate to another, and allowing none of it to periſh or become uſeleſs. It encreaſes frugality, by giving occupation to men, and employing them in the arts of gain, which ſoon engage their affection, and remove them from all reliſh of pleaſure and expence. 'Tis an infallible conſequence of all induſtrious profeſſions to beget frugality, and make the love of gain prevail over the love of pleaſure. Among lawyers and phyſicians, who have any practice, there are many more, who live within their income, than who exceed it, or even live up to it. But lawyers and phyſicians beget no induſtry; and 'tis even at the expence of others they acquire their riches; ſo that they are ſure to diminiſh the poſſeſſions of ſome of their fellow citizens as faſt as they encreaſe their own. Merchants, on the contrary, beget induſtry, by ſerving as canals to convey it thro' every corner of the ſtate; and, at the ſame time, by their frugality, they acquire great power over that induſtry, and collect a large property in the labour and commodities, which they are the chief inſtruments in producing. There is no other profeſſion, therefore, except merchandize, which can make the

the money'd intereſt conſiderable, or in other words, can encreaſe induſtry, and by alſo encreaſing frugality, give a great command of that induſtry to particular members of the ſociety. Without commerce, the ſtate muſt conſiſt chiefly of landed gentry, whoſe prodigality and expence make a continual demand for borrowing; and of peaſants, who have no ſums to ſupply that demand. The money never gathers into large ſtocks or ſums, that can be lent at intereſt. It is diſperſt into numberleſs hands, who either ſquander it in idle ſhow and magnificence, or employ it in the purchaſe of the common neceſſaries of life. Commerce alone aſſembles it into conſiderable ſums; and this effect it has merely from the induſtry, which it begets, and the frugality, which it inſpires, independent of the quantity of precious metal, which may circulate in the ſtate.

THUS an encreaſe of commerce, by a neceſſary and infallible conſequence, raiſes a great number of lenders, and by that means produces a lowneſs of intereſt. We muſt now conſider how far this encreaſe of commerce diminiſhes the profits ariſing from that profeſſion, and gives riſe to the *third* circumſtance requiſite to produce a lowneſs of intereſt.

IT may be proper to obſerve on this head, that low intereſt and low profits of merchandize are

two

two events, that mutually forward each other, and are both originally deriv'd from that extenſive commerce, which produces opulent merchants, and renders the money'd intereſt conſiderable. Where merchants poſſeſs great ſtocks, whether repreſented by few or many pieces of metal, it muſt frequently happen, that, when they either become tir'd of buſineſs, or have heirs unwilling or unfit to engage in commerce, a great deal of theſe riches naturally ſeeks an annual and ſecure revenue. The plenty diminiſhes their price, and makes the lenders accept of a low intereſt. This conſideration obliges many to keep their ſtocks in trade, and rather be content with low profit than diſpoſe of their money at an under-value. On the other hand, when commerce has become very extenſive, and employs very large ſtocks, there muſt ariſe rivalſhips among the merchants, which diminiſh the profits of trade; at the ſame time, that they encreaſe the trade itſelf. The low profits of merchandize induce the merchants to accept more willingly of a low intereſt, when they leave off buſineſs, and begin to indulge themſelves in eaſe and indolence. It is needleſs, therefore, to enquire, which of theſe circumſtances, *viz. low intereſt* or *low profits*, is the cauſe, and which the effect. They both ariſe from an extenſive commerce, and mutually forward each other. No man will accept of low profits, where he can have high intereſt; and no man will accept of low intereſt, where he can have

have high profits. An extenſive commerce, by producing large ſtocks, diminiſhes both intereſt and profit, and is always aſſiſted, in its diminution of the one, by the proportional ſinking of the other. I may add, that as low profits ariſe from the encreaſe of commerce and induſtry; they ſerve in their turn to the farther encreaſe of commerce, by rendering the commodities cheaper, encreaſing the conſumption, and heightening the induſtry. And thus, if we conſider the whole connexion of cauſes and effects, intereſt is the true barometer of the ſtate, and its lowneſs is a ſign almoſt infallible of the flouriſhing of a people. It proves the encreaſe of induſtry, and its prompt circulation thro' the whole ſtate, little inferior to a demonſtration. And tho', perhaps, it may not be impoſſible but a ſudden and a great check to commerce may have a momentary effect of the ſame kind, by throwing ſo many ſtocks out of trade; it muſt be attended with ſuch miſery and want of employment in the poor, that, beſides its ſhort duration, it will not be poſſible to miſtake the one caſe for the other.

THOSE, who have aſſerted, that the plenty of money was the cauſe of low intereſt, ſeem to have taken a collateral effect for a cauſe; ſince the ſame induſtry, which ſinks the intereſt, does commonly acquire great abundance of the precious metals. A variety of fine manufactures, along with vigilant, enterpriſing merchants, will ſoon draw money to

a ſtate, if it be any where to be found in the world. The ſame cauſe, by multiplying the conveniences of life, and encreaſing induſtry, collects great riches into the hands of perſons, who are not proprietors of land, and produces by that means a lowneſs of intereſt. But tho' theſe effects, plenty of money and low intereſt, do both naturally ariſe from commerce and induſtry, they are altogether independent of each other. For, ſuppoſe a nation remov'd into the *Pacific* ocean, without any foreign commerce or any knowledge of navigation: Suppoſe, that this nation poſſeſſes always the ſame ſtock of coin, but is continually encreaſing in its numbers and induſtry: 'Tis evident, that the price of every commodity muſt gradually diminiſh in that kingdom; ſince 'tis the proportion betwixt money and any ſpecies of goods, which fixes their mutual value; and upon the preſent ſuppoſition, the conveniences of life become every day more abundant, without any alteration on the current ſpecie. A leſs quantity of money, therefore, amongſt this people, will make a rich man, during the times of induſtry, than wou'd ſerve to that purpoſe, in ignorant and ſlothful ages. Leſs money will build a houſe, portion a daughter, buy an eſtate, ſupport a manufactory, or maintain a family and equipage. Theſe are the uſes, for which men borrow money; and therefore, the greater or leſs quantity of it in a ſtate has no influence on the intereſt. But 'tis evident, that the greater or leſs ſtock of labour

and

and commodities muſt have a great influence; ſince we really and in effect borrow theſe, when we take money upon intereſt. 'Tis true, when commerce is extended all over the globe, the moſt induſtrious nations always abound moſt with the precious metals: So that low intereſt and plenty of money are in fact almoſt inſeparable. But ſtill 'tis of conſequence to know the principle, whence any phenomenon ariſes, and to diſtinguiſh betwixt a cauſe and a concomitant effect. Beſides, that the ſpeculation is curious, it may frequently be of uſe in the conduct of public affairs. At leaſt, it muſt be own'd, that nothing can be of more uſe than to improve, by practice, the method of reaſoning on theſe ſubjects, which, of all others, are the moſt important; tho' they are commonly treated in the looſeſt and moſt careleſs manner.

ANOTHER reaſon of this popular miſtake with regard to the cauſe of low intereſt ſeems to be the inſtance of ſome nations; where, after a ſudden acquiſition of riches or of the precious metals, by means of foreign conqueſt, the intereſt has fallen, not only amongſt them, but in all the neighbouring ſtates, as ſoon as that money was diſperſt, and had inſinuated itſelf into every corner. Thus, intereſt in *Spain* fell near a half immediately after the diſcovery of the *Weſt Indies*, as we are inform'd by *Garcilaſſo de la Vega*: And it has been ever ſince gradually ſinking in every kingdom of *Europe*.

Intereſt

Intereſt in *Rome*, after the conqueſt of *Egypt*, fell from 6 to 4 *per cent.* as we learn from *Dion.**

THE cauſes of the ſinking of intereſt upon ſuch an event ſeem different in the conquering country and in the neighbouring ſtates; but in neither of them can we juſtly aſcribe that effect merely to the encreaſe of gold and ſilver.

IN the conquering country, 'tis natural to imagine, that this new acquiſition of money will fall into a few hands, and be gather'd into large ſums, which ſeek a ſecure revenue, either by the purchaſe of land or by intereſt; and conſequently the ſame effect follows, for a little time, as if there had been a great occaſion of induſtry and commerce. The encreaſe of lenders above the borrowers ſinks the intereſt; and ſo much the faſter, if thoſe, who have acquir'd thoſe large ſums, find no induſtry or commerce in the ſtate, and no method of employing their money but by lending it at intereſt. But after this new maſs of gold and ſilver has been digeſted and has circulated, thro' the whole ſtate, affairs will ſoon return to their former ſituation: While the landlords and new money-holders, living idly, ſquander above their income; and the former daily contract debt, and the latter encroach on their ſtock 'till its final extinction. The whole money may ſtill be in the ſtate, and

* Lib. 51.

and make itſelf felt by the encreaſe of prices: But not being now collected into any large maſſes or ſtocks, the diſproportion betwixt the borrowers and lenders is the ſame as formerly, and conſequently the high intereſt returns.

ACCORDINGLY we find, in *Rome*, that ſo early as *Tiberius*'s time, intereſt had again mounted to 6 *per cent.** tho' no accident had happen'd to drain the empire of money. In *Trajan*'s time, money, lent on mortgages in *Italy*, bore 6 *per cent.*† on common ſecurities in *Bithynia*, 12.‡ And if intereſt in *Spain* has not riſen to its old pitch; this can be aſcrib'd to nothing but the continuance of the ſame cauſe, that ſunk it, *viz.* the large fortunes continually made in the *Indies*, which come over to *Spain*, from time to time, and ſupply the demand of the borrowers. By this accidental and extraneous cauſe, more money is to be lent in *Spain*; that is, more money is collected into large ſums, than would otherways be found in a ſtate, where there are ſo little commerce and induſtry.

As to the reduction of intereſt, which has follow'd in *England*, *France*, and other kingdoms of *Europe*, that have no mines, it has been gradual, and has not proceeded from the encreaſe of money, conſider'd merely in itſelf, but from the en-

* *Columella*, lib. 3. cap. 3.

† *Plinii epiſt.* lib. 7. ep. 18. ‡ *Ibid.* lib. 10. ep. 62.

encreaſe of induſtry, which is the natural effect of the former encreaſe, in that interval, before it raiſes the price of labour and proviſions. For to return to the foregoing ſuppoſition; if the induſtry of *England* had riſen as much from other cauſes (and that riſe might eaſily have happen'd, tho' the ſtock of money had remain'd the ſame) muſt not all the ſame conſequences have follow'd, which we obſerve at preſent? The ſame people wou'd, in that caſe, be found in the kingdom, the ſame commodities, the ſame induſtry, manufactures and commerce, and conſequently the ſame merchants, with the ſame ſtocks, that is, with the ſame command over labour and commodities, only repreſented by a ſmaller number of white or yellow pieces: Which being a circumſtance of no moment, would only affect the waggoner, porter, and trunk-maker. Luxury, therefore, manufactures, arts, induſtry, frugality, flouriſhing equally as at preſent, 'tis evident that intereſt muſt alſo have been as low; ſince that is the neceſſary reſult of all theſe circumſtances; ſo far as they determine the profits of commerce, and the proportion betwixt the borrowers and lenders in any ſtate.

# DISCOURSE V.

## *Of the Balance of Trade.*

'TIS very uſual, amongſt nations ignorant of the nature of commerce, to prohibit the exportation of commodities, and to preſerve amongſt themſelves, whatever they think valuable and uſeful. They conſider not, that, in this prohibition, they act directly contrary to their intentions, and that the more is exported of any commodity, the more will be rais'd at home, of which they themſelves will always have the firſt offer.

'TIS well known to the learned, that the antient laws of *Athens* render'd the exportation of figs criminal; that being ſuppos'd a ſpecies of fruit ſo excellent in *Attica*, that the *Athenians* eſteem'd it too delicious for the palate of any foreigner. And in this ridiculous prohibition they were ſo much in earneſt, that informers were thence called ſycophants among them, from two *Greek* words, which ſignify *figs* and *diſcoverer*.* I have been told, that many old acts of parliament ſhow the ſame ignorance in the nature of commerce. And to this day, in a neighbouring kingdom, the exportation of corn is almoſt always prohibited; in order,

as

* Plut. *de curioſitate*,

as they ſay, to prevent famines; tho' 'tis evident, that nothing contributes more to the frequent famines, which ſo much diſtreſs that fertile country.

THE ſame jealous fear with regard to money has alſo prevail'd amongſt ſeveral nations; and it requir'd both reaſon and experience to convince any people, that theſe prohibitions ſerve to no other purpoſe than to raiſe the exchange againſt them, and produce a ſtill greater exportation.

THESE errors, one may ſay, are groſs and palpable: But there ſtill prevails, even amongſt nations well acquainted with commerce, a ſtrong jealouſy with regard to the balance of trade, and a fear, that all their gold and ſilver may be leaving them. This ſeems to me, almoſt in every caſe, a very groundleſs apprehenſion; and I ſhou'd as ſoon dread, that all our ſprings and rivers wou'd be exhauſted, as that money ſhou'd abandon a kingdom, where there are people and induſtry. Let us carefully preſerve theſe latter advantages; and we need never be apprehenſive of loſing the former.

'TIS eaſy to obſerve, that all calculations concerning the balance of trade are founded on very uncertain facts and ſuppoſitions. The cuſtom-houſe books are own'd to be an inſufficient ground of reaſoning; nor is the rate of exchange much better, unleſs we conſider it with all nations, and know

know alſo the proportions of the ſeveral ſums remitted; which one may ſafely pronounce impoſſible. Every man, who has ever reaſon'd on this ſubject, has always prov'd his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations, and by an enumeration of all the commodities ſent to all foreign kingdoms.

THE writings of Mr. *Gee* ſtruck the nation with an univerſal pannic, when they ſaw it plainly demonſtrated, by a detail of particulars, that the balance was againſt them for ſo conſiderable a ſum as muſt leave them without a ſingle ſhilling in five or ſix years. But, luckily, twenty years have ſince elaps'd, along with an expenſive foreign war; and yet 'tis commonly ſuppos'd, that money is ſtill more plentiful amongſt us than in any former period.

NOTHING can be more entertaining on this head than Dr. *Swift*; an author, who has more humour than knowledge, more taſte than judgment, and more ſpleen, prejudice, and paſſion than any of theſe qualities. He ſays, in his *ſhort view of the ſtate of* Ireland, that the whole caſh of that kingdom amounted but to 500,000 *l.* that out of this they remitted every year a neat million to *England*, and had ſcarce any other ſource to compenſate themſelves from, and little other foreign trade but the importation of *French* wines, for which they pay'd ready money. The conſequence of

this ſituation, which muſt be own'd diſadvantageous, was, that in a courſe of three years, the current money of *Ireland*, from 500,000 *l.* was reduc'd to leſs than two. And at preſent, I ſuppoſe, in a courſe of near 30 years, it is abſolutely nothing. Yet I know not how, that opinion of the advance of riches in *Ireland*, which gave the doctor ſo much indignation, ſeems ſtill to continue, and gain ground amongſt every body.

In ſhort, this apprehenſion of the wrong balance of trade, appears of ſuch a nature, that it diſcovers itſelf, wherever one is out of humour with the miniſtry, or is in low ſpirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a general argument, which may prove the impoſſibility of that event, as long as we preſerve our people and our induſtry.

Suppose four parts of all the money in *Britain* to be annihilated in one night, and the nation reduc'd to the ſame condition, in this particular, as in the reigns of the *Harrys* and *Edwards*; what would be the conſequence? Muſt not the price of all labour and commodities ſink in proportion, and every thing be ſold as cheap as they were in thoſe ages? What nation could then diſpute with us in any foreign market, or pretend to navigate or to ſell manufactures at the ſame price, which to us

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wou'd afford ſufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, muſt this bring back the money, which we had loſt, and raiſe us to the level of all the neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arriv'd, we immediately loſe the advantage of the cheapneſs of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing in of money is ſtopt by our fulneſs and repletion.

AGAIN; ſuppoſe, that all the money in *Britain* were multiply'd four-fold in a night, muſt not the contrary effect follow? Muſt not all labour and commodities riſe to ſuch an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while their commodities, on the other hand, became ſo cheap in compariſon, that, in ſpite of all the laws, which cou'd be form'd, they wou'd be run in upon us, and our money wou'd flow out; 'till we fall to a level with foreigners, and loſe that great ſuperiority of riches, which had laid us under ſuch diſadvantages?

NOW 'tis evident, that the ſame cauſes, which wou'd correct theſe exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculouſly, muſt prevent their happening in the common courſe of nature, and muſt for ever, in all neighbouring nations, preſerve money nearly proportion'd to the art and induſtry of each nation. All water, wherever it communicates, remains always at a level: Ask naturaliſts the

the reaſon; they tell you, that were it to be rais'd in any one place, the ſuperior gravity of that part, not being balanc'd, muſt depreſs it, 'till it meets a counterpoize; and that the ſame cauſe, which redreſſes the inequality, when it happens, muſt for ever prevent it, without ſome violent, external operation.*

CAN one imagine, that it had ever been poſſible, by any laws, or even by any art, or induſtry, to have preſerv'd all the money in *Spain*, which the galleons have brought from the *Indies*? Or that all commodities cou'd be ſold in *France* for a tenth of the price they wou'd yield on the other ſide of the *Pyrenees*, without finding their way thither, and draining from that immenſe treaſure? What other reaſon, indeed, is there, why all nations, at preſent, gain in their trade with *Spain* and *Portugal*; but becauſe it is impoſſible to heap up money, more than any fluid, beyond its proper level? The ſovereigns of theſe countries have ſhown, that they wanted not inclination to keep their gold and ſilver to themſelves, had it been in any degree practicable.

BUT

* THERE is another cauſe, tho' more limited in its operation, which checks the wrong balance of trade, to every particular nation, to which the kingdom trades. When we import more goods than we export, the exchange turns againſt us, and this becomes a new encouragement to export; as much as the charge of carriage and inſurance of the money due would amount to. For the exchange can never riſe higher than that ſum.

BUT as any body of water may be rais'd above the level of the ſurrounding element, if the former has no communication with the latter; ſo in money, if the communication be cut off, by any material or phyſical impediment (for all laws alone are ineffectual) there may, in ſuch a caſe, be a very great inequality of money. Thus the immenſe diſtance of *China*, along with the monopolies of our *India* companies, obſtructing the communication, preſerve in *Europe* the gold and ſilver, eſpecially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But notwithſtanding this great obſtruction, the force of the cauſes above mention'd is ſtill evident. The ſkill and ingenuity of *Europe* in general much ſurpaſſes that of *China*, with regard to manual arts and manufactures; yet are we never able to trade thither without great diſadvantage: And were it not for the continual recruits we receive from *America*, money wou'd very ſoon ſink in *Europe*, and riſe in *China*, 'till it came nearly to a level in both places. Nor can any reaſonable man doubt, but that induſtrious nation, were they as near us as *Poland* or *Barbary*, would drain us of the overplus of our ſpecie, and draw to themſelves a larger ſhare of the *Weſt Indian* treaſures. We need have no recourſe to a phyſical attraction, to explain the neceſſity of this operation. There is a moral attraction, ariſing from the intereſts and paſſions of men, which is full as potent and infallible.

How

How is the balance kept in the provinces of every kingdom among themſelves, but by the force of this principle, which makes it impoſſible for money to loſe its level, and either to riſe or ſink, beyond the proportion of the labour and commodities, that is in each province? Did not long experience make people eaſy on this head, what a fund of gloomy reflections might calculations afford a melancholy *Yorkſhire* man; while he computed and magnify'd the ſums drawn to *London* by taxes, abſentees, commodities; and found on compariſon the oppoſite articles ſo much inferior? And no doubt, had the *Heptarchy* ſubſiſted in *England*, the legiſlature of each ſtate had been continually alarm'd by the fear of a wrong balance; and as 'tis probable, that the mutual hatred of theſe ſtates wou'd have been extremely violent, on account of their cloſe neighbourhood, they wou'd have loaded and oppreſt all commerce, by a jealous and ſuperfluous caution. Since the union has remov'd the barriers betwixt *Scotland* and *England*; which of theſe nations gains from the other by this free commerce? Or if the former kingdom has receiv'd any encreaſe of riches, can it be reaſonably accounted for by any thing, but the encreaſe of its art and induſtry? 'Twas a common apprehenſion in *England*, before the union, as we learn from *L'Abbe du Bos*,* that *Scotland* wou'd ſoon drain them of their treaſure, were

* *Les interets d'Angleterre mal-entendus.*

were an open trade allow'd; and on t'other ſide the *Tweed* a contrary apprehenſion prevail'd: With what juſtice in both, time has ſhown.

WHAT happens in ſmall portions of mankind muſt take place in greater. The provinces of the *Roman* empire, no doubt, kept their balance with each other, and with *Italy*, independent of the legiſlature; as much as the ſeveral counties of *Britain*, or the ſeveral pariſhes of each county. And any man, who travels over *Europe*, at this day, may ſee, by the prices of commodities, that money, in ſpite of the abſurd jealouſy of princes and ſtates, has brought itſelf nearly to a level, and that the difference betwixt one kingdom and another is not greater in this reſpect, than it is often betwixt different provinces of the ſame kingdom. Men naturally flock to capital cities, ſea-ports, and navigable rivers. There we find more men, more induſtry, more labour, and conſequently more money; but ſtill the latter difference holds proportion with the former, and the level is preſerv'd.*

OUR

* IT muſt carefully be remark'd, that, throughout this diſcourſe, wherever I ſpeak of the level of money, I mean always its proportional level to the commodities, labour, induſtry, and skill, which is in the ſeveral ſtates. And I aſſert, that, where theſe advantages are double, triple, quadruple, to what they are in the neighbouring ſtates, the money infallibly will alſo be double, triple, quadruple. The only circumſtance, that can obſtruſt the exactneſs of theſe proportions, is the expence of tranſporting the commodities

OUR jealouſy and our hatred of *France* are without bounds; and the former ſentiment, at leaſt, muſt be acknowledg'd very reaſonable and well grounded. Theſe paſſions have occaſion'd innumerable barriers and obſtructions upon commerce, where we are accus'd of being commonly the aggreſſors. But what have we gain'd by the bargain? We loſt the *French* market for our woolen manufactures, and transferr'd the commerce of wine to *Spain* and *Portugal*, where we buy much worſe liquor at a higher price. There are few *Engliſhmen*, that wou'd not think their country abſolutely ruin'd, were *French* wines ſold in *England* ſo cheap and in ſuch abundance as to ſupplant, in ſome meaſure, all ale and home-brewn liquors: But wou'd we lay aſide prejudice, it wou'd not be difficult to prove, that nothing cou'd be more innocent, perhaps advantageous. Each new acre of vineyard planted in *France*, in order to ſupply *England* with wine, wou'd make it requiſite for the *French* to take the product of an *Engliſh* acre, ſown in wheat or barley, in order to ſubſiſt themſelves; and 'tis evident, we have thereby got command of the better commodity.

THERE

modities from one place to another; and this expence is ſometimes unequal. Thus the corn, cattle, cheeſe, butter of *Derbyſhire* cannot draw the money of *London*, ſo much as the manufactures of *London* draw the money of *Derbyſhire*. But this objection is only a ſeeming one: For ſo far as the tranſport of commodities is expenſive, ſo far is the communication betwixt the places obſtructed and imperfect.

THERE are many edicts of the *French* king, prohibiting the planting of new vineyards, and ordering all thoſe lately planted to be grubb'd up: So ſenſible are they, in that country, of the ſuperior value of corn, above every other product.

MARESCHAL *Vauban* complains often, and with reaſon, of the abſurd duties, which load the entry of wines of *Languedoc*, *Guienne* and thoſe other ſouthern provinces, that are imported into *Britany* and *Normandy*. He entertain'd no doubt, but theſe latter provinces cou'd preſerve their balance, notwithſtanding the open commerce, which he recommends. And 'tis evident, that a few leagues more navigation to *England* wou'd make no difference: Or if it did, that it muſt operate alike on the commodities of both kingdoms.

THERE is indeed one expedient, by which it is poſſible to ſink, and another by which we may raiſe, money beyond its natural level in any kingdom; but theſe caſes, when examin'd, will be found to reſolve into our general theory, and to bring additional authority to it.

I SCARCE know any method of ſinking money below its level; but thoſe inſtitutions of banks, funds, and paper credit, with which we are in this kingdom ſo much infatuated. Theſe render

paper equivalent to money, circulate it thro' the whole ſtate, make it ſupply the place of gold and ſilver, raiſe proportionably the price of labour and commodities, and by that means either baniſh a great part of thoſe precious metals, or prevent their farther encreaſe. What can be more ſhort-ſighted than our reaſonings on this head? We fancy, becauſe an individual wou'd be much richer, were his ſtock of money doubled, that the ſame good effect wou'd follow were the money of every one encreas'd; not conſidering, that this wou'd raiſe as much the price of every commodity, and reduce every man, in time, to the ſame condition as before. 'Tis only in our public negotiations and tranſactions with foreigners, that a greater ſtock of money is advantageous; and as our paper is there abſolutely inſignificant, we feel, by its means, all the ill effects, ariſing from a great abundance of money, without reaping any of the advantages.

SUPPOSE there are 12 millions of paper, that circulate in the kingdom as money (for we are not to imagine, that all our enormous funds are employ'd in that ſhape) and ſuppoſe, that the real caſh of the kingdom is 18 millions: Here is a ſtate, which is found by experience able to hold a ſtock of 30 millions. I ſay, if it be able to hold it, it muſt of neceſſity have acquir'd it in gold and ſilver, had we not obſtructed the entrance of theſe metals by this new invention of paper. *Whence would it have*

*have acquir'd that ſum?* From all the kingdoms of the world. *But why?* Becauſe, if you remove theſe 12 millions, money in this ſtate is below its level, compar'd with our neighbours; and we muſt immediately draw from all of them, till we be full and ſaturate, ſo to ſpeak, and can hold no more. By our wiſe politics, we are as careful to ſtuff the nation with this fine commodity of bank-bills and chequer-notes, as if we were afraid of being overburthen'd with the precious metals.

'Tis not to be doubted, but the great plenty of bullion in *France*, is, in a great meaſure, owing to the want of paper credit. The *French* have no banks: Merchants bills do not there circulate as with us: Uſury or lending on intereſt is not directly permitted; ſo that many have large ſums in their coffers: Great quantities of plate are us'd in private houſes; and all the churches are full of it. By this means, proviſions and labour ſtill remain much cheaper amongſt them than in nations that are not half ſo rich in gold and ſilver. The advantage of this ſituation in point of trade, as well as in great public emergencies, is too evident to be diſputed.

The ſame faſhion, a few years ago, prevail'd in *Genoa*, which ſtill has place in *England* and *Holland*, of uſing ſervices of *China* ware inſtead of plate; but the ſenate, wiſely foreſeeing the conſequences,

quences, prohibited the uſe of that brittle commodity beyond a certain extent; while the uſe of ſilver plate was left unlimited. And I ſuppoſe, in their late diſtreſſes, they felt the good effect of this ordonnance.*

BEFORE the introduction of paper money into our colonies, they had gold and ſilver ſufficient for their circulation. Since the introduction of that commodity, the leaſt of the inconveniencies that has follow'd, is the total baniſhment of the precious metals. And after the abolition of paper, can it be doubted but money will return, while theſe colonies poſſeſs manufactures and commodities, the only things valuable in commerce, and for whoſe ſake alone all men deſire money.

WHAT pity *Lycurgus* did not think of paper credit, when he wanted to baniſh gold and ſilver from *Sparta!* It wou'd have ſerv'd his purpoſe better than the lumps of iron he made uſe of as money; and wou'd alſo have prevented more effectually all commerce with ſtrangers, as being of ſo much leſs real and intrinſic value.

BUT as our darling projects of paper credit are pernicious, being almoſt the only expedient, by which we can ſink money below its level; ſo in my opinion the only expedient, by which we can raiſe money above its level, is a practice we wou'd all ex-

* OUR tax on plate is, perhaps, in this view, impolitic.

exclaim againſt as deſtructive, *viz.* the gathering large ſums into a public treaſure, locking them up, and abſolutely preventing their circulation. The fluid, not communicating with the neighbouring element, may, by ſuch an artifice, be rais'd to what height we pleaſe. To prove this, we need only return to our firſt ſuppoſition, of the annihilating the half or any part of our caſh; where we found, that the immediate conſequence of ſuch an event wou'd be, the attraction of an equal ſum from all the neighbouring kingdoms. Nor does there ſeem to be any neceſſary bounds ſet, by the nature of things, to this practice of hoarding. A ſmall city, like *Geneva*, continuing this policy for ages, might engroſs nine tenths of the money of *Europe*. There ſeems, indeed, in the nature of man, an invincible obſtacle to that immenſe growth of riches. A weak ſtate, with an enormous treaſure, wou'd ſoon become a prey to ſome of its poorer but more powerful neighbours. A great ſtate wou'd diſſipate its wealth on dangerous and ill-concerted projects; and probably deſtroy, along with it, what is much more valuable, the induſtry, morals, and numbers of its people. The fluid, in this caſe, rais'd to too great a height, burſts and deſtroys the veſſel, that contains it; and mixing itſelf with the ſurrounding element, ſoon falls to its proper level.

So little are we commonly acquainted with this principle, that, tho' all hiſtorians agree in relating uniformly ſo recent an event, as the immenſe treaſure amaſs'd by *Harry* the VII. (which they make amount to 1,700,000 pounds) we rather reject their concurring teſtimony, than admit of a fact, which agrees ſo ill with our inveterate prejudices. 'Tis indeed probable, that that ſum might be three fourths of all the money in *England*. But where is the difficulty that ſuch a ſum might be amaſs'd in twenty years, by a cunning, rapacious, frugal, and almoſt arbitrary monarch? Nor is it probable, that the diminution of circulating money was ever ſenſibly felt by the people, or ever did them any prejudice. The ſinking of the prices of all commodities wou'd immediately replace it, by giving *England* the advantage in its commerce with all the neighbouring kingdoms.

HAVE we not an inſtance in the ſmall republic of *Athens* with its allies, who in about fifty years, betwixt the *Median* and *Peloponeſian* wars, amaſs'd a ſum greater than that of *Harry* the VII?* For all the *Greek* hiſtorians † and orators ‡ agree, that the *Athenians* collected in the citadel more than 10,000 talents,

* There were about eight ounces of ſilver in a pound *Sterling* in *Harry* the VII.'s time.

† *Thucydidis* lib. 2. and *Diod. Sic.* lib. 12.

‡ *Vid. Æſchinis & Demoſthenis epiſt.*

talents, which they afterwards diſſipated to their own ruin, in raſh and imprudent enterpriſes. But when this money was ſet a running, and began to communicate with the ſurrounding fluid; what was the conſequence? Did it remain in the ſtate? No. For we find by the memorable *cenſus*, mention'd by *Demoſthenes* * and *Polybius*, † that in about fifty years afterwards, the whole value of the republic, comprehending lands, houſes, commodities, ſlaves, and money, was leſs than 6000 talents.

WHAT an ambitious high ſpirited people was this, to collect and keep in their treaſury, with a view to conqueſts, a ſum, which it was every day in the power of the citizens, by a ſingle vote, to diſtribute among themſelves, and which wou'd go near to triple the riches of every individual! For we muſt obſerve, that the numbers and private riches of the *Athenians* are ſaid by antient writers to have been no greater at the beginning of the *Peloponneſian* war, than at the beginning of the *Macedonian*.

MONEY was little more plentiful in *Greece* during the age of *Philip* and *Perſeus* than in *England* during that of *Harry* the VII: Yet theſe two monarchs in 30 years, ‡ collected, from the ſmall kingdom of *Macedon*, a much larger treaſure than that of the *Engliſh* monarch. *Paulus Æmilius* brought

* περὶ Συμμοριῶν. † Lib. 2. cap. 62.

‡ *Titi Livii* lib. 45. cap. 40.

brought to *Rome* about 1,700,000 pounds *Sterling*.* *Pliny* ſays 2,400,000.† And that was but a part of the *Macedonian* treaſure. The reſt was diſſipated by the reſiſtance and flight of *Perſeus*.‡

We may learn from *Stanyan*, that the canton of *Berne* had 300,000 pounds lent at intereſt, and had above ſix times as much in their treaſury. Here then is a ſum hoarded of 1,800,000 pounds *Sterling*, which is at leaſt quadruple of what ſhou'd naturally circulate in ſuch a petty ſtate; and yet no one, who travels into the *Païs de Vaux* or any part of that canton, obſerves any want of money more than cou'd be ſuppos'd in a country of that extent, ſoil, and ſituation. On the contrary, there are ſcarce any inland provinces in the continent of *France* or *Germany*, where the inhabitants are at this time ſo opulent; tho' that canton has vaſtly encreas'd its treaſure ſince 1714, the time when *Stanyan* wrote his judicious account of *Switzerland*.*

The account given by *Appian*† of the treaſure of the *Ptolemies*, is ſo prodigious, that one cannot admit

* *Vel. Paterc.* lib. 1. cap. 9. † Lib. 33. cap. 3.

‡ *Titi Livii, ibid.*

* The poverty, which *Stanyan* ſpeaks of, is only to be ſeen in the moſt mountainous cantons, where there is no commodity to bring money: And even there the people are not poorer than in the dioceſe of *Saltzburg* on the one hand, or *Savoy* on the other; if they be ſo poor.

† *Proem.*

mit of it; and ſo much the more, that the hiſtorian ſays the other ſucceſſors of *Alexander* were alſo frugal, and had many of them treaſures not much inferior. For this ſaving humour of the neighbouring princes muſt neceſſarily have check'd the frugality of the *Ægyptian* monarchs, according to the foregoing theory. The ſum he mentions is 740,000 talents or 191,166,666 pounds 13 ſhillings and 4 pence, according to Dr. *Arbuthnot*'s computation. And yet *Appian* ſays, that he extracted his account from the public records; and he was himſelf a native of *Alexandria*.

FROM theſe principles we may learn what judgment we ought to form of thoſe numberleſs bars, obſtructions, and impoſts, which all nations of *Europe*, and none more than *England*, have put upon trade; from an exorbitant deſire of amaſſing money, which never will heap up beyond its level, while it circulates; or from an ill grounded apprehenſion of loſing their ſpecie, which never will ſink below it. Cou'd any thing ſcatter our riches, 'twou'd be ſuch impolitic contrivances. But this general ill effect, however, reſults from them, that they deprive neighbouring nations of that free communication and exchange, which the author of the world has intended, by giving them ſoils, climates, and geniuſes, ſo different from each other.

OUR modern politics embrace the only method of baniſhing money, the uſing paper credit; they reject the only method of amaſſing it, the practice of hoarding; and they adopt a hundred contrivances, which ſerve to no purpoſe but to check induſtry, and rob ourſelves and our neighbours of the common benefits of art and nature.

ALL taxes, however, upon foreign commodities, are not to be regarded as prejudicial or uſeleſs, but thoſe only which are founded on the jealouſy above mention'd. A tax on *German* linen encourages home manufactures, and thereby multiplies our people and induſtry. A tax on brandy encreaſes the ſale of rum, and ſupports our ſouthern colonies. And as 'tis neceſſary impoſts ſhou'd be levy'd for the ſupport of government, it may be thought more convenient to lay them on foreign commodities, which can eaſily be intercepted at the port, and ſubjected to the impoſt. We ought, however, always to remember the maxim of Dr. *Swift*, that, in the arithmetic of the cuſtoms, two and two make not four, but often make only one. It can ſcarcely be doubted, but if the duties on wine were lower'd to a third, they wou'd yield much more to the government than at preſent: Our people might thereby afford to drink commonly a better and more wholſome liquor: And no prejudice wou'd enſue to the balance of trade, of which

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we are ſo jealous. The manufacture of ale, beyond the agriculture, is but inconſiderable, and gives employment to few hands. The tranſport of wine and corn wou'd not be much inferior.

BUT are there not frequent inſtances, you will ſay, of ſtates and kingdoms, that were formerly rich and opulent, and are now poor and beggarly? Has not the money left them, with which they formerly abounded? I anſwer, If they loſe their trade, induſtry, and people, they cannot expect to keep their gold and ſilver: For theſe precious metals hold proportion to the former advantages. When *Lisbon* and *Amſterdam* got the *Eaſt India* trade from *Venice* and *Genoa*, they alſo got the profits and money, that aroſe from it. Where the ſeat of government is transferr'd, where expenſive armies are maintain'd at a diſtance, where great funds are poſſeſt by foreigners; there naturally follows from theſe cauſes a diminution of the ſpecie. But theſe, we may obſerve, are violent and forcible methods of carrying away money, and are in time commonly attended with the tranſport of people and induſtry. But where theſe remain, and the drain is not continu'd, the money always finds its way back again, by a hundred canals, of which we have no notion nor ſuſpicion. What immenſe treaſures have been ſpent, by ſo many nations, in *Flanders*, ſince the revolution, in the courſe of three long wars? More money perhaps, than the half of what

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is at preſent in all *Europe*. But what has now become of it? Is it in the narrow compaſs of the *Auſtrian* provinces? No ſurely: It has moſt of it return'd to the ſeveral countries, whence it came, and has follow'd that art and induſtry, by which, at firſt, it was acquir'd.

In ſhort, a government has great reaſon to preſerve with care its people and its manufactures. Its money, it may ſafely truſt to the courſe of human affairs, without fear or jealouſy. Or if it ever give attention to that latter circumſtance, it ought only to be ſo far as it affects the former.

# DISCOURSE VI.

## *Of the Balance of Power.*

IT is a queſtion, whether the *idea* of the balance of power be owing entirely to modern policy, or whether the *phraſe* only has been invented in theſe latter ages. 'Tis certain, that * *Xenophon*, in his inſtitution of *Cyrus*, repreſents the combination of the *Aſiatic* powers to have ariſen from a jealouſy of the encreaſing force of the *Medes* and *Perſians*; and tho' that elegant compoſition ſhou'd be ſuppos'd altogether a romance, this ſentiment, aſcrib'd by the author to the Eaſtern princes, is at leaſt a proof of the prevailing notions of antient times.

IN the whole politics of *Greece*, the anxiety, with regard to the balance, is moſt apparent, and is expreſsly pointed out to us, even by the antient hiſtorians. *Thucydides* † repreſents the league, which was form'd againſt *Athens*, and which produc'd the *Peloponneſian* war, as entirely owing to this principle. And after the decline of *Athens*, when the *Thebans* and *Lacedemonians* diſputed for ſovereignity, we find, that the *Athenians* (as well as many other republics) threw themſelves always into the lighter

* Lib. 1. † Lib. 1.

lighter ſcale, and endeavour'd to preſerve the balance. They ſupported *Thebes* againſt *Sparta*, till the great victory, gain'd by *Epaminondas* at *Leuctra*; after which they immediately went over to the conquer'd, from generoſity, as they pretended, but, in reality, from their jealouſy of the conquerors.*

WHOEVER will read *Demoſthenes*'s oration for the *Megalopolitans*, may ſee the utmoſt refinements on this principle, that ever enter'd into the head of a *Venetian* or *Engliſh* ſpeculatiſt. And upon the firſt riſe of the *Macedonian* power, this orator immediately diſcover'd the danger, ſounded the alarm thro' all *Greece*, and at laſt aſſembled that confederacy under the banners of *Athens*, which fought the great and deciſive battle of *Chæronea*.

'TIS true, the *Grecian* wars are regarded by hiſtorians as wars of emulation rather than of politics; and each ſtate ſeems to have had more in view the honour of leading the reſt than any well-grounded hopes of authority and dominion. If we conſider, indeed, the ſmall number of inhabitants in any one republic, compar'd to the whole, the great difficulty of forming ſieges in thoſe times, and the extraordinary bravery and diſcipline of every freeman amongſt that noble people; we ſhall conclude,

* *Xenoph.* hiſt. *Græc.* lib. 6. & 7.

clude, that the balance of power was of itſelf ſufficiently ſecur'd in *Greece*, and needed not to be guarded with that caution, which may be requiſite in other ages. But whether we aſcribe the ſhifting ſides in all the *Grecian* republics to *jealous emulation* or *cautious politics*, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was ſure to meet with a confederacy againſt it, and that often compos'd of its former friends and allies.

THE ſame principle, call it envy or prudence, which produc'd the *Oſtraciſm* of *Athens* and *Petaliſm* of *Syracuſe*, and expell'd every citizen, whoſe fame or power overtop'd the reſt; the ſame principle, I ſay, naturally diſcover'd itſelf in foreign politics, and ſoon rais'd enemies to the leading ſtate, however moderate in the exerciſe of its authority.

THE *Perſian* monarch was really, in his force, a petty prince, compar'd to the *Grecian* republics; and therefore it behov'd him, from views of ſafety more than from emulation, to intereſt himſelf in their quarrels, and to ſupport the weaker ſide in every conteſt. This was the advice given by *Alcibiades* to *Tiſſaphernes*,* and it prolong'd near a century the date of the *Perſian* empire; till the neglect of it for a moment, after the firſt appearance of the aſpiring genius of *Philip*, brought that lofty and frail edifice to the ground, with

* *Thuc.* lib. 8.

with a rapidity, of which there are few inſtances in the hiſtory of mankind.

THE ſucceſſors of *Alexander* ſhow'd an infinite jealouſy of the balance of power; a jealouſy, founded on true politics and prudence, and which preſerv'd diſtinct for ſeveral ages the partitions made after the death of that famous conqueror. The fortune and ambition of *Antigonus* * threaten'd them anew with an univerſal monarchy; but their combination and their victory at *Ipſus* ſav'd them. And in after times, we find, that, as the Eaſtern princes conſider'd the *Greeks* and *Macedonians* as the only real military force, with whom they had any intercourſe, they kept always a watchful eye over that part of the world. The *Ptolemies*, in particular, ſupported firſt *Aratus* and the *Achæans*, and then *Cleomenes* King of *Sparta*, from no other view than as a counterbalance to the *Macedonian* monarchs. For this is the account, which *Polybius* gives of the *Egyptian* politics. †

THE reaſon, why 'tis ſuppos'd, that the antients were intirely ignorant of the *balance of power*, ſeems to be drawn from the *Roman* hiſtory more than the *Greek*; and as the tranſactions of the former are generally the moſt familiar to us, we have thence form'd all our concluſions. It muſt be own'd,

* *Diod. Sic.* lib. 20. † Lib. 2. cap. 51.

own'd, that the *Romans* never met with any ſuch general combination or confederacy againſt them, as might naturally be expected from their rapid conqueſts and declar'd ambition; but were allow'd peaceably to ſubdue their neighbours, one after another, till they extended their dominion over the whole known world. Not to mention the fabulous hiſtory of their *Italic* wars *; there was,



* THERE have ſtrong ſuſpicions, of late, ariſen amongſt critics, and, in my opinion, not without reaſon, concerning the firſt ages of the *Roman* hiſtory; as if they were almoſt entirely fabulous, 'till after the ſacking of the city by the *Gauls*; and were even doubtful for ſome time afterwards, 'till the *Greeks* began to give attention to *Roman* affairs, and commit them to writing. This ſcepticiſm, however, ſeems to me ſcarcely defenſible in its full extent, with regard to the domeſtic hiſtory of *Rome*, which has ſome air of truth and probability, and cou'd ſcarce be the invention of an hiſtorian, who had ſo little morals or judgment as to indulge himſelf in fiction and romance. The revolutions ſeem ſo well proportion'd to their cauſes: The progreſs of the factions is ſo conformable to political experience: The manners and maxims of the age are ſo uniform and natural, that ſcarce any real hiſtory affords more juſt reflection and improvement. Is not *Machiavel*'s comment on *Livy* (a work ſurely of great judgment and genius) founded entirely on this period, which is repreſented as fabulous. I won'd willingly, therefore, in my private ſentiments, divide the matter with theſe critics; and allow, that the battles and victories and triumphs of thoſe ages had been extremely falſify'd by family memoirs, as *Cicero* ſays they were: But as in the accounts of domeſtic factions, there were two oppoſite relations tranſmitted to poſterity, this both ſerv'd as a check upon fiction, and enabled latter hiſtorians to gather ſome truth from compariſon and reaſoning. Half of the ſlaughter, which *Livy* commits on the *Æqui* and the *Volſci*, wou'd depopulate *France* and *Germany*; and that

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upon *Hannibal*'s invaſion of the *Roman* ſtate, a very remarkable criſis, which ought to have call'd up the attention of all civiliz'd nations. It appear'd afterwards (nor was it difficult to be obſerv'd at the time*) that this was a conteſt for univerſal empire; and yet no prince or ſtate ſeems to have been in the leaſt alarm'd about the event or iſſue of the quarrel. *Philip* of *Macedon* remain'd neuter, 'till he ſaw the victories of *Hannibal*; and then moſt imprudently form'd an alliance with the conqueror, upon terms ſtill more imprudent. He ſtipulated, that he was to aſſiſt the *Carthaginian* ſtate in their conqueſt of *Italy*; after which they engag'd to ſend over forces into *Greece*, to aſſiſt him in ſubduing the *Grecian* commonwealths †.

THE *Rhodian* and *Achæan* republics are much celebrated by antient hiſtorians for their wiſdom and ſound policy; yet both of them aſſiſted the *Romans* in their wars againſt *Philip* and *Antiochus*. And what may be eſteem'd ſtill a ſtronger proof, that this maxim was not familiarly known in thoſe ages; no antient author has ever remark'd the imprudence

that hiſtorian, tho' perhaps he may juſtly be charg'd as ſuperficial, is at laſt ſhock'd himſelf with the incredibility of his narration. The ſame love of exaggeration ſeems to have magnify'd the numbers of the *Romans* in their armies, and *cenſus*.

* IT was obſerv'd by ſome, as appears by the ſpeech of *Agelaus* of *Naupactum* in a general congreſs of *Greece*. See *Polyb.* lib. 5. cap. 104.

† *Titi Livii* lib. 23. cap. 33.

dence of thoſe meaſures, nor has even blam'd that abſurd treaty above mention'd, made by *Philip* with the *Carthaginians*. Princes and ſtateſmen may, in all ages, be blinded in their reaſonings with regard to events, before hand: But 'tis ſomewhat extraordinary, that hiſtorians, afterwards, ſhou'd not form a ſounder judgment of them.

*Maſſiniſſa*, *Attalus*, *Pruſias*, in ſatisfying their private paſſions, were, all of them, the inſtruments of the *Roman* greatneſs, and never ſeem to have ſuſpected, that they were forging their own chains, while they advanc'd the conqueſts of their ally. A ſimple treaty and agreement betwixt *Maſſiniſſa* and the *Carthaginians*, ſo much requir'd by mutual intereſt, barr'd the *Romans* from all entrance into *Africa*, and preſerv'd liberty to mankind.

THE only prince we meet with in the *Roman* hiſtory, who ſeems to have underſtood the balance of power, is *Hiero* king of *Syracuſe*. Tho' ally of *Rome*, he ſent aſſiſtance to the *Carthaginians*, during the war of the auxiliaries. "Eſteeming it re-
"quiſite, (ſays *Polybius* *) both in order to re-
"tain his dominions in *Sicily*, and to preſerve the
"*Roman* friendſhip, that *Carthage* ſhou'd be ſafe:
"Leſt by its fall the remaining power ſhou'd be
"able, without contraſte or oppoſition, to execute
"every

* Lib. 1. cap. 83.

" every purpoſe and undertaking. And here he " acted with great wiſdom and prudence. For that " is never, on any account, to be overlookt; nor " ought ſuch a force ever to be thrown into one " hand, as to incapacitate the neighbouring ſtates " from defending their rights againſt it." Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in expreſs terms.

In ſhort, the maxim of preſerving the balance of power is founded ſo much on common ſenſe and obvious reaſoning, that 'tis impoſſible it cou'd altogether have eſcap'd antiquity, where we find, in other particulars, ſo many marks of deep penetration and diſcernment. If it was not ſo generally known, and acknowledg'd as at preſent, it had, at leaſt, an influence on all the wiſer and more experienc'd princes and politicians. And indeed, even at preſent, however generally known and acknowledged, amongſt ſpeculative reaſoners, it has not, in practice, an authority much more extenſive, amongſt thoſe who govern the world.

After the fall of the *Roman* empire, the form of government eſtabliſh'd by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great meaſure, from farther conqueſts, and long maintain'd each ſtate in its proper boundaries. But when vaſſalage and the feudal militia were aboliſh'd, mankind were anew alarm'd by the danger of univerſal monarchy,

narchy, from the union of ſo many kingdoms and principalities in the perſon of the emperor, *Charles*. But the power of the houſe of *Auſtria*, founded on extenſive but divided dominions, and their riches, deriv'd chiefly from mines of gold and ſilver, were more likely to decay, of themſelves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks rais'd againſt them. In leſs than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was ſhatter'd, their opulence diſſipated, their ſplendor eclips'd. A new power ſucceeded, more formidable to the liberties of *Europe*, poſſeſſing all the advantages of the former, and labouring under none of its defects; except a ſhare of that ſpirit of bigotry and perſecution, with which the houſe of *Auſtria* were ſo long and ſtill are ſo much infatuated.

*Europe* has now, for above a century, remain'd on the defenſive againſt the greateſt force, that ever, perhaps, was form'd by the civil or political combination of mankind. And ſuch is the influence of the maxim here treated of, that tho' that ambitious nation, in the five laſt general wars, have been victorious in four *, and unſucceſsful only in one †, they have not much enlarg'd their dominions, nor acquir'd a total aſcendant over *Europe*.

On

* THOSE concluded by the peace of the *Pyrenees*, *Nimeguen*, *Ryſwick* and *Aix-la-Chapelle*.

† THAT concluded by the peace of *Utrecht*.

On the contrary, there remain ſtill ſome hopes of maintaining the reſiſtance ſo long, that the natural revolutions of human affairs, together with unforeſeen events and accidents, may guard us againſt univerſal monarchy, and preſerve the world from ſo great an evil.

In the three laſt of theſe general wars, *Britain* has ſtood foremoſt in the glorious ſtruggle; and ſhe ſtill maintains her ſtation, as guardian of the general liberties of *Europe*, and patron of mankind. Beſide her advantages of riches and ſituation; her people are animated with ſuch a national ſpirit, and are ſo fully ſenſible of the ineſtimable bleſſings of their government, that we may hope their vigor never will languiſh in ſo neceſſary and ſo juſt a cauſe. On the contrary, if we may judge by the paſt, their paſſionate ardour ſeems rather to require ſome moderation; and they have oftener err'd from a laudable exceſs than from a blamable deficiency.

In the *firſt* place, we ſeem to have been more poſſeſt with the antient *Greek* ſpirit of jealous emulation, than actuated with the prudent views of modern politics. Our wars with *France* have been begun with juſtice, and even, perhaps, from neceſſity; but have always been too far puſh'd, from obſtinacy and paſſion. The ſame peace, which was afterwards made at *Ryſwick* in 1697, was offer'd ſo early as the ninety two; that concluded at *Utrecht*

*Utrecht* in 1712 might have been finiſh'd on as good conditions at *Gertruytenberg* in the eight; and we might have given at *Frankfort*, in 1743, the ſame terms, which we were glad to accept of at *Aix-la-Chapelle* in the forty eight. Here then we ſee, that above half of our wars with *France*, and all our public debts are owing more to our own imprudent vehemence, than to the ambition of our neighbours.

In the *ſecond* place, we are ſo declar'd in our oppoſition to *French* power, and ſo alert in defence of our allies, that they always reckon upon our force as upon their own; and expecting to carry on war at our expence, refuſe all reaſonable terms of accommodation. *Habent ſubjectos, tanquam ſuos; viles, ut alienos.* All the world knows, that the factious vote of the houſe of commons, in the beginning of the laſt parliament, along with the profeſt humour of the nation, made the queen of *Hungary* inflexible in her terms, and prevented that agreement with *Pruſſia*, which wou'd immediately have reſtor'd the general tranquillity of *Europe*.

In the *third* place, we are ſuch true combatants, that, when once engag'd, we loſe all concern for ourſelves and our poſterity, and conſider only how we may beſt annoy the enemy. To mortgage our revenues at ſo deep a rate, in wars, where we were only acceſſaries, was ſurely the moſt fatal deluſion,

that

that a nation, who had any pretenſion to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of. That remedy of funding, if it be a remedy, and not rather a poiſon, ought, in all reaſon, to be reſerv'd to the laſt extremity; and no evil, but the greateſt and moſt urgent, ſhou'd ever induce us to embrace ſo dangerous an expedient.

THESE exceſſes, to which we have been carry'd, are prejudicial; and may, perhaps, in time, become ſtill more prejudicial another way, by begetting, as is uſual, the oppoſite extreme, and rendering us totally careleſs and ſupine with regard to the fate of *Europe*. The *Athenians*, from the moſt buſtling, intriguing, warlike people of *Greece*, finding their error in thruſting themſelves into every quarrel, abandon'd all attention to foreign affairs; and in no conteſt ever took party on either ſide, except by their flatteries and complaiſance to the victor.

ENORMOUS monarchies, ſuch as *Europe*, at preſent, is in danger of falling into, are, probably, deſtructive to human nature; in their progreſs, in their continuance, * and even in their downfall, which never can be very diſtant from their eſtabliſhment. The military genius, which aggrandiz'd

* IF the *Roman* empire was of advantage, it cou'd only proceed from this, that mankind were generally in a very diſorderly, unciviliz'd condition, before its eſtabliſhment.

diz'd the monarchy, ſoon leaves the court, the capital, and the center of ſuch a government; while the wars are carry'd on at a great diſtance, and intereſt ſo ſmall a part of the ſtate. The antient nobility, whoſe affections attach them to their ſovereign, live all at court, and never will accept of military employments, which wou'd carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are diſtant both from their pleaſure and their fortune. The arms of the ſtate muſt, therefore, be truſted to mercenary ſtrangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour; ready on every occaſion to turn them againſt the prince, and join each deſperate malecontent, who offers pay and plunder. This is the neceſſary progreſs of human affairs: Thus human nature checks itſelf in its airy elevations: Thus ambition blindly labours for the deſtruction of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The *Bourbons*, truſting to the ſupport of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would puſh their advantage, without reſerve or limitation. Theſe, while fir'd with glory and emulation, can bear the fatigues and dangers of war: But never would ſubmit to languiſh in the garriſons of *Hungary* or *Lithuania*, forgot at court, and ſacrific'd to the intrigues of every minion or miſtreſs, that approaches the prince. The troops are filled with *Cravates* and *Tartars*, *Huſſars* and *Coſſacs*; intermingled, perhaps, with

a few ſoldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the *Roman* emperors, from the ſame cauſes, is renew'd, over and over again, 'till the final diſſolution of the monarchy.

DIS-

# DISCOURSE VII.

## *Of Taxes.*

THERE is a maxim, that prevails amongſt thoſe, whom, in this country, we call *ways and means men*, and who are denominated *Financiers* and *Maltotiers* in *France*; *that every new tax creates a new ability in the ſubjects to bear it, and that each encreaſe of publick burthens encreaſes proportionably the induſtry of the people.* This maxim is of ſuch a nature as is moſt likely to be extremely abus'd, and is ſo much the more dangerous, that its truth cannot be altogether deny'd; but it muſt be own'd; when kept within certain bounds, to have ſome foundation in reaſon and experience.

WHEN a tax is laid upon commodities, that are conſum'd by the common people, the neceſſary conſequence may ſeem to be, that either the poor muſt retrench ſomething from their way of living, or raiſe their wages, ſo as to make the burthen of the tax fall entirely upon the rich. But there is a third conſequence, which very often follows upon taxes, *viz.* that the poor encreaſe their induſtry, perform more work, and live as well as before, without demanding more for their labour. Where taxes are moderate, are laid on gradually, and affect not the ne-

neceſſaries of life, this conſequence naturally follows; and 'tis certain, that ſuch difficulties often ſerve to excite the induſtry of a people, and render them more opulent and laborious than others, who enjoy the greateſt advantages. For we may obſerve, as a parallel inſtance, that the moſt trading nations have not always poſſeſt the greateſt extent of fertile land; but on the contrary, that they have labour'd under many natural diſadvantages. *Tyre*, *Athens*, *Carthage*, *Rhodes*, *Genoa*, *Venice*, *Holland* are ſtrong examples to this purpoſe. And in all hiſtory, we find only three inſtances of large and fertile countries, that have poſſeſt much trade, the *Netherlands*, *England*, and *France*. The two former ſeem to have been allur'd by the advantages of their maritime ſituation, and the neceſſity they lay under of frequenting foreign ports, in order to procure what their own climate refus'd them. And as to *France*, trade has come very late into that kingdom, and ſeems to have been the effect of reflection and obſervation in an ingenious and enterpriſing people, who remark'd the immenſe riches acquir'd by ſuch of the neighbouring nations as cultivated navigation and commerce.

THE places mention'd by *Cicero*, * as poſſeſt of the greateſt commerce in his time are *Alexandria*, *Colchos*, *Tyre*, *Sidon*, *Andros*, *Cyprus*, *Pamphilia*, *Lycia*, *Rhodes*, *Chios*, *Byzantium*, *Lesbos*, *Smyrna*, *Miletum*,

* *Epiſt. ad Att.* lib. 9. ep. 11.

*Miletum*, *Coos*. All theſe, except *Alexandria*, were either ſmall iſlands or narrow territories. And that city ow'd its trade entirely to the happineſs of its ſituation.

SINCE therefore ſome natural neceſſities or diſadvantages may be thought favourable to induſtry, why may not artificial burthens have the ſame effect? Sir *William Temple*, † I am ſure, aſcribes the induſtry of the *Dutch* entirely to neceſſity, proceeding from their natural diſadvantages; and illuſtrates his doctrine by a very ſtriking compariſon with *Ireland*; "where, (ſays he,) by the largeneſs and "plenty of the ſoil, and ſcarcity of people, all "things neceſſary to life are ſo cheap, that an in-"duſtrious man, by two days labour, may gain "enough to feed him the reſt of the week: Which "I take to be a very plain ground of the lazineſs, "attributed to the people. For men naturally "prefer eaſe before labour, and will not take "pains, if they can live idle; though when, by "neceſſity, they have been enur'd to it, they "cannot leave it, being grown a cuſtom neceſſary "to their health and to their very entertainment: "Nor perhaps is the change harder, from con-"ſtant eaſe to labour, than from conſtant labour to "eaſe." After which the author proceeds to confirm his doctrine, by enumerating, as above, the places, where trade has moſt flouriſh'd, in an-

† ACCOUNT of the *Netherlands*, chap. 6.

antient and modern times; and which are commonly obſerv'd to be ſuch narrow confin'd territories, as beget a neceſſity for induſtry.

'Tis always obſerv'd, in years of ſcarcity, if it be not extreme, that the poor labour more, and really live better, than in years of great plenty, when they indulge themſelves in idleneſs and riot. I have been told, by a conſiderable manufacturer, that in the year 1740, when bread and proviſions of all kinds were very dear, his workmen not only made a ſhift to live, but paid debts, which they had contracted in former years, that were much more favourable and abundant.*

This doctrine, therefore, with regard to taxes, may be admitted in ſome degree: But beware of the abuſe. Taxes, like neceſſity, when carry'd too far, deſtroy induſtry, by engendring deſpair; and even before they reach this pitch, they raiſe the wages of the labourer and manufacturer, and heighten the price of all commodities. An attentive, diſintereſted legiſlature will obſerve the point, when the emolument ceaſes, and the prejudice begins: But as the contrary character is much more common, 'tis to be fear'd, that taxes, all over *Europe*, are multiplying to ſuch a degree, as will entirely cruſh all art and induſtry; tho', perhaps, their firſt increaſe, along with other circumſtances,

* To this purpoſe, ſee alſo diſcourſe I. at the end.

ces, might contribute to the growth of theſe advantages.

THE beſt taxes are thoſe which are levy'd upon conſumptions, eſpecially thoſe of luxury; becauſe ſuch taxes are leſs felt by the people. They ſeem to be, in ſome meaſure, voluntary; ſince a man may chuſe how far he will uſe the commmodity, which is taxed: They are paid gradually and inſenſibly: And being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are ſcarcely perceiv'd by the conſumers. Their only diſadvantage is, that they are expenſive in the levying.

TAXES upon poſſeſſions are levy'd without expence; but have every other diſadvantage. Moſt ſtates, however, are oblig'd to have recourſe to them, in order to ſupply the deficiencies of the other.

BUT the moſt pernicious of all taxes are thoſe which are arbitrary. They are commonly converted, by their management, into puniſhments on induſtry; and alſo, by their unavoidable inequality, are more grievous than by the real burthen, which they impoſe. 'Tis ſurpriſing, therefore, to ſee them have place amongſt any civiliz'd people.

IN general, all poll-taxes, even when not arbitrary, which they commonly are, may be eſteem'd dan-

dangerous: Becauſe it is ſo eaſy for the ſovereign to add a little more, and a little more, to the ſum demanded, that theſe taxes are apt to become altogether oppreſſive and intolerable. On the other hand, a duty upon commodities checks itſelf; and a prince will ſoon find, that an encreaſe of the impoſt is no encreaſe of his revenue. It is not eaſy, therefore, for a people to be altogether ruin'd by ſuch taxes.

HISTORIANS inform us, that one of the chief cauſes of the deſtruction of the *Roman* ſtate was the alteration, which *Conſtantine* introduc'd into the finances, by ſubſtituting an univerſal poll-tax, in lieu of almoſt all the tythes, cuſtoms, and exciſes, which formerly compos'd the revenue of the *empire*. The people, in all the provinces, were ſo grinded and oppreſt by the *publicans*, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians; whoſe dominion, as they had fewer neceſſities and leſs art, was found preferable to the refin'd tyranny of the *Romans*.

THERE is a prevailing opinion, that all taxes, however levy'd, fall upon the land at laſt. Such an opinion may be uſeful in *Britain*, by checking the landed gentlemen, in whoſe hands our legiſlature is lodg'd, and making them preſerve great regard for trade and induſtry. But I muſt confeſs, that this principle, tho' firſt advanc'd by a celebrated writer, has

has ſo little appearance of reaſon, that, were it not for his authority, it had never been receiv'd by any body. Every man, to be ſure, is deſirous of puſhing off from himſelf the burthen of any tax, that is impos'd, and laying it upon others: But as every man has the ſame inclination, and is upon the defenſive; no ſet of men can be ſuppos'd to prevail altogether in this conteſt. And why the landed gentleman ſhou'd be the victim of the whole, and ſhou'd not be able to defend himſelf, as well as others are, I cannot readily imagine. All tradeſmen, indeed, wou'd willingly prey upon him, and divide him among them, if they cou'd: But this inclination they always have, tho' no taxes were levy'd; and the ſame methods, by which he guards againſt the impoſition of tradeſmen before taxes, will ſerve him afterwards, and make them ſhare the burthen with him.

I SHALL conclude this ſubject with obſerving, that we have, with regard to taxes, an inſtance of what frequently happens in political inſtitutions, that the conſequences of things are diametrically oppoſite to what we ſhou'd expect on the firſt appearance. 'Tis regarded as a fundamental maxim of the *Turkiſh* government, that the *Grand ſignior*, tho' abſolute maſter of the lives and fortunes of each individual, has no authority to impoſe a new tax; and every *Ottoman* prince, who has made ſuch an attempt, either has been oblig'd to retract,

or has found the fatal effects of his perſeverance. One wou'd imagine, that this prejudice or eſtabliſh'd opinion were the firmeſt barrier in the world againſt oppreſſion; yet 'tis certain, that its effect is quite contrary. The emperor, having no regular method of encreaſing his revenue, muſt allow all the baſhas and governors to oppreſs and abuſe the ſubjects: And theſe he ſqueezes after their return from their government. Whereas, if he cou'd impoſe a new tax, like our *European* princes, his intereſt wou'd ſo far be united with that of his people, that he wou'd immediately feel the bad effects of theſe diſorderly levies of money, and wou'd find, that a pound, rais'd by a general impoſition, wou'd have leſs pernicious effects, than a ſhilling taken in ſo unequal and arbitrary a manner.

# DISCOURSE VIII.

## *Of Public Credit.*

IT appears to have been the common practice of antiquity, to make proviſion, in time of peace, for the neceſſities of war, and to hoard up treaſures, before hand, as the inſtruments either of conqueſt or defence; without truſting to extraordinary impoſts, much leſs to borrowing, in times of diſorder and confuſion. Beſides the immenſe ſums above-mention'd, * which were amaſs'd by *Athens*, and by the *Ptolemies*, and other ſucceſſors of *Alexander*; we learn from *Plato*, † that the frugal *Lacedemonians* had alſo collected a great treaſure; and *Arrian* ‡ and *Plutarch* * ſpecify the riches, which *Alexander* got poſſeſſion of on the conqueſt of *Suſa* and *Ecbatana*, and which were reſerv'd, ſome of them, from the time of *Cyrus*. If I remember right, the ſcripture alſo mentions the treaſure of *Hezekiah* and the *Jewiſh* princes; as profane hiſtory does that of *Philip* and *Perſeus* kings of *Macedon*. The antient republics in *Gaul* had commonly large

* Discourse V.

† *Alcib.* 1. ‡ Lib. 3.

* *Plut. in vita Alex.* He makes theſe treaſures amount to 20,000 talents, or about 15 millions *Sterling*. *Quintus Curtius* (*lib.* 5. *cap.* 2.) ſays that *Alexander* found in *Suſa* above 50,000 talents.

large ſums in reſerve.* Every one knows the treaſure ſeiz'd in *Rome* by *Julius Cæſar*, during the civil wars; and we find afterwards, that the wiſer emperors, *Auguſtus*, *Tiberius*, *Veſpaſian*, *Severus*, *&c.* always diſcover'd the prudent foreſight, of ſaving great ſums againſt any public exigency.

On the contrary, our modern expedient, which has become very general, is to mortgage the public revenues, and to truſt, that poſterity, during peace, will pay off the incumbrances, contracted during the preceding war: And they, having before their eyes, ſo good an example of their wiſe fathers, have the ſame prudent reliance on their poſterity; who, at laſt, from neceſſity, more than choice, are oblig'd to place the ſame confidence in a new poſterity. But not to waſte time in declaiming againſt a practice, which appears ruinous, beyond the evidence of a hundred demonſtrations; it ſeems pretty apparent, that the antient maxims are, in this reſpect, much more prudent than the modern; even tho' the latter had been confin'd within ſome reaſonable bounds, and had ever, in any inſtance, been attended with ſuch frugality, in time of peace, as to diſcharge the debts incurr'd by an expenſive war. For why ſhou'd the caſe be ſo very different betwixt the public and an individual, as to make us eſtabliſh ſuch different maxims of conduct for each? If the funds of the former be greater,

* *Strabo*, lib 4.

greater, its neceſſary expences are proportionably larger; if its reſources be more numerous, they are not infinite; and as its frame ſhould be calculated for a much longer duration, than the date of a ſingle life, or even of a family, it ſhou'd embrace maxims, large, durable, and generous, ſuitable to the ſuppos'd extent of its exiſtence. To truſt to chances and temporary expedients is, indeed, what the neceſſity of human affairs frequently reduces us to; but whoever voluntarily depend on ſuch reſources have not neceſſity, but their own folly, to accuſe for their misfortunes, when any ſuch befal them.

If the abuſes of treaſures be dangerous, either by engaging the ſtate in raſh enterpriſes, or making them neglect military diſcipline, in confidence of their riches; the abuſes of mortgaging are more certain and inevitable; poverty, impotence, and ſubjection to foreign powers.

According to modern policy, war is attended with every deſtructive circumſtance; loſs of men, encreaſe of taxes, decay of commerce, diſſipation of money, plunder by ſea and land. According to antient maxims, the opening of the public treaſure, as it produc'd an uncommon affluence of gold and ſilver, ſerv'd as a temporary encouragement to induſtry, and aton'd, in ſome degree, for the inevitable calamities of war.

WHAT then ſhall we ſay to the new paradox, that public encumbrances are, of themſelves, advantageous, independent of the neceſſity of contracting them; and that any ſtate, even tho' it were not preſt by a foreign enemy, cou'd not poſſibly have embrac'd a wiſer expedient for promoting commerce and riches, than to create funds and debts and taxes, without limitation? Diſcourſes, ſuch as theſe, might naturally have paſt for trials of wit among rhetoricians, like the panegyrics on folly and a fever, on *Buſiris* and *Nero*; had we not ſeen ſuch abſurd maxims patroniz'd, by great miniſters, and by a whole party among us. And theſe puzzling arguments, (for they deſerve not the name of ſpecious) tho' they cou'd not be the foundation of lord *Orford*'s conduct; for he had more ſenſe; ſerv'd at leaſt to keep his partizans in countenance, and perplex the underſtanding of the nation.

LET us examine the conſequences of public debts, both in our domeſtic management, by their influence on commerce and induſtry, and in our foreign tranſactions, by their effects on wars and negotiations.

THERE is a word, which is here in the mouth of every body, and which, I find, has alſo got abroad, and is much employ'd by foreign writers,* in

* *Melon, Du Tot, Law,* in the pamphlets, publiſh'd in *France.*

in imitation of the *Engliſh*; and that is CIRCULATION. This word ſerves as an account of every thing; and tho' I confeſs, that I have ſought for its meaning in the preſent ſubject, ever ſince I was a ſchool-boy, I have never yet been able to diſcover it. What poſſible advantage is there which the nation can reap by the eaſy transference of ſtock from hand to hand? Or is there any parallel to be drawn from the circulation of other commodities, to that of chequer notes and *India* bonds? Where a manufacturer has a quick ſale of his goods to the merchant, the merchant to the ſhop-keeper, the ſhop-keeper to his cuſtomers; this enlivens induſtry, and gives new encouragement to the firſt dealer or the manufacturer and all his tradeſmen, and makes them produce more and better commodities of the ſame ſpecies. A ſtagnation is here pernicious, wherever it happens; becauſe it operates backwards, and ſtops or benumbs the induſtrious hand in its production of what is uſeful to human life. But what production we owe to *Change-alley*, or even what conſumption, except that of coffee, and pen, ink and paper, I have not yet learn'd; nor can one foreſee the loſs or decay of any one beneficial commerce or commodity, tho' that place and all its inhabitants were for ever bury'd in the ocean.

BUT tho' this term, circulation, has never been explain'd by thoſe, who inſiſt ſo much on the advan-

vantages that reſult from it, there ſeems, however, to be ſome benefit of a ſimilar kind, ariſing from our incumbrances: As indeed, what human evil is there, which is not attended with ſome advantage? This we ſhall endeavour to explain, that we may eſtimate the weight we ought to allow it.

PUBLIC ſecurities are with us become a kind of money, and paſs as readily at the current price as gold or ſilver. Wherever any profitable undertaking offers itſelf, however expenſive, there are never wanting hands enow to embrace it; nor need a trader, who has ſums in the public ſtocks, fear to launch out into the moſt extenſive trade; ſince he is poſſeſt of funds, which will anſwer the moſt ſudden demand that can be made upon him. No merchant thinks it neceſſary to keep by him any conſiderable caſh. Bank ſtock, or *India* bonds, eſpecially the latter, ſerve to all the ſame purpoſes; becauſe he can diſpoſe of them, or pledge them to a banker, in a quarter of an hour; and at the ſame time, they are not idle, even when in his ſcritoire, but bring him in a conſtant revenue. In ſhort, our national debts furniſh merchants with a ſpecies of money, that is continually multiplying in their hands, and produces ſure gain, beſide the profits of their commerce. This muſt enable them to trade upon leſs profit. The ſmall profit of the merchant renders the commodity cheaper; cauſes a greater conſumption; quickens the labour of the com-

common people; and helps to ſpread arts and induſtry thro' the whole ſociety.

THERE are alſo, we may obſerve, in *England*, and in all ſtates, that have both commerce and public debts, a ſet of men, who are half merchants, half ſtock-holders, and may be ſuppos'd willing to trade for ſmall profits; becauſe commerce is not their principal or ſole ſupport, and their revenues in the funds are a ſure reſource for themſelves and their families. Were there no funds, great merchants wou'd have no expedient for realizing or ſecuring any part of their profit, but by making purchaſes of land; and land has many diſadvantages in compariſon of funds. Requiring more care and inſpection, it divides the time and attention of the merchant; upon any tempting offer or extraordinary accident in trade, it is not ſo eaſily converted into money; and as it attracts too much, both by the many natural pleaſures it affords, and the authority it gives, it ſoon converts the citizen into the country gentleman. More men, therefore, with large ſtocks and incomes may naturally be ſuppos'd to continue in trade, where there are public debts: And this, it muſt be own'd, is of ſome advantage to commerce, by diminiſhing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging induſtry.*



* ON this head, I ſhall obſerve, without interrupting the thread of the argument, that the multiplicity of our public debts ſerves rather

BUT in oppoſition to theſe two favourable circumſtances, perhaps of no very great importance, weigh the many diſadvantages, that attend our public debts, in the whole *interior* œconomy of the ſtate: You will find no compariſon betwixt the ill and the good, that reſult from them.

*Firſt*, 'TIS certain, that national debts cauſe a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital, by the great ſums, which are levy'd in the provinces to pay the intereſt of thoſe debts; and perhaps too, by the advantages in trade above mention'd, which they give the merchants in the capital above the reſt of the kingdom. The queſtion is, whether, in our caſe, it be for the public intereſt, that ſo many privileges ſhou'd be conferr'd on *London*, which has already arriv'd at ſuch an enormous ſize, and ſeems ſtill encreaſing. Some men are apprehenſive of the conſequences. For my part, I cannot forbear thinking, that tho' the head is undoubtedly too big for the body, yet that great city is ſo happily ſituated, that its exceſſive bulk cauſes leſs inconvenience, than even a ſmaller capital to a greater kingdom. There is more difference betwixt

rather to ſink the intereſt, and that the more the government borrows, the cheaper may they expect to borrow; contrary to firſt appearance, and contrary to common opinion. The profits of trade have an influence on intereſt. See diſcourſe IV.

twixt the prices of all proviſions in *Paris* and *Languedoc* than betwixt thoſe in *London* and *Yorkſhire*.

*Secondly*, PUBLIC ſtocks, being a kind of paper-credit, have all the diſadvantages attending that ſpecies of money. They baniſh gold and ſilver from the moſt conſiderable commerce of the ſtate, reduce them to common circulation, and by that means render all proviſions and labour dearer than otherwiſe they wou'd be.

*Thirdly*, THE taxes, which are levy'd to pay the intereſt of theſe debts, are a check upon induſtry, heighten the price of labour, and are an oppreſſion on the poorer ſort.

*Fourthly*, AS foreigners poſſeſs a ſhare of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occaſion the tranſport of our people and our induſtry.

*Fifthly*, THE greateſt part of public ſtock being always in the hands of idle people, who live on their revenue, our funds give great encouragement to an uſeleſs and inactive life.

BUT tho' the injury, that ariſes to commerce and induſtry from our public funds, will appear, upon balancing the whole, very conſiderable, it is trivial in compariſon of the prejudice, that reſults

to

to the ſtate, conſider'd as a body politic, which muſt ſupport itſelf in the ſociety of nations, and have various tranſactions with other ſtates, in wars and negotiations. The ill, there, is pure and unmixt, without any favourable circumſtance to atone for it: And 'tis an ill too, of a nature the higheſt and moſt important.

We have indeed been told, that the public is no weaker upon account of its debts; ſince they are moſtly due amongſt ourſelves, and bring as much property to one as they take from another. 'Tis like transferring money from the right hand to the left; which leaves the perſon neither richer nor poorer than before. Such looſe reaſonings and ſpecious compariſons will always paſs, where we judge not upon principles. I ask, Is it poſſible, in the nature of things, to overburthen a nation with taxes, even where the ſovereign reſides amongſt them? The very doubt ſeems extravagant; ſince 'tis requiſite, in every commonwealth, that there be a certain proportion obſerv'd betwixt the laborious and the idle part of it. But if all our preſent taxes be mortgag'd, muſt we not invent new ones? And may not this matter be carry'd to a length, that is ruinous and deſtructive?

In every nation, there are always ſome methods of levying money more eaſy than others, ſuitable to the way of living of the people, and the commodi-

ties

ties they make uſe of. In *Britain*, the exciſes upon malt and beer afford a very large revenue; becauſe the operations of malting and brewing are very tedious and are impoſſible to be conceal'd; and at the ſame time, theſe commodities are not ſo abſolutely neceſſary to life, as that the raiſing their price wou'd very much affect the poorer ſort. Theſe taxes being all mortgag'd, what difficulty to find new ones! What vexation and ruin of the poor!

DUTIES upon conſumptions are more equal and eaſy than thoſe upon poſſeſſions. What a loſs to the public, that the former are all exhauſted, and that we muſt have recourſe to the more grievous method of levying taxes!

WERE all the proprietors of land only ſtewards to the public; muſt not neceſſity force them to practiſe all the arts of oppreſſion, us'd by ſtewards, where the abſence and negligence of the proprietor render them ſecure againſt enquiry?

'TWILL ſcarce be aſſerted, that no bounds ought ever to be ſet to national debts, and that the public wou'd be no weaker, were 12 or 15 ſhillings in the pound, land tax, mortgag'd, along with all the preſent cuſtoms and exciſes. There is ſomething, therefore, in the caſe, beſide the mere transferring of property from one hand to another. In 500 years, the

the poſterity of thoſe, now in the coaches, and of thoſe upon the boxes, will probably have chang'd places, without affecting the public by theſe revolutions.

I MUST confeſs, that there is a ſtrange ſupineneſs, from long cuſtom, crept into all ranks of men, with regard to public debts; not unlike what divines ſo vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the moſt ſanguine imagination cannot hope, either that this or any future miniſtry will be poſſeſt of ſuch rigid and ſteady frugality, as to make any conſiderable progreſs in the payment of our debts, or that the ſituation of foreign affairs will, for any long time, allow them leiſure and tranquillity, ſufficient for ſuch an undertaking.* *What then is to become of us?* Were we ever ſo good Chriſtians, and ever ſo reſign'd to providence; this, methinks, were a curious queſtion, even conſider'd as a ſpeculative one, and what it might not be altogether impoſſible to

* IN times of peace and ſecurity, when alone it is poſſible to pay debt, the money'd intereſt are averſe to receive partial payments, which they know not how to diſpoſe of to advantage; and the landed intereſt are averſe to continue the taxes requiſite for that purpoſe. Why therefore ſhou'd a miniſter perſevere in a meaſure ſo diſagreeable to all parties? For the ſake, I ſuppoſe, of a poſterity, which he will never ſee, or of a few reaſonable, reflecting people, whoſe united intereſt, perhaps, will not be able to ſecure him the ſmalleſt borough in *England*. 'Tis not likely we ſhall ever find any miniſter ſo bad a politician. With regard to theſe narrow, deſtructive maxims of politics, all miniſters are expert enough,

to form ſome conjectural ſolution of. The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions. There ſeems to be a natural progreſs of things, which may guide our reaſoning. As it wou'd have requir'd but a moderate ſhare of prudence, when we firſt began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of miniſters, that things wou'd neceſſarily be carry'd to the length we ſee; ſo now that they have at laſt happily reach'd it, it may not be difficult to gueſs at the conſequence. It muſt, indeed, be one of theſe two events; either the nation muſt deſtroy public credit, or public credit will deſtroy the nation. 'Tis impoſſible they can both ſubſiſt, after the manner they have been hitherto manag'd, in this, as well as in ſome other nations.

THERE was, indeed, a ſcheme for the payment of our debts, which was propos'd by an excellent citizen, Mr. *Hutchinſon*, above 30 years ago, and which was much approv'd of by ſome men of ſenſe, but never was likely to take effect. He aſſerted, that there was a fallacy in imagining, that the public ow'd this debt; for that really every individual ow'd a proportional ſhare of it, and paid, in his taxes, a proportional ſhare of the intereſt, beſide the expences of levying theſe taxes. Had we not better, then, ſays he, make a proportional diſtribution of the debt amongſt us, and each of us contribute a

ſum

ſum ſuitable to his property, and by that means, diſcharge at once all our funds and public mortgages? He ſeems not to have conſider'd, that the laborious poor pay a conſiderable part of the taxes by their annual conſumptions, tho' they cou'd not advance, at once, a proportional part of the ſum requir'd. Not to mention, that property in money and ſtock in trade might eaſily be conceal'd or diſguis'd; and that viſible property in lands and houſes wou'd really at laſt anſwer for the whole: An inequality and oppreſſion, which never wou'd be ſubmitted to. But tho' this project is never likely to take place; 'tis not altogether improbable, that, when the nation become heartily ſick of their debts, and are cruelly oppreſt by them, ſome daring projector may ariſe, with viſionary ſchemes for their diſcharge. And as public credit will begin, by that time, to be a little frail, the leaſt touch will deſtroy it, as happen'd in *France*; and in this manner, it will *dye of the doctor*.*

BUT

* SOME neighbouring ſtates practiſe an eaſy expedient, by which they lighten their public debts. The *French* have a cuſtom (as the *Romans* formerly had) of augmenting their money; and this the nation has been ſo much familiariz'd to, that it hurts not public credit, tho' it be really cutting off at once, by an edict, ſo much of their debts. The *Dutch* diminiſh the intereſt without the conſent of their creditors; or which is the ſame thing, they arbitrarily tax the funds as well as other property. Cou'd we practiſe either of theſe methods, we need never be oppreſt by the national debt; and 'tis not impoſſible but one of theſe, or ſome other method

BUT 'tis more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the neceſſary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities, or even perhaps of victories and conqueſts. I muſt confeſs, when I ſee princes and ſtates fighting and quarreling, amidſt their debts, funds, and public mortgages, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel-playing fought in a *China* ſhop. How can it be expected, that ſovereigns will ſpare a ſpecies of property, which is pernicious to themſelves and to the public, when they have ſo little compaſſion on lives and properties, which are uſeful to both? Let the time come (and ſurely it will come) when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not ſubſcrib'd to, and raiſe not the money projected. Suppoſe, either that the caſh of the nation is exhauſted; or that our faith, which has been hitherto ſo ample, begins to fail us. Suppoſe, that, in this diſtreſs, the nation is threaten'd with an invaſion, a rebellion is ſuſpected or broke out at home, a ſquadron cannot be equipt for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign ſubſidy cannot be advanc'd. What muſt a prince or miniſter do in ſuch an emergence? The right of



method may, at all adventures, be try'd, on the augmentation of our encumbrances and difficulties. But people in this country are ſo good reaſoners upon whatever regards their intereſt, that ſuch a practice will deceive no body; and public credit will probably tumble at once by ſo dangerous a trial.

ſelf-preſervation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our ſtateſmen muſt then be greater than the folly of thoſe who firſt contracted debt, or what is more, than that of thoſe who truſted, or continue to truſt this ſecurity, if theſe ſtateſmen have the means of ſafety in their hands, and do not employ it. The funds, created and mortgag'd, will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, ſufficient for the defence and ſecurity of the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer, ready for the diſcharge of the quarterly intereſt: Neceſſity calls, fear urges, reaſon exhorts, compaſſion alone exclaims: The money will immediately be ſeiz'd for the current ſervice, under the moſt ſolemn proteſtations, perhaps, of being immediately replac'd. But no more is requiſite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thouſands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the *natural death* of public credit: For to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its diſſolution and deſtruction.*

THESE

* So great dupes are the generality of mankind, that, notwithſtanding ſuch a violent ſhock to public credit, as a voluntary bankruptcy in *England* wou'd occaſion, it wou'd not probably be long, e're credit wou'd again revive in as flouriſhing a condition as before. The preſent king of *France*, during the late war, borrow'd money at lower intereſt than ever his grandfather did; and as low as the *Britiſh* parliament, comparing the natural rate of intereſt in both kingdoms. And tho' men are commonly more govern'd by

THESE two events, ſuppos'd above, are calamitous, but not the moſt calamitous. Thouſands are thereby ſacrific'd to the ſafety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be ſacrific'd, for ever, to the temporary ſafety of thouſands.* Our po-

by what they have ſeen, than by what they foreſee, with whatever certainty; yet promiſes, proteſtations, fair appearances, with the allurements of preſent intereſt, have ſuch powerful influence as few are able to reſiſt. Mankind are, in all ages, caught by the ſame baits: The ſame tricks, play'd over and over again, ſtill trepan them. The heights of popularity and patriotiſm are ſtill the beaten road to power and tyranny; flattery to treachery; ſtanding armies to arbitrary government; and the glory of God to the temporal intereſt of the clergy. The fear of an everlaſting deſtruction of credit, allowing it to be an evil, is a needleſs bugbear. A prudent man, in reality, wou'd rather lend to the public immediately after they had taken a ſpunge to their debts than at preſent; as much as an opulent knave, even tho' one cou'd not force him to pay, is a preferable debtor to an honeſt bankrupt: For the former, in order to carry on buſineſs, may find it his intereſt to diſcharge his debts, where they are not exorbitant: The latter has it not in his power. The reaſoning of *Tacitus, hiſt. lib* 3. as it is eternally true, is very applicable to our preſent caſe. *Sed vulgus ad magnitudinem beneficiorum aderat: Stultiſſimus quiſque pecuniis mercabatur: Apud ſapientes caſſa habebantur, quæ neque dari neque accepi, ſalva republica, poterant.* The public is a debtor, whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check, which the creditors have on it, is the intereſt of preſerving credit; an intereſt, which may eaſily be overbalanc'd by a very great debt; and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even ſuppoſing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention, that a preſent neceſſity often forces ſtates into meaſures, which are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, againſt their intereſt.

*I HAVE heard it has been computed, that the whole creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17000.

Theſe

popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult or dangerous for a miniſter to venture on ſo deſperate an expedient, as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And tho' the houſe of lords be altogether compos'd of the proprietors of lands, and the houſe of commons chiefly; and conſequently neither of them can be ſuppos'd to have great property in the funds; yet the connexions of the members may be ſo great with the proprietors, as to render them more tenacious of public faith, than prudence, policy, or even juſtice, ſtrictly ſpeaking, requires. And perhaps too, our foreign enemies, or rather enemy (for we have but one to dread) may be ſo politic as to diſcover, that our ſafety lyes in deſpair, and may not, therefore, ſhow the danger, open and bare-fac'd, 'till it be inevitable. The balance of power in *Europe*, our grandfathers, our fathers, and we, have all juſtly eſteem'd too unequal to be preſerv'd without our attention and aſſiſtance. But our chil-

Theſe make a figure at preſent on their income; but in caſe of a public bankruptcy, wou'd, in an inſtant, become the loweſt, as well as the moſt wretched of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted; and wou'd render the contention very unequal, if ever we come to that extremity. One wou'd incline to aſſign to this event a very near period, ſuch as half a century, had not our fathers propheſies of this kind been already found fallacious, by the duration of our public credit, ſo much beyond all reaſonable expectation. When the aſtrologers in *France* were every year foretelling the death of *Harry* the IV. *Theſe fellows*, ſays he, *muſt be right at laſt*. We ſhall, therefore, be more cautious than to aſſign any preciſe date; and ſhall content ourſelves with pointing out the event in general.

children, weary with the ſtruggle, and fetter'd with incumbrances, may ſit down ſecure, and ſee their neighbours oppreſt and conquer'd; till at laſt, they themſelves and their creditors lye both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may properly enough be denominated the *violent death* of our public credit.

THESE ſeem to be the events, which are not very remote, and which reaſon foreſees as clearly almoſt as ſhe can do any thing, that lyes in the womb of time. And tho' the antients maintain'd, that, in order to reach the gift of propheſy, a certain divine fury or madneſs was requiſite; one may ſafely affirm, that, in order to deliver ſuch propheſies as theſe, no more is neceſſary, than merely to be in one's ſenſes, free from the influence of popular madneſs and deluſion.

# DISCOURSE IX.

## *Of ſome remarkable cuſtoms.*

I SHALL obſerve three remarkable cuſtoms in three celebrated governments; and ſhall conclude from the whole, that all general maxims in politics ought to be eſtabliſh'd with great reſerve, and that irregular and extraordinary appearances are frequently diſcover'd, in the moral, as well as in the phyſical world. The former, perhaps, we can better account for, after they happen, from ſprings and principles, of which every one has, within himſelf, or from obvious obſervation, the ſtrongeſt aſſurance and conviction: But 'tis often fully as impoſſible for human prudence, before hand, to foreſee and foretell them.

I. ONE wou'd think it eſſential to every ſupreme council or aſſembly, which debates, that entire liberty of ſpeech ſhou'd be granted to every member, and that all motions or reaſonings ſhou'd be receiv'd, which can any way tend to illuſtrate the point under deliberation. One wou'd conclude, with ſtill greater aſſurance, that, after a motion was made, which was voted and approv'd by that aſſembly, in which the legiſlature is lodg'd, the member, who made the motion, muſt, for ever, be exempt-

exempted from farther trial and enquiry. But no political maxim can, at firſt ſight, appear more undiſputable, than that he muſt, at leaſt, be ſecur'd from all inferior juriſdiction; and that nothing leſs, than the ſame ſupreme legiſlative aſſembly, in their ſubſequent meetings, cou'd render him accountable for thoſe motions and harangues, which they had before approv'd of. But theſe axioms, however irrefragable they may appear, have all fail'd in the *Athenian* government, from cauſes and principles too, which appear almoſt inevitable.

By the γραφη παρανομων or *indictment of illegality*, (tho' it has not been remark'd by antiquaries or commentators) any man was try'd and puniſh'd, in a common court of judicature, for any law, which had paſs'd upon his motion, in the aſſembly of the people, if that law appeared to the court unjuſt or prejudicial to the public. Thus *Demoſthenes*, finding that ſhip money was levy'd irregularly, and that the poor bore the ſame burthen as the rich, in equipping the gallies, corrected this inequality by a very uſeful law, which proportion'd the expence to the revenue and income of each individual. He mov'd for this law in the aſſembly; he prov'd its advantages;* he convinc'd the people, the only legiſlature in *Athens*; the law paſs'd; and was carried into execution: And yet he was try'd in a criminal court for that law, upon the complaint

* His harangue for it is ſtill extant; περὶ Συμμοριας.

plaint of the rich, who reſented the alteration he had introduc'd into the finances.* He was, indeed, acquitted, upon proving anew the uſefulneſs of his law.

*Cteſiphon* mov'd in the aſſembly of the people, that particular honours ſhou'd be conferr'd on *Demoſthenes*, as on a citizen affectionate and uſeful to the commonwealth: The people, convinc'd of this truth, voted thoſe honours: Yet was *Cteſiphon* try'd by the γραφη παρανομων. It was aſſerted, amongſt other topics, that *Demoſthenes* was not a good citizen, nor affectionate to the commonwealth: And the orator was called upon to defend his friend, and conſequently himſelf; which he executed by that ſublime piece of eloquence, that has ever ſince been the admiration of mankind.

AFTER the fatal battle of *Chæronea*, a law was paſt, upon the motion of *Hyperides*, giving liberty to ſlaves, and enrolling them in the troops.† On account of this law, the orator was afterwards try'd by the indictment above mention'd; and defended himſelf, amongſt other topics, by that ſtroke celebrated by *Plutarch* and *Longinus*. *It was not I,*

 ſaid

* *Pro Cteſiphonte.*

† *Plutarch in vita decem oratorum.* *Demoſthenes* gives a different account of this law *contra Ariſtogiton, orat.* II. He ſays, that its purport was, to render the ατιμοι επιτιμοι, or to reſtore the privilege of bearing offices to thoſe who had been declar'd incapable. Perhaps, theſe were both clauſes of the ſame law.

ſaid he, *that mov'd for this law: It was the neceſſities of war; it was the battle of Chæronea.* The orations of *Demoſthenes* abound with many inſtances of trials of this nature, and prove clearly, that nothing was more commonly practis'd.

THE *Athenian* democracy was ſuch a mobbiſh government, as we can ſcarce form a notion of in the preſent age of the world. The whole collective body of the people voted in every law, without any limitation of property, without any diſtinction of rank, without controul from any magiſtracy or ſenate;* and conſequently with little regard to order, juſtice, or prudence. The *Athenians* ſoon became ſenſible of the miſchiefs attending this conſtitution: But being averſe to the checking themſelves by any rule or reſtriction, they reſolv'd, at leaſt, to check their demagogues or counſellors, by the fear of future puniſhment and enquiry. They accordingly inſtituted this remarkable law; a law eſteem'd ſo eſſential to their government, that *Æſchines* inſiſts on it, as a known truth, that were it aboliſh'd or neglected, it were impoſſible for the democracy to ſubſiſt.†

THE

* THE ſenate of the Bean was only a leſs numerous mob, choſen by lot from among the people; and their authority was not great.

† *In Cteſiphontem.* 'Tis remarkable, that the firſt ſtep, after the diſſolution of the democracy by *Critias* and the Thirty, was to

THE people fear'd not any ill conſequences to liberty from the authority of the criminal courts; becauſe theſe were nothing but very numerous juries, choſen by lot from amongſt the people. And they conſider'd themſelves juſtly as in a ſtate of pupillage, where they had an authority, after they came to the uſe of reaſon, not only to retract and controul whatever had been determin'd, but to puniſh any guardian for meaſures, which they had embrac'd by his perſuaſion. The ſame law had place in *Thebes*;* and for the ſame reaſon.

IT appears to have been an uſual practice in *Athens*, on the eſtabliſhment of any law, eſteem'd very uſeful or popular, to prohibit for ever its abrogation and repeal. Thus the demagogue, who diverted all the public revenues to the ſupport of ſhows and ſpectacles, made it criminal ſo much as to move for a reverſement of this law.† Thus *Leptines* mov'd for a law, not only to recal all the immunities formerly granted, but to deprive the people for the future of the power of granting any more.‡ Thus all bills of attrainder ⁎ were forbid, or laws that affect one *Athenian*, without extending to the whole com-

to annul the γεγραφη παρανομων; as we learn from *Demoſthenes* κατα Τιμοκ. The orator in this oration gives us the words of the law, eſtabliſhing the γεγραφη παρανομων. Page 297 *ex edit. Aldi.* And he accounts for it, from the ſame principles, that we here reaſon upon.

* *Plut. in vita Pelop.* † *Demoſt. Olynth.* 1. 2.

‡ *Demoſt. contra Lept.* ⁎ *Demoſt. contra Ariſtocratem.*

commonwealth. Theſe abſurd clauſes, by which the legiſlature vainly attempted to bind itſelf for ever, proceeded from an univerſal ſenſe of the levity and inconſtancy of the people.

II. A WHEEL within a wheel, ſuch as we obſerve in the *German* empire, is conſider'd by lord *Shaftsbury*, * as an abſurdity in politics: But what muſt we ſay to two equal wheels, which govern the ſame political machine, without any mutual check, controul, or ſubordination; and yet preſerve the greateſt harmony and concord? To eſtabliſh two diſtinct legiſlatures, each of which poſſeſſes full and abſolute authority within itſelf, and ſtands in no need of the other's aſſiſtance, in order to give validity to its acts; this may appear, before hand, altogether impracticable, as long as men are actuated by the paſſions of ambition, emulation, and avarice, which have been hitherto their chief governing principles. And ſhou'd I aſſert, that the ſtate I have in my eye was divided by two diſtinct factions, each of which predominated in a diſtinct legiſlature, and yet produc'd no claſhing of theſe independent powers; the ſuppoſition may appear almoſt incredible. And if, to augment the paradox, I ſhou'd affirm, that this disjointed, irregular government was the moſt active, triumphant, and illuſtrious commonwealth, that ever yet appear'd on the

† ESSAY on the freedom of wit and humour. Part 3. ſect. 2.

the ſtage of the world; I ſhou'd certainly be told, that ſuch a political chimera was as abſurd as any viſion of the poets. But there is no need for ſearching long, in order to prove the reality of the foregoing ſuppoſitions: For this was actually the caſe with the *Roman* republic.

THE legiſlative power was there lodged both in the *comitia centuriata* and *comitia tributa*. In the former, 'tis well known, the people voted accordingly to their *cenſus*; ſo that when the firſt claſs was unanimous, (as commonly happen'd) tho' it contain'd not, perhaps, the hundredth part of the commonwealth, it determin'd the whole; and with the authority of the ſenate, eſtabliſh'd a law. In the latter, every vote was alike; and as the authority of the ſenate was not there requiſite, the lower people entirely prevail'd, and gave law to the whole ſtate. In all party diviſions, at firſt betwixt the *Patricians* and *Plebeians*, afterwards betwixt the nobles and the people, the intereſt of the Ariſtocracy was predominant in the firſt legiſlature; that of the Democracy in the ſecond: The one cou'd always deſtroy what the other had eſtabliſh'd: Nay, the one, by a ſudden and unforeſeen motion, might take the ſtart of the other; and totally annihilate its rival, by a vote, which, from the nature of the conſtitution, had the full authority of a law. But no ſuch conteſt or ſtruggle is obſerv'd in the hiſtory of *Rome*: No inſtance of a quarrel betwixt theſe two legiſla-

tures;

tures; tho' many betwixt the parties, that govern'd in each. Whence aroſe this concord, which may ſeem ſo extraordinary?

THE legiſlature eſtabliſh'd at *Rome*, by the authority of *Servius Tullius*, was the *comitia centuriata*, which, after the expulſion of the kings, render'd the government, for ſome time, altogether ariſtocratical. But the people, having numbers and force on their ſide, and being elated with frequent conqueſts and victories in their foreign wars, always prevail'd when puſh'd to extremities, and firſt extorted from the ſenate the magiſtracy of the tribunes, and then the legiſlative power of the *comitia tributa*. It then behov'd the nobles to be more careful than ever not to provoke the people. For beſide the force, which the latter were always poſſeſt of, they had now got poſſeſſion of legal authority, and cou'd inſtantly break in pieces any order or inſtitution, which directly oppos'd them. By intrigue, by influence, by money, by combination, and by the reſpect paid their character; the nobles might often prevail, and direct the whole machine of government: But had they openly ſet their *comitia centuriata* in oppoſition to the *tributa*, they had ſoon loſt the advantage of that inſtitution, along with their conſuls, prætors, ediles, and all the magiſtrates elected by it. But the *comitia tributa*, not having the ſame reaſon for reſpecting the *centuriata*, frequently repeal'd laws favourable to the

the ariſtocracy: They limited the authority of the nobles; protected the people from oppreſſion; and controul'd the actions of the ſenate and magiſtracy. The *centuriata* found it convenient always to ſubmit; and tho' equal in authority, yet being inferior in power, durſt never directly give any ſhock to the other legiſlature, either by repealing its laws, or eſtabliſhing laws, which, it foreſaw, wou'd ſoon be repeal'd by it.

No inſtance is found of any oppoſition or ſtruggle betwixt theſe *comitia*; except one ſlight attempt of this kind, mention'd by *Appian* in the 3d book of his civil wars. *Mark Anthony* reſolving to deprive *Decimus Brutus* of the government of *Ciſalpine Gaul*, rail'd in the *Forum*, and call'd one of the *comitia*, in order to prevent the meeting of the other, which had been order'd by the ſenate. But affairs were then fallen into ſuch confuſion, and the *Roman* conſtitution was ſo near its laſt extremity, that no inference can be drawn from ſuch an expedient. This conteſt, beſides, was founded more on form than party. 'Twas the ſenate, who order'd the *comitia tributa*, that they might obſtruct the meeting of the *centuriata*, which, by the conſtitution, or at leaſt forms of the government, cou'd alone diſpoſe of provinces.

*Cicero* was recall'd by the *comitia centuriata*; tho' baniſh'd by the *tributa*, that is, by a *plebiſcitum*: But

But his baniſhment, we may obſerve, never was conſider'd as a legal deed, ariſing from the free choice and inclination of the people. It was always aſcrib'd to the violence alone of *Clodius*, and the diſorders introduc'd by him into the government.

III. THE *third* cuſtom we propos'd to obſerve regards *England*; and tho' it be not ſo important as thoſe, which we have pointed out in *Athens* and *Rome*, it is no leſs ſingular and remarkable. 'Tis a maxim in politics, which we readily admit as undiſputed and univerſal, that a power, however great, when granted by law to an eminent magiſtrate, is not ſo dangerous to liberty, as an authority, however inconſiderable, which he acquires from violence and uſurpation. For beſides that the law always limits every power, which it beſtows; the very receiving it as a conceſſion eſtabliſhes the authority whence it is deriv'd, and preſerves the harmony of the conſtitution. By the ſame right that one prerogative is aſſum'd without law, another may alſo be claim'd, and another, with ſtill greater facility: While the firſt uſurpations both ſerve as precedents to the following, and give force to maintain them. Hence the heroiſm of *Hampden*, who ſuſtain'd the whole violence of royal proſecution rather than pay a tax of 20 ſhillings, not impos'd by parliament: Hence the care of all *Engliſh* patriots to guard againſt the firſt encroach-

croachments of the crown: And hence alone the exiſtence, at this day, of *Engliſh* liberty.

THERE is, however, one occaſion, wherein the parliament has departed from this maxim; and that is, in the *preſſing of ſeamen*. The exerciſe of an illegal power is here tacitly permitted in the crown; and tho' it has frequently been deliberated on, how that power might be render'd legal, and under what reſtrictions it might be granted to the ſovereign, no ſafe expedient cou'd ever be propos'd for that purpoſe, and the danger to liberty always appear'd greater from law than from uſurpation. While this power is exercis'd to no other end than to man the navy, men willingly ſubmit to it, from a ſenſe of its uſe and neceſſity; and the ſailors, who are alone affected by it, find no body to ſupport them, in claiming the rights and privileges, which the law grants, without diſtinction, to all *Engliſh* ſubjects. But were this power, on any occaſion, made an inſtrument of faction or miniſterial tyranny, the oppoſite faction, and indeed all lovers of their country, wou'd immediately take the alarm, and ſupport the injur'd party: The liberty of *Engliſhmen* wou'd be aſſerted: Juries wou'd be implacable; and the tools of tyranny, acting both againſt law and equity, wou'd meet with the ſevereſt vengeance. On the other hand, were the parliament to grant ſuch an authority, they wou'd probably fall into one of theſe two inconveniencies: They wou'd either beſtow it under ſo

many reſtrictions as wou'd make it loſe its effects, by cramping the authority of the crown; or they wou'd render it ſo large and comprehenſive, as might give occaſion to great abuſes, for which we cou'd, in that caſe, have no remedy. The very illegality of the power, at preſent, prevents its abuſes, by affording ſo eaſy a remedy againſt them.

I PRETEND not, by this reaſoning, to exclude all poſſibility of contriving a regiſter for ſeamen, which might mann the navy, without being dangerous to liberty. I only obſerve, that no ſatisfactory ſcheme of that nature has yet been propos'd. Rather than adopt any project hitherto invented, we continue a practice ſeemingly the moſt abſurd and unaccountable. Authority, in times of full internal peace and concord, is arm'd againſt law: A continu'd and open uſurpation in the crown is permitted, amidſt the greateſt jealouſy and watchfulneſs in the people; nay proceeding from thoſe very principles: Liberty, in a country of the higheſt liberty, is left entirely to its own defence, without any countenance or protection: The wild ſtate of nature is renew'd, in one of the moſt civiliz'd ſocieties of mankind: And great violences and diſorders, amongſt the people, the moſt humane and the beſt natur'd, are committed with impunity; while the one party pleads obedience to the ſupreme magiſtrate, the other the permiſſion of fundamental laws.

DIS-

# DISCOURSE X.

## *Of the Populouſneſs of antient Nations.**

THERE is very little ground, either from reaſon or experience, to conclude the univerſe eternal or incorruptible. The continual and rapid motion of matter, the violent revolutions with which every part is agitated, the changes remark'd in the heavens, the plain traces, as well as tradition, of an univerſal deluge or general convulſion of the elements; all theſe prove ſtrongly the mortality of this fabric of the world, and its paſſage, by corruption or diſſolution, from one ſtate or order to another. It muſt, therefore, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age, as well as each individual form, which it contains, and 'tis probable, that, in all theſe variations, man, equally with every animal and

* An eminent clergyman in *Edinburgh*, having wrote, ſome years ago, a diſcourſe on the ſame queſtion with this, of the populouſneſs of antient nations, was pleas'd lately to communicate it to the author. It maintain'd the oppoſite ſide of the argument, to what is here inſiſted on, and contained much erudition and good reaſoning. The author acknowledges to have borrow'd, with ſome variations, from that diſcourſe, two computations, that with regard to the number of inhabitants in *Belgium*, and that with regard to thoſe in *Epirus*. If this learned gentleman be prevail'd on to publiſh his diſſertation, it will ſerve to give great light into the preſent queſtion, the moſt curious and important of all queſtions of erudition.

and vegetable, will partake. In the flouriſhing age of the world, it may be expected, that the human ſpecies ſhou'd poſſeſs greater vigour both of mind and body, more proſperous health, higher ſpirits, longer life, and a ſtronger inclination and power of generation. But if the general ſyſtem of things, and human ſociety of courſe, have any ſuch gradual revolutions, they are too ſlow to be diſcernible in that ſhort period, which is comprehended by hiſtory and tradition. Stature and force of body, length of life, even courage and extent of genius, ſeem hitherto to have been naturally, in all ages, pretty much the ſame. The arts and ſciences, indeed, have flouriſh'd in one period, and have decay'd in another: But we may obſerve, that at the time when they roſe to greateſt perfection amongſt one people, they were perhaps totally unknown to all the neighbouring nations; and tho' they univerſally decay'd in one age, yet in a ſucceeding generation they again reviv'd, and diffus'd themſelves over the world. As far, therefore, as obſervation reaches, there is no univerſal difference diſcernible in the human ſpecies; and tho' it were allow'd, that the univerſe, like an animal body, had a natural progreſs from infancy to old age, yet as it muſt ſtill be uncertain, whether, at preſent, it be advancing to its point of perfection, or declining from it, we cannot thence preſuppoſe any decay in human nature.* To prove,

* *Collumela* ſays, lib. 3. cap. 8. that in *Ægypt* and *Africa* the bearing of twins was frequent and even cuſtomary, *gemini partus fami-*

prove, therefore, or account for the greater populouſneſs of antiquity, by the imaginary youth or vigour of the world, will ſcarce be admitted by any juſt reaſoner. Theſe *general phyſical* cauſes ought entirely to be excluded from that queſtion.

THERE are indeed ſome more *particular phyſical* cauſes of great importance. Diſeaſes are mention'd in antiquity, which are almoſt unknown to modern medicine; and new diſeaſes have ariſen and propagated themſelves, of which there are no traces in ancient hiſtory. And in this particular, we may obſerve, upon compariſon, that the diſadvantage is very much on the ſide of the moderns. Not to mention ſome others of leſs importance, the ſmall pox commits ſuch ravages, as would almoſt alone account for the great ſuperiority ſuppos'd in antient times. The tenth or the twelfth part of mankind, deſtroy'd every generation, ſhou'd make a vaſt difference, it may be thought, in the numbers of the people; and when join'd to venereal diſtempers, a new plague diffus'd every where, this diſeaſe is perhaps equivalent, by its conſtant operation, to the three great ſcourges of mankind, war, peſti-

*familiares, ac pæne ſolennes ſunt.* If this was true, there is a phyſical difference both in countries and ages. For travellers make no ſuch remark of thoſe countries at preſent. On the contrary, we are apt to ſuppoſe the northern nations more fertile. As thoſe two countries were provinces of the *Roman* empire, it is difficult, tho' not altogether abſurd, to ſuppoſe, that ſuch a man as *Columella* might be miſtaken with regard to them.

peſtilence, and famine. Were it certain, therefore, that antient times were more populous than the preſent, and cou'd no moral cauſes be aſſign'd for ſo great a change; theſe phyſical cauſes alone, in the opinion of many, wou'd be ſufficient to give us ſatisfaction on that head.

But is it certain, that antiquity was ſo much more populous, as is pretended? The extravagancies of *Voſſius*, with regard to this ſubject, are well known: But an author of much greater genius and diſcernment has ventur'd to affirm, that, according to the beſt computations, which theſe ſubjects will admit of, there are not now the fiftieth part of mankind on the face of the earth, which exiſted in the time of *Julius Cæſar*.* It may eaſily be obſerv'd, that the compariſons, in this caſe, muſt be very imperfect; even tho' we confine ourſelves to the ſcene of antient hiſtory, *Europe* and the nations about the *Mediterranean*. We know not exactly the numbers of any *European* kingdom, or even city, at preſent: How can we pretend to calculate thoſe of antient cities and ſtates, where hiſtorians have left us ſuch imperfect traces? For my part, the matter appears to me ſo uncertain, that, as I intend to throw together ſome reflexions on that head, I ſhall intermingle the enquiry concerning *cauſes* with that concerning *facts*; which

* *Lettres Perſanes.* See alſo *L'Eſprit des Loix liv.* 23. chap. 17, 18, 19.

which ought never to be admitted, where the facts can be aſcertain'd with any tolerable aſſurance. We ſhall *firſt* conſider, whether it be probable, from what we know of the ſituation of ſociety in both periods, that antiquity muſt have been more populous. *Secondly*, Whether in reality it was ſo. If I can make appear, that the concluſion is not ſo certain, as is pretended, in favour of antiquity, 'tis all I aſpire to.

In general, we may obſerve, that the queſtion with regard to the comparative populouſneſs of ages or kingdoms implies very important conſequences, and commonly determines concerning the preference of their whole police, manners, and conſtitution of government. For as there is in all men, both male and female, a deſire and power of generation more active than is ever univerſally exerted, the reſtraints, which it lyes under, muſt proceed from ſome difficulties in mens ſituation, which it belongs to a wiſe legiſlature carefully to obſerve and remove. Almoſt every man, who thinks he can maintain a family, will have one; and the human ſpecies, at this rate of propagation, wou'd more than double every generation, were every one coupled as ſoon as he comes to the age of puberty. How faſt do mankind multiply in every colony or new ſettlement; where it is an eaſy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no way ſtraitned or confin'd, as in long eſtabliſh'd governments? Hiſtory

ſtory tells us frequently of plagues, that have ſwept away the third or fourth part of a people: Yet in a generation or two, the deſtruction was not perceiv'd; and the ſociety had again acquir'd their former number. The lands, that were cultivated, the houſes built, the commodities rais'd, the riches acquir'd, enabled the people, who eſcap'd, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which ſupply'd the place of thoſe who had periſh'd.* And for a like reaſon, every wiſe, juſt, and mild government, by rendering the condition of its ſubjects eaſy and ſecure, will always abound moſt in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whoſe climate and ſoil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one, which produces only corn, and that more populous than one, which is only fitted for paſturage. But if every thing elſe be equal, it ſeems natural to expect, that whereever there are moſt happineſs and virtue and the wiſeſt inſtitutions, there will alſo be moſt people.

THE queſtion, therefore, concerning the populouſneſs of antient and modern times being allow'd of great importance, 'twill be requiſite, if we wou'd bring

* THIS too is a good reaſon, why the ſmall pox does not depopulate countries ſo much as may at firſt ſight be imagin'd. Where there is room for more people, they will always ariſe, even without the aſſiſtance of naturalization bills. 'Tis remarkt by *Don Geronimo de Uſtariz*, that the provinces of *Spain*, which ſend moſt people to the *Indies*, are moſt populous; which proceeds from their ſuperior riches.

bring it to ſome determination, to compare both the *domeſtic* and *political* ſituation of theſe two periods, in order to judge of the facts by their moral cauſes; which is the firſt view, in which we propos'd to conſider them.

THE chief difference betwixt the *domeſtic* oeconomy of the antients and that of the moderns conſiſts in the practice of ſlavery, which prevail'd amongſt the former, and which has been aboliſh'd for ſome centuries throughout the greateſt part of *Europe*. Some paſſionate admirers of the antients and zealous partizans of civil liberty (for theſe ſentiments, as they are both of them, in the main, extremely juſt, are alſo found to be almoſt inſeparable) cannot forbear regreting the loſs of this inſtitution; and whilſt they brand all ſubmiſſion to the government of a ſingle perſon, with the harſh denomination of ſlavery, they wou'd gladly ſubject the greateſt part of mankind to real ſlavery and ſubjection. But to one, who conſiders coolly of the ſubject, it will appear, that human nature, in general, really enjoys more liberty at preſent, in the moſt arbitrary government of *Europe*, than it ever did during the moſt flouriſhing period of antient times. As much as ſubmiſſion to a petty prince, whoſe dominions extend not beyond a ſingle city, is more grievous than obedience to a great monarch; ſo much is domeſtic ſlavery more cruel and oppreſſive than any civil ſubjection whatſoever.

The more the maſter is remov'd from us in place and rank, the greater liberty do we enjoy; the leſs are our actions inſpected and controul'd; and the fainter that cruel compariſon becomes betwixt our own ſubjection, and the freedom and even dominion of another. The remains, that are left of domeſtic ſlavery, in our colonies, and amongſt ſome *European* nations, wou'd never ſurely create a deſire of rendering it more univerſal. The little humanity commonly obſerv'd in perſons, accuſtom'd, from their infancy, to exerciſe ſo great authority over their fellow creatures, and to trample upon human nature, were ſufficient alone to diſguſt us with that authority. Nor can a more probable reaſon be given for the ſevere, I might ſay, barbarous, manners of antient times, than the practice of domeſtic ſlavery; by which every man of rank was render'd a petty tyrant, and educated amidſt the flattery, ſubmiſſion, and low debaſement of his ſlaves.

ACCORDING to the antient practice, all checks were on the inferior, to reſtrain him to the duty of ſubmiſſion; none on the ſuperior, to engage him to the reciprocal duties of gentleneſs and humanity. In modern times, a bad ſervant finds not eaſily a good maſter, nor a bad maſter a good ſervant; and the checks are mutual, ſuitable to the inviolate and eternal laws of reaſon and equity.

THE

THE cuſtom of expoſing old, uſeleſs, or ſick ſlaves in an iſland of the *Tyber*, there to ſtarve, ſeems to have been pretty common in *Rome*; and whoever recover'd, after having been ſo expos'd, had his liberty given him, by an edict of the emperor *Claudius*; where it was likeways forbid to kill any ſlave, merely for old age or ſickneſs.* But ſuppoſing, that this edict was ſtrictly obey'd, wou'd it better the domeſtic treatment of ſlaves, or render their lives much more comfortable? We may imagine what others wou'd practiſe, when it was the profeſt maxim of the elder *Cato* to ſell his ſuperannuated ſlaves for any price, rather than maintain what he eſteem'd an uſeleſs burthen.†

THE *ergaſtula* or dungeons, where ſlaves in chains were beat to work, were very common all over *Italy*. *Columella* ‡ adviſes, that they be always built under ground; and recommends‡ it as the duty of a careful overſeer to call over every day the names of theſe ſlaves, like the muſtering of a regiment or ſhip's company, in order to know preſently when any of them had deſerted. A proof of the frequency of theſe *ergaſtula*, and of the great number of ſlaves confin'd in them. *Partem Italiæ ergaſtula a ſolitudine vindicant*, ſays *Livy*.

A

* *Suetonius in vita Claudii.* † *Plut. in vita Catonis.*
‡ Lib. 1. cap. 6. ‡ Id. lib. 11. cap. 1.

A CHAIN'D ſlave for a porter was uſual in *Rome*, as appears from *Ovid*,* and other authors.† Had not theſe people ſhaken off all ſenſe of compaſſion towards that unhappy part of their ſpecies, wou'd they have preſented all their friends, at the firſt entrance, with ſuch an image of the ſeverity of the maſter, and miſery of the ſlave?

NOTHING ſo common in all trials, even of civil cauſes, as to call for the evidence of ſlaves; which was always extorted by the moſt exquiſite torments. *Demoſthenes* ſays,‡ that where it was poſſible to produce, for the ſame fact, either freemen or ſlaves as witneſſes, the judges always preferr'd the torturing of ſlaves, as a more certain and infallible evidence.†

*Seneca* draws a picture of that diſorderly luxury, which changes day into night and night into day, and inverts every ſtated hour of every office in life. Amongſt other circumſtances, ſuch as diſplacing the meals and time of bathing, he mentions, that, regularly, about the third hour of the night, the neigh-

* *Amor.* lib. 1. eleg. 6.

† *Sueton. de claris rhetor.* So alſo the antient poet *Janitoris tintinnire impedimenta audio.*

‡ *In Oneterom. orat.* 1.

† THE ſame practice was common in *Rome*; but *Cicero* ſeems not to think this evidence ſo certain as the teſtimony of free citizens, *Pro Cœlio*,

neighbours of one, who indulges this falſe refinement, hear the noiſe of whips and laſhes; and upon enquiry, find he is then taking an account of the conduct of his ſervants, and giving them due correction and diſcipline. This is not remark'd as an inſtance of cruelty, but only of diſorder, which, even in actions the moſt uſual and methodical, changes the fixt hours, that an eſtabliſh'd cuſtom had aſſign'd them.*

But our preſent buſineſs is only to conſider the influence of ſlavery on the populouſneſs of a ſtate. 'Tis pretended, that, in this particular, the antient practice has infinitely the advantage, and was the the chief cauſe of that extreme populouſneſs, which is

* *Epiſt.* 122. The inhuman ſports, exhibited at *Rome*, may juſtly be conſider'd too as an effect of the people's contempt for ſlaves, and was alſo a great cauſe of the general inhumanity of their princes and rulers. Who can read the accounts of the amphitheatrical entertainments without horror? Or who is ſurpris'd, that the emperors ſhou'd treat that people in the ſame way the people treated their inferiors? One's humanity, on that occaſion, is apt to renew the barbarous wiſh of *Caligula*, that the people had but one neck. A man cou'd almoſt be pleas'd, by a ſingle blow, to put an end to ſuch a race of monſters. You may thank God, ſays the author above cited (*epiſt.* 7.) addreſſing himſelf to the *Romans* people, that you have a maſter, (*viz.* the mild and merciful *Nero*) who is incapable of learning cruelty from your example. This was ſpoke in the beginning of his reign: But he fitted them very well afterwards; and no doubt, was conſiderably improv'd by the ſight of the barbarous objects, to which he had, from his infancy, been accuſtom'd.

is ſuppos'd in thoſe times. At preſent, all maſters diſcourage the marrying of their male ſervants, and admit not by any means the marriage of the female, who are then ſuppos'd altogether incapacitated for their ſervice. But where the property of the ſervants is lodg'd in the maſter, their marriage and fertility form his riches, and bring him a ſucceſſion of ſlaves that ſupply the place of thoſe, whom age and infirmity have diſabled. He encourages, therefore, their propagation, as much as that of his cattle; rears the young with the ſame care; and educates them to ſome art or calling, which may render them more uſeful or valuable to him. The opulent are, by this policy, intereſted in the being at leaſt, tho' not the well-being of the poor; and enrich themſelves by encreaſing the number and induſtry of thoſe, who are ſubjected to them. Each man, being a ſovereign in his own family, has the ſame intereſt with regard to it, as the prince with regard to the ſtate; and has not, like the prince, any oppoſite motives of ambition or vain-glory, which may lead him to depopulate his little ſovereignty. All of it is, at all times, under his eye; and he has leiſure to inſpect the moſt minute detail of the marriage and education of his ſubjects.*

SUCH

* WE may here obſerve, that if domeſtic ſlavery really encreas'd populouſneſs, it wou'd be an exception to the general rule, that the happineſs of any ſociety and its populouſneſs are neceſſary attendants.

SUCH are the conſequences of domeſtic ſlavery, according to the firſt aſpect and appearance of things: But if we enter deeper into the ſubject, we ſhall perhaps find reaſon to retract our haſty determinations. The compariſon is ſhocking betwixt the management of human creatures and that of cattle; but being extremely juſt, when apply'd to the preſent ſubject, it may be proper to trace the conſequences of it. At the capital, near all great cities, in all populous, rich, induſtrious provinces, few cattle are bred. Proviſions, lodging, attendance, labour are there dear; and men find better their account in buying the cattle, after they come to a certain age, from the remoter and cheaper countries. Theſe are conſequently the only breeding countries for cattle; and by a parity of reaſon, for men too, when the latter are put on the ſame footing with the former. To rear a child in *London*, till he cou'd be ſerviceable, wou'd coſt much dearer, than to buy one of the ſame age from *Scotland* or *Ireland*; where he had been rais'd in a cottage, cover'd with rags, and fed on oatmeal or potatoes. Thoſe who had ſlaves, therefore, in all the richer and more populous countries, wou'd diſcourage the pregnancy of the females, and either pre-

dants. A maſter, from humour or intereſt, may make his ſlaves very unhappy, and yet be careful, from intereſt, to encreaſe their number. Their marriage is not a matter of choice with them, no more than any other action of their life.

prevent or deſtroy the birth. The human ſpecies wou'd periſh in thoſe places, where it ought to encreaſe the faſteſt; and a perpetual recruit be needed from all the poorer and more deſart provinces. Such a continu'd drain wou'd tend mightily to depopulate the ſtate, and render great cities ten times more deſtructive than with us; where every man is maſter of himſelf, and provides for his children from the powerful inſtinct of nature, not the calculations of ſordid intereſt. If *London*, at preſent, without much encreaſing, needs a yearly recruit from the country of 5000 people, as is commonly computed: What muſt it require, if the greateſt part of the tradeſmen and common people were ſlaves, and were hinder'd from breeding, by their avaricious maſters?

ALL antient authors tell us, that there was a perpetual flux of ſlaves to *Italy* from the remoter provinces, particularly *Syria*, *Cilicia*,* *Cappadocia*, the leſſer *Aſia*, *Thrace* and *Egypt*: Yet the number of people encreas'd not in *Italy*; and writers complain of the continual decay of induſtry and agriculture.† Where then is that extreme fertility of the *Roman* ſlaves, which is commonly ſuppos'd? So

* TEN thouſand ſlaves in a day have been often ſold for the uſe of the *Romans*, at *Delus* in *Cilicia*. *Strabo*, lib. 14.

† *Columella*, lib. 1. *Proem.* et cap. 2. et 7. *Varro*, lib. 3. cap. 1. *Horace*, lib. 2. od. 15. *Tacit. Annal.* lib. 3. cap. 54. *Sueton. in vita Aug.* cap. 42. *Plin.* lib. 18. cap. 13.

So far from multiplying, they cou'd not, it ſeems, ſo much as keep up the ſtock, without immenſe recruits. And tho' great numbers were continually manumitted, and converted into *Roman* citizens, the numbers even of theſe did not encreaſe;* till the freedom of the city was communicated to foreign provinces.

THE term for a ſlave, born and bred in the family, was *verna*;† and theſe ſlaves ſeem to have been



* *Minore indies plebe ingenua*, ſays *Tacitus*, *ann.* lib. 4. cap 27.

† As *ſervus* was the name of the genus, and *verna* of the ſpecies, without any correlative, this forms a ſtrong preſumption, that the latter were, by far, the leaſt numerous. 'Tis an univerſal obſervation, which we may form upon language, that where two related parts of a whole bear any proportion to each other, in numbers, rank, or conſideration, there are always correlative terms invented, which anſwer to both the parts, and expreſs their mutual relation. If they bear no proportion to each other, the term is only invented for the leſs, and marks its diſtinction from the whole. Thus, man and woman, maſter and ſervant, father and ſon, prince and ſubject, ſtranger and citizen are correlative terms. But the words, ſeaman, carpenter, ſmith, taylor, *&c.* have no correſpondent terms, which expreſs thoſe who are no ſeaman, no carpenter, *&c.* Languages differ very much with regard to the particular words, where this diſtinction obtains; and may thence afford very ſtrong inferences, concerning the manners and cuſtoms of different nations. The military government of the *Roman* emperors had exalted the ſoldiery ſo high, that they balanc'd all the other orders of the ſtate: Hence *miles* and *paganus* became relative terms, a thing, till then, unknown to antient and ſtill ſo to modern languages. Modern ſuperſtition exalted the clergy ſo high, that they overbalanced the whole ſtate: Hence *clergy* and *laity* are terms oppos'd in all modern languages; and in theſe alone. And from

been intitled by cuſtom to privileges and indulgences beyond others; a ſufficient reaſon, why the maſters wou'd not be fond of rearing many of that kind.* Whoever is acquainted with the maxims of our planters will acknowledge the juſtneſs of this obſervation.†

*Atticus* is much prais'd by his hiſtorian for the care which he took in recruiting his family from the ſlaves born in it:‡ May we not thence infer, that that practice was not then very common?

THE names of ſlaves in the *Greek* comedies, *Syrus*, *Myſus*, *Geta*, *Thrax*, *Davus*, *Lydus*, *Phryx*, &c. afford a preſumption, that at *Athens*, at leaſt, moſt of the ſlaves were imported from foreign nations. The

from the ſame principles I infer, that, if the number of ſlaves, bought by the *Romans* from foreign countries, had not extremely exceeded thoſe bred at home, *verna* wou'd have had a correlative, which wou'd have expreſt the former ſpecies of ſlaves. But theſe, it wou'd ſeem, compos'd the main body of the antient ſlaves, and the latter were but a few exceptions.

* *Verna* is us'd by *Roman* writers as a word equivalent to *ſcurra*, on account of the petulance and impudence of thoſe ſlaves. *Mart.* lib. 1. ep. 42. *Horace* alſo mentions the *vernæ procaces*, and *Petronius*, cap. 24. *vernula urbanitas*. *Seneca de provid.* cap. 1. *vernularum licentia*.

† 'TIS computed in the *Weſt Indies*, that a ſtock of ſlaves grow worſe five *per cent.* every year, unleſs new ſlaves be bought to recruit them. They are not able to keep up their own number, even in thoſe warm countries, where cloaths and proviſions are ſo eaſily got. How much more muſt this happen in *European* countries, and in or near great cities?

‡ *Corn. Nepos in vita Attici*.

The *Athenians*, ſays *Strabo*,* gave to their ſlaves, either the names of the nations, whence they were bought, as *Lydus*, *Syrus*, or the names that were moſt common amongſt thoſe nations, as *Manes* or *Midas* to a *Phrygian*, *Tibias* to a *Paphlagonian*.

*Demoſthenes*, after having mention'd a law, which forbid any man to ſtrike the ſlave of another, praiſes the humanity of this law; and adds, that if the barbarians, from whom ſlaves were bought, had information that their countrymen met with ſuch gentle treatment, they wou'd entertain a great eſteem for the *Athenians*.† *Iſocrates*‡ alſo ſays, that all the *Greek* ſlaves were barbarians.

'Tis well known, that *Demoſthenes*, in his non-age, had been defrauded of a large fortune by his tutors, and that afterwards he recover'd, by a proſecution at law, the value of his patrimony. His orations, on that occaſion, ſtill remain, and contain a very exact detail of the whole ſubſtance left by his father,.·. in money, merchandiſe, houſes, and ſlaves, along with the value of each particular. Amongſt the reſt were 52 ſlaves, handicraftſmen, *viz.* 32 ſword-cutlers, and 20 cabinet-makers;() all males, not a word of any wives, children, or family,

* Lib. 7. † *In Midiam*, p. 221. *ex edit. Aldi.*

‡ *Panegyr.* .·. *In Aphobum orat.* 1.

() κλινοποιοι, makers of thoſe beds, which the antients lay upon at meals.

family, which they certainly wou'd have had, had it been a common cuſtom at *Athens* to breed from the ſlaves: And the value of the whole muſt have depended very much on that circumſtance. No female ſlaves are even ſo much as mention'd, except ſome chamber-maids, that belong'd to his mother. This argument has great force, if it be not altogether deciſive.

CONSIDER this paſſage of *Plutarch*,* ſpeaking of the elder *Cato*. "He had a great number of "ſlaves, which he took care to buy at the ſales of "priſoners of war; and he choſe them young, that "they might eaſily be accuſtom'd to any diet or "manner of life, and be inſtructed in any buſi-"neſs or labour, as men teach any thing to young "dogs or horſes.----And eſteeming love the chief "ſource of all diſorders, he allow'd the male ſlaves "to have a commerce with the female in his fa-"mily, upon paying a certain ſum for this privi-"lege: But he ſtrictly forbid all intrigues out of "his family." Are there any ſymptoms in this narration of that care, which is ſuppos'd in the antients, of the marriage and propagation of their ſlaves? If that was a common practice, founded on general intereſt, it wou'd ſurely have been embrac'd by *Cato*, who was a great oeconomiſt, and liv'd

* *In vita Catonis.*

liv'd in times, when the antient frugality and ſimplicity of manners were ſtill in credit and reputation.

It is expreſsly remark'd by the writers of the *Roman* law, that ſcarce any ever purchaſe ſlaves with a view of breeding from them.*

Our lackeys and chamber-maids, I own, do not ſerve much to multiply the ſpecies: But the antients, beſide thoſe who attended on their perſon, had all their labour perform'd by ſlaves, who liv'd, many of them, in their family; and ſome great men poſſeſt to the number of 10,000. If there be any ſuſ-

* *Non temere ancillæ ejus rei cauſa comparantur ut pariant. Digeſt.* lib. 5. tit. 3. *de hæred. petit. lex* 27. The following texts are to the ſame purpoſe. *Spadonem morboſum non eſſe, neque vitioſum, verius mihi videtur; ſed ſanum eſſe, ſicuti illum qui unum teſticulum habet, qui etiam generare poteſt. Digeſt.* lib. 2. tit. 1. *de ædilicio edicto lex* 6. ſect. 2. *Sin autem quis ita ſpado ſit, ut tam neceſſaria pars corporis penitus abſit, morboſus eſt. Id. lex.* 7. His impotence, it ſeems, was only regarded ſo far as his health or life might be affected by it. In other reſpects, he was full as valuable. The ſame reaſoning is employ'd with regard to female ſlaves. *Quæritur de ea muliere, quæ ſemper mortuos parit, an morboſa ſit; et ait Sabinus, ſi vulvæ vitio hoc contingit, morboſam eſſe. Id. lex* 14. It has even been doubted, whether a woman pregnant was morbid or vitiated; and it is determined, that ſhe is ſound, not on account of the value of her offſpring, but becauſe it is the natural part or office of women to bear children. *Si mulier prægnans venerit, inter omnes convenit ſanam eam eſſe. Maximum enim ac præcipuum munus fœminarum accipere ac tueri conceptum. Puerperam quoque ſanam eſſe: Si modo nihil extrinſecus accedit, quod corpus ejus in aliquam valitudinem immitteret. De ſterili Celius diſtinguere Trebatium dicit, ut ſi natura ſterilis ſit, ſana ſit. Si vitio corporis, contra. Id.*

ſuſpicion, therefore, that this inſtitution was unfavourable to propagation, (and the ſame reaſon, at leaſt in part, holds with regard to antient ſlaves as well as modern ſervants) how deſtructive muſt ſlavery have prov'd?

HISTORY mentions a *Roman* nobleman, who had 400 ſlaves under the ſame roof with him; and having been aſſaſſinated at home by the furious revenge of one of them, the law was executed with rigour, and all without exception were put to death.* Many other *Roman* noblemen had families equally, or more numerous; and I believe every one will allow, that this wou'd ſcarce be practicable were we to ſuppoſe all the ſlaves marry'd, and the females to be breeders.†

So early as the poet *Heſiod*,‡ marry'd ſlaves, whether male or female, were eſteem'd very inconvenient. How much more, where families had encreas'd to ſuch an enormous ſize, as in *Rome*, and the antient ſimplicity of manners was baniſh'd from all ranks of people?

*Xeno-*

* *Tacit. ann.* lib. 14. cap. 43.

† THE ſlaves, in the great houſes, had little rooms aſſigned them, called *cellæ*. Whence the name of cell was transfer'd to the monks room in a convent. See farther on this head, *Juſt. Lipſius*, Saturn. 1. cap. 14. Theſe form ſtrong preſumptions againſt the marriage and propagation of the family ſlaves.

‡ *Opera & Dies*, lib. 2. l. 24. alſo l. 220.

*Xenophon* in his oeconomics, where he gives directions for the management of a farm, recommends a ſtrict care and attention of laying the male and female ſlaves at a diſtance from each other. He ſeems not to ſuppoſe they are ever marry'd. The only ſlaves amongſt the *Greeks*, that appear to have continu'd their own breed, were the *Helotes*, who had houſes apart, and were more the ſlaves of the public than of individuals.*

THE antients talk ſo frequently of a fixt, ſtated portion of proviſions aſſign'd to each ſlave,† that we are naturally led to conclude, that ſlaves liv'd almoſt all ſingle, and receiv'd that portion as a kind of board wages.

THE practice, indeed, of marrying the ſlaves ſeems not to have been very common, even amongſt the country labourers, where it is more naturally to be expected. *Cato*,‡ enumerating the ſlaves, requiſite to labour a vineyard of a hundred acres, makes them amount to 15; the overſeer and his wife, *villicus* and *villica*, and 13 male ſlaves. For an olive plantation of 240 acres, the overſeer and his wife and 11 male ſlaves: And ſo in proportion to a greater or leſs plantation or vineyard.

*Varro*,

* *Strabo*, lib. 8.

† SEE *Cato de re ruſtica*, cap. 56. *Donatus in Phormion.* I. 1. 9. *Seneca epiſt.* 80.

‡ *De re ruſt.* cap. 10, 11.

*Varro*,* citing this paſſage of *Cato*, allows his computation to be juſt in every other reſpect, except the laſt. For as it is requiſite, ſays he, to have an overſeer and his wife, whether the vineyard or plantation be great or ſmall, this muſt alter the exactneſs of the proportion. Had *Cato*'s computation been erroneous in any other reſpect, it had certainly been corrected by *Varro*, who ſeems fond of diſcovering ſo trivial an error.

The ſame author,† as well as *Columella*,‡ recommends it as requiſite to give a wife to the overſeer, in order to attach him the more ſtrongly to his maſter's ſervice. This was, therefore, a peculiar indulgence granted to a ſlave, in whom ſo great a confidence was repos'd.

In the ſame place, *Varro* mentions it as an uſeful precaution not to buy too many ſlaves from the ſame nation; leſt they beget factions and ſeditions in the family: A preſumption, that in *Italy* the greateſt part, even of the country labouring ſlaves (for he ſpeaks of no other) were bought from the remoter provinces. All the world knows, that the family ſlaves in *Rome*, who were inſtruments of ſhow and luxury, were commonly imported from the Eaſt. *Hoc profecere*, ſays *Pliny*, ſpeaking of the jealous care of maſters, *mancipiorum legiones, et in domo*

* Lib. 1. cap. 18. † Lib. 1. cap. 17.
‡ Lib. 1. cap. 18.

*domo turba externa, ac ſervorum quoque cauſa nomenclator adhibendus.**

It is indeed recommended by *Varro*,† to propagate young ſhepherds in the family from the old ones. For as graſing farms were commonly in remote and cheap places, and each ſhepherd liv'd in a cottage apart, his marriage and encreaſe were not liable to the ſame inconveniencies as in dearer places, and where many ſervants liv'd in a family; which was univerſally the caſe in ſuch of the *Roman* farms as produc'd wine or corn. If we conſider this exception with regard to ſhepherds, and weigh the reaſon of it, it will ſerve for a ſtrong confirmation of all our foregoing ſuſpicions.‡

*Columella*, ∴ I own, adviſes the maſter to give a reward, and even liberty to a female ſlave, that had rear'd him above three children: A proof, that ſometimes the antients propagated from their ſlaves, which, indeed, cannot be deny'd. Were it otherwiſe, the practice of ſlavery, being ſo common in antiquity, muſt have been deſtructive to a degree, which no expedient cou'd repair. All I pretend by theſe reaſonings is, that ſlavery is in general diſadvantageous both to the happineſs and populouſneſs of mankind, and that its place is much better ſupply'd by the practice of hir'd ſervants.



* Lib. 33. cap. 1. † Lib. 2. cap. 10.

‡ *Paſtoris duri eſt hic filius, ille bubulci.* *Juven. Sat.* XI. 151.

∴ Lib. 1. cap. 8.

THE laws, or, as ſome writers call them, the ſeditions of the *Gracchi*, were occaſion'd by their obſerving the encreaſe of ſlaves all over *Italy*, and the diminution of free-citizens. *Appian* * aſcribes this encreaſe to the propagation of the ſlaves: *Plutarch* † to the purchaſe of barbarians, who were chain'd and impriſon'd, βαρβαρικα δεσμωτηρια ‡. 'Tis to be preſum'd, that both cauſes concurr'd.

*Sicily*, ſays *Florus*, .·. was full of *ergaſtula*, and was cultivated by labourers in chains. *Eunus* and *Athenio* excited the ſervile war, by breaking up theſe monſtrous priſons, and giving liberty to 60,000 ſlaves. The younger *Pompey* augmented his army in *Spain* by the ſame expedient(). If the country labourers throughout the *Roman* empire were ſo generally in this ſituation, and if it was difficult or impoſſible to find ſeparate lodgings for the families of the city ſervants; how unfavourable to propagation

* *De bell. civ.* lib. 1. † *In vita Tib. & C. Grach.*

‡ To the ſame purpoſe is that paſſage of the elder *Seneca, ex controverſia* 5. lib. 5. *Arata quondam populis rura, ſingulorum ergaſtulorum ſunt; latiuſque nunc villici, quam olim reges, imperant. At nunc eadem*, ſays *Pliny, vincti pedes, damnatæ manus, inſcripti vultus exercent.* lib. 18. cap. 3. So alſo *Martial:*

*Et ſoret innumera compede Thuſcus ager.* lib. 9. ep. 23.

And *Lucan: Tum longos jungere fines*
*Agrorum, et quondam duro ſulcata Camilli,*
*Vomere et antiquas Curiorum paſſa ligones,*
*Longa ſub ignotis extendere rura colonis.* lib. 1.
*Vincto foſſore coluntur*
*Heſperiæ ſegetes.* lib 7.

.·. LIB. 3. cap. 19. () *Id.* lib. 4 cap. 8.

gation, as well as humanity, muſt the inſtitution of domeſtic ſlavery be eſteem'd?

*Conſtantinople*, at preſent, requires the ſame recruits of ſlaves from all the provinces, which *Rome* did of old; and theſe provinces are of conſequence far from being populous.

*Ægypt*, according to Monſ. *Maillet*, ſends continual colonies of black ſlaves to the other parts of the *Turkiſh* empire, and receives annually an equal return of white: The one brought from the inland parts of *Africa*, the other from *Mingrelia*, *Circaſſia*, and *Tartary*.

Our modern convents are, no doubt, very bad inſtitutions: But there is reaſon to ſuſpect, that antiently every great family in *Italy*, and probably in other parts of the world, was a ſpecies of convent. And tho' we have reaſon to deteſt all theſe popiſh inſtitutions, as nurſeries of the moſt abject ſuperſtition, burthenſome to the public, and oppreſſive to the poor priſoners, male, as well as female; yet may it be queſtion'd, whether they be ſo deſtructive to the populouſneſs of a ſtate as is commonly imagin'd. Were the land, which belongs to a convent, beſtow'd on a nobleman, he wou'd ſpend its revenue on dogs, horſes, grooms, footmen, cooks, and chamber-maids; and his family wou'd not furniſh many more citizens than the convent.

THE common reaſon why parents thruſt their daughters into nunneries, is, that they may not be overburthen'd with too numerous a family; but the antients had a method almoſt as innocent and more effectual to that purpoſe, *viz.* the expoſing their children in the earlieſt infancy. This practice was very common; and is not mention'd by any author of thoſe times with the horror it deſerves, or ſcarce * even with diſapprobation. *Plutarch*, the humane, good natur'd *Plutarch*, † recommends it as a virtue in *Attalus*, king of *Pergamus*, that he murder'd, or, if you will, expos'd all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the ſon of his brother, *Eumenes*: Signalizing in this manner his gratitude and affection to *Eumenes*, who had left him his heir preferably to that ſon. 'Twas *Solon*, the moſt celebrated of the ſages of *Greece*, who gave parents permiſſion by law to kill their children.‡

SHALL we then allow theſe two circumſtances to compenſate each other, *viz.* monaſtic vows and the expoſing of children, and to be unfavourable, in equal degrees, to the propagation of mankind? I doubt the advantage is here on the ſide of antiquity.

* *Tacitus* blames it. *De morib. Germ.*

† *De fraterno amore.* *Seneca* alſo approves of the expoſing of ſickly, infirm children. *De ira*, lib. 1. cap. 15.

‡ *Sext. Emp.* lib 3. cap. 24.

quity. Perhaps, by an odd conexion of cauſes, the barbarous practice of the antients might rather render thoſe times more populous. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it wou'd engage many people in marriage; and ſuch is the force of natural affection, that very few, in compariſon, wou'd have reſolution enough, when it came to the puſh, to carry into execution their former intentions.

*China* the only country, where this barbarous practice of expoſing children prevails at preſent, is the moſt populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages cou'd ſcarce be general, had not men the proſpect of ſo eaſy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that *Plutarch* * ſpeaks of it as a very univerſal maxim of the poor to expoſe their children; and as the rich were then averſe to marriage, on account of the courtſhip they met with from thoſe who expected legacies from them, the public muſt have been in a bad ſituation betwixt them.†

OF

* *De amore prolis.*

† THE practice of leaving great ſums of money to friends, tho' one had near relations, was common to *Greece* as well as *Rome*; as we may gather from *Lucian*. This practice prevails very little in modern times; and *Ben Johnſon*'s *volpone* is therefore almoſt entirely extracted from antient authors, and ſuits better the manners of thoſe times.

It

OF all ſciences there is none, where firſt appearances are more deceitful than politics. Hoſpitals for foundlings ſeem favourable to the encreaſe of numbers; and perhaps, may be ſo, when kept under proper reſtrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without diſtinction, they have probably a contrary effect, and are pernicious to the ſtate. 'Tis computed, that every ninth child, born at *Paris*, is ſent to the hoſpital; tho' it ſeems certain, according to the common courſe of human affairs, that 'tis not a hundredth part, whoſe parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate them. The infinite difference, for health, induſtry, and morals, betwixt an education in an hoſpital and that in a private family, ſhou'd induce us not to make the entrance into an hoſpital too eaſy and engaging. To kill one's own child is ſhocking to nature, and muſt therefore be pretty unuſual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very tempting to the natural indolence of mankind.

HAVING conſider'd the domeſtic life and manners of the antients, compar'd to thoſe of the moderns;

It may juſtly be thought, that the liberty of divorces in *Rome* was another diſcouragement to marriage. Such a practice prevents not quarrels from *humour*, or rather encreaſes them, and occaſions alſo thoſe from *intereſt*, which are much more dangerous and deſtructive. See farther on this head, Eſſays moral and political, eſſay XXI. Perhaps too the unnatural luſts of the antients ought to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome moment.

derns; where, in the main, we ſeem rather ſuperior, ſo far as the preſent queſtion is concern'd; we ſhall now examine the *political* cuſtoms and inſtitutions of both ages, and weigh their influence in retarding or forwarding the propagation of mankind.

BEFORE the encreaſe of the *Roman* power, or rather, till its full eſtabliſhment, almoſt all the nations, which are the ſcene of antient hiſtory, were divided into ſmall territories or petty commonwealths, where of courſe a great equality of fortune prevail'd, and the center of government was always very near its frontiers. This was the ſituation of affairs, not only in *Greece* and *Italy*, but alſo in *Spain*, *Gaul*, *Germany*, *Afric*, and a great part of the leſſer *Aſia*: And it muſt be own'd, that no inſtitution cou'd be more favourable to the propagation of mankind. For tho' a man of an overgrown fortune, not being able to conſume more than another, muſt ſhare it with thoſe who ſerve and attend him: Yet their poſſeſſion being precarious, they have not the ſame encouragement to marriage, as if each had a ſmall fortune, ſecure and independent. Enormous cities are beſides deſtructive to ſociety, beget vice and diſorder of all kinds, ſtarve the remoter provinces, and even ſtarve themſelves, by the high prices, to which they raiſe all proviſions. Where each man had his little houſe and field to himſelf, and each county had its capital, free and independent: What a happy ſituation

tuation of mankind! How favourable to induſtry and agriculture; to marriage and propagation! The prolific virtue of men, were it to act in its full extent, without that reſtraint, which poverty and neceſſity impoſes on it, wou'd double the numbers every generation: And nothing ſurely can give it more liberty, than ſuch ſmall commonwealths, and ſuch an equality of fortune amongſt the citizens. All ſmall ſtates naturally produce equality of fortune, becauſe they afford no opportunities of great encreaſe; but ſmall commonwealths much more, by that diviſion of power and authority, which is eſſential to them.

WHEN *Xenophon* * return'd after the famous expedition with *Cyrus*, he hir'd himſelf and 6000 of the *Greeks* into the ſervice of *Seuthes*, a prince of *Thrace*; and the articles of his agreement were, that each ſoldier ſhou'd receive a *daric* a month, each captain two *darics*, and he himſelf as general four: A regulation of pay, which wou'd not a little ſurprize our modern officers.

WHEN *Demoſthenes* and *Æſchines*, with eight more, were ſent ambaſſadors to *Philip* of *Macedon*, their appointments for above four months were a thouſand *drachmas*, which is leſs than a *drachma* a day for each ambaſſador.† But a *drachma* a day, nay

* *De exp. Cyr.* lib. 7.

† *Demoſt. de falſa leg.* He calls it a conſiderable ſum.

nay ſometimes two, * was the pay of a common foot ſoldier.

A CENTURION amongſt the *Romans* had only double pay to a common ſoldier, in *Polybius*'s † time; and we accordingly find their gratuities after a triumph regulated by that proportion.‡ But *Mark Anthony* and the triumvirate gave the centurions five times the reward of the other.‖ So much had the encreaſe of the commonwealth encreas'd the inequality amongſt the citizens.§

IT muſt be own'd, that the ſituation of affairs in modern times, with regard to civil liberty, as well as equality of fortune, is not near ſo favourable, either to the propagation or happineſs of mankind. *Europe* is ſhar'd out moſtly into great monarchies; and ſuch parts of it as are divided into ſmall territories, are commonly govern'd by abſolute princes, who ruin their people by a ridiculous mimickry of the greater monarchs, in the ſplendor of their court and number of their forces. *Swiſſerland* alone and *Holland* reſemble the antient republics; and tho' the former is far from poſſeſſing any advantage ei-



* *Thucyd.* lib. 3. † LIB. 6. cap. 37.

‡ *Tit. Liv.* lib 41. cap 7, 13. *& alibi, paſſim.*

‖ *Appian de bell. civ.* lib. 4.

§ *Cæſar* gave the centurions ten times the gratuity of the common ſoldiers. *De bell. Gallico*, lib. 8. In the *Rhodian* cartel, mention'd afterwards, no diſtinction in the price of ranſom was made on account of ranks in the army.

ther of ſoil, climate, or commerce, yet the numbers of people, with which it abounds, notwithſtanding their enliſting themſelves into every ſervice in *Europe*, prove ſufficiently the advantages of their political inſtitutions.

THE antient republics deriv'd their chief or only ſecurity from the numbers of their citizens. The *Trachinians* having loſt great numbers of their people, the remainder, inſtead of enriching themſelves by the inheritance of their fellow citizens, apply'd to *Sparta*, their metropolis, for a new ſtock of inhabitants. The *Spartans* immediately collected ten thouſand men, amongſt whom the old citizens divided the lands, of which the former proprietors had periſh'd.*

AFTER *Timoleon* had baniſh'd *Dionyſius* from *Syracuſe*, and had ſettled the affairs of *Sicily*, finding the cities of *Syracuſe* and *Sellinuntium* extremely depopulated by tyranny, war, and faction, he invited over from *Greece* ſome new inhabitants to repeople them.† Immediately forty thouſand men (*Plutarch* ‡ ſays ſixty thouſand) offer'd themſelves; and he diſtributed ſo many lots of land amongſt them, to the great ſatisfaction of the antient inhabitants: A proof at once of the maxims of antient policy, which affected populouſneſs more than riches;

* *Diod. Sic.* lib. 12. *Thucyd.* lib. 3.
† *Diod. Sic.* lib. 16. ‡ *In vita Timol.*

es; and of the good effects of theſe maxims, in the extreme populouſneſs of that ſmall country, *Greece*, which cou'd at once ſupply ſo large a colony. The caſe was not much different with the *Romans* in early times. He is a pernicious citizen, ſaid *M. Curius*, who cannot be contented with ſeven acres.* Such ideas of equality cou'd not fail to produce populouſneſs.

We muſt now conſider what diſadvantages the antients lay under with regard to populouſneſs, and what checks they receiv'd from their political maxims and inſtitutions. There are commonly compenſations in every human condition; and tho' theſe compenſations be not always perfectly equivalent, yet they ſerve, at leaſt, to reſtrain the prevailing principle. To compare them and eſtimate their influence is indeed very difficult, even where they take place in the ſame age and in neighbouring countries: But where ſeveral ages have interven'd, and only ſcatter'd lights are afforded us by antient authors; what can we do but amuſe ourſelves

* *Plin.* lib. 18. cap. 3. The ſame author in cap. 6. ſays, *Verumque fatentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam: Jam vero et provincias. Sex domi ſemiſſem Africæ poſſidebant, cum interfecit eos Nero princeps.* In this view, the barbarous butchery committed by the firſt *Roman* emperors was not perhaps ſo deſtructive to the public as we may imagine. Theſe never ceas'd till they had extinguiſh'd all the illuſtrious families, which had enjoy'd the plunder of the world, during the latter ages of the republic. The new nobles, who roſe in their place, were leſs ſplendid, as we learn from *Tacit. Ann.* lib. 3. cap. 55.

ſelves by talking, *pro* and *con*, on an intereſting ſubject, and thereby correcting all haſty and violent determinations?

*Firſt*, We may obſerve, that the antient republics were almoſt in perpetual war; a natural effect of their martial ſpirit, their love of liberty, their mutual emulation, and that hatred, which generally prevails amongſt nations, that live in a cloſe neighbourhood. Now war in a ſmall ſtate is much more deſtructive than in a great one; both becauſe all the inhabitants, in the former caſe, muſt fill the armies, and becauſe the ſtate is all frontier, and all expos'd to the inroads of the enemy.

The maxims of antient war were much more deſtructive than thoſe of modern; chiefly by the diſtribution of plunder, in which the ſoldiers were indulg'd. Our common ſoldiers are ſuch a low raſcally ſet of people, that we find any abundance, beyond their ſimple pay, breeds confuſion and diſorder, and a total diſſolution of diſcipline. The very wretchedneſs and meanneſs of thoſe, who fill the modern armies, render them leſs deſtructive to the countries, which they invade: One inſtance, amongſt many, of the deceitfulneſs of firſt appearances in all political reaſonings.*

An-

* The antient ſoldiers, being free citizens, above the loweſt rank, were all marry'd. Our modern ſoldiers are either forc'd to

ANTIENT battles were much more bloody by the very nature of the weapons employ'd in them. The antients drew up their men 16 or 20, ſometimes 50 men deep, which made a narrow front; and 'twas not difficult to find a field, in which both armies might be marſhall'd, and might engage with each other. Even where any body of the troops was kept off by hedges, hillocks, woods, or hollow ways, the battle was not ſo ſoon decided betwixt the contending parties, but that the others had time to overcome the difficulties, that oppos'd them, and take part in the engagement. And as the whole armies were thus engag'd, and each man cloſely buckl'd to his antagoniſt, the battles were commonly very bloody, and great ſlaughter made on both ſides, but eſpecially on the vanquiſh'd. The long, thin lines, requir'd by fire arms, and the quick deciſion of the fray, render our modern engagements but partial rencounters, and enable the general, who is foil'd in the beginning of the day, to draw off the greateſt part of his army, ſound and entire. Cou'd *Folard*'s project of the column take place (which ſeems impracticable*) it wou'd render modern battles as deſtructive as the antient.

THE

to live unmarry'd, or their marriages turn to ſmall account towards the encreaſe of mankind. A circumſtance which ought, perhaps, to be taken into conſideration, as of ſome conſequence in favour of the antients.

* WHAT is the advantage of the column after it has broke the enemy's line? Only, that it then takes them in the flank, and diſ-

THE battles of antiquity, both by their duration and their reſemblance of ſingle combats, were wrought up to a degree of fury, quite unknown to latter ages. Nothing cou'd then engage the combatants to give quarter but the hopes of profit, by making ſlaves of their priſoners. In civil wars, as we learn from *Tacitus*,† the battles were the moſt bloody, becauſe the priſoners were not ſlaves.

WHAT a ſtout reſiſtance muſt be made, where the vanquiſh'd expected ſo hard a fate! How inveterate the rage, where the maxims of war were, in every reſpect, ſo bloody and ſevere!

INSTANCES are very frequent, in antient hiſtory, of cities beſieg'd, whoſe inhabitants, rather than open their gates, murder'd their wives and children, and ruſh'd themſelves on a voluntary death, ſweeten'd perhaps with a little proſpect of revenge upon the enemy. *Greeks*,* as well as *Barbarians*, have been often wrought up to this degree of fury. And the ſame determinate ſpirit and cruelty muſt, in many other inſtances, leſs remarkable, have been ex-

diſſipates whatever ſtands near it by a fire from all ſides. But till it has broke them, does it not preſent a flank to the enemy, and that expos'd to their muſquetry, and what is much worſe, to their cannon?

† HIST. lib. 2. cap. 44.

* As *Abydus* mention'd by *Livy*, lib. 31. cap. 17, 18. and *Polyb.* lib. 16. As alſo the *Xanthians*, *Appian de bell. civil.* lib. 4.

extremely deſtructive to human ſociety, in thoſe petty commonwealths, that liv'd in a cloſe neighbourhood, and were engag'd in perpetual wars and contentions.

SOMETIMES the wars in *Greece*, ſays *Plutarch*,* were carried on entirely by inroads, and robberies, and pyracies. Such a method of war muſt be more deſtructive, in ſmall ſtates, than the bloodieſt battles and ſieges.

BY the laws of the 12 tables, poſſeſſion for two years form'd a preſcription for land; one year for movables :† An indication, that there was not in *Italy*, during that period, much more order, tranquillity, and ſettled police than there is at preſent amongſt the *Tartars*.

THE only cartel, I remember in antient hiſtory, is that betwixt *Demetrius Poliorcetes* and the *Rhodians*; when it was agreed, that a free citizen ſhou'd be reſtor'd for 1000 *drachamas*, a ſlave bearing arms for 500.‡

BUT *ſecondly*, it appears, that antient manners were more unfavourable than the modern, not only in time of war but alſo in time of peace, and that too, in every reſpect, except the love of civil liberty

* *In vita Arati.*

† INST. lib. 2. cap. 6. 'Tis true, the ſame law ſeems to have been continu'd, till the time of *Juſtinian*. But abuſes, introduc'd by barbariſm, are not always corrected by civility.

‡ *Diod. Sicul.* lib. 20.

berty and equality, which is, I own, of conſiderable importance. To exclude faction from a free government is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable; but ſuch inveterate rage betwixt the factions, and ſuch bloody maxims, are found, in modern times, amongſt religious parties alone, where bigotted prieſts are the accuſers, judges, and executioners. In antient hiſtory, we may always obſerve, where one party prevail'd, whether the nobles or people, (for I can obſerve no difference in this reſpect†) that they immediately butcher'd all of the oppoſite party they laid their hands on, and baniſh'd ſuch as had been ſo fortunate as to eſcape their fury. No form of proceſs, no law, no trial, no pardon. A fourth, a third, perhaps near a half of the city were ſlaughter'd, or expell'd, every revolution; and the exiles always join'd foreign enemies, and did all the miſchief poſſible to their fellow citizens; till fortune put it in their power to take full revenge by a new revolution. And as theſe were very frequent in ſuch violent governments, the diſorder, diffidence, jealouſy, enmity, which muſt prevail, are not eaſy for us to imagine in this age of the world.

THERE are only two revolutions I can recollect in all antient hiſtory, which paſt without great ſeverity and great effuſion of blood in maſſacres and aſſaſſi-

† *Lyſias*, who was himſelf of the popular faction, and very narrowly eſcap'd from the 30 *Tyrants*, ſays that the Democracy was as violent a government as the Oligarchy. *Orat.* 24. de ſtatu popul.

aſſaſſinations, *viz.* the reſtoration of the *Athenian* democracy by *Thraſybulus*, and the ſubduing the *Roman* republic by *Cæſar*. We learn from antient hiſtory, that *Thraſybulus* paſt a general amneſty for all paſt offences; and firſt introduc'd that word, as well as practice into *Greece*.* It appears, however, from many orations of *Lyſias*,† that the chief, and even ſome of the ſubaltern offenders, in the preceeding tyranny, were try'd, and capitally puniſh'd. This is a difficulty not clear'd up, and even not obſerv'd, by antiquarians and hiſtorians. And as to *Cæſar's* clemency, tho' much celebrated, it wou'd not gain great applauſe in the preſent age. He butcher'd, for inſtance, all *Cato*'s ſenate, when he became maſter of *Utica*;‡ and theſe, we may readily believe, were not the moſt worthleſs of the party. All thoſe, who had born arms againſt that uſurper, were forfeited; and, by *Hirtius*'s law, declar'd incapable of all public offices.

THESE people were extremely fond of liberty; but ſeem not to have underſtood it very well. When the thirty tyrants firſt eſtabliſh'd their dominion at *Athens*, they began with ſeizing all the ſycophants and informers, that had been ſo troubleſome during the democracy, and putting them to death, by an arbitrary ſentence and execution. *E-*



* *Cicero Philip.* 1.

† As orat. 11. *contra Eratoſt.* orat. 12. *contra Agorat.* orat 15. *pro Mantith.*

‡ *Appian de bell. civ.* lib. 2.

*very man*, ſays *Salluſt** and *Lyſias*,† *was rejoiced at theſe puniſhments*; not conſidering, that liberty was from that moment annihilated.

THE utmoſt energy of *Thucydides*'s nervous ſtile, and the great copiouſneſs and expreſſion of the *Greek* language ſeem to ſink under that hiſtorian, when he attempts to deſcribe the diſorders, that aroſe from faction, throughout all the *Greek* commonwealths. You wou'd imagine, that he ſtill labours with a thought greater than he can find words to communicate. And he concludes his pathetic deſcription with an obſervation, which is at once very refin'd and very ſolid. "In theſe con-"teſts, (ſays he,) thoſe who were dulleſt and "moſt ſtupid and had the leaſt foreſight, com-"monly prevail'd. For being conſcious of this "weakneſs, and dreading to be over-reach'd by "thoſe of greater penetration, they went to work "haſtily, without premeditation, by the ſword and "poniard, and thereby prevented their antago-"niſts, who were forming fine ſchemes and pro-"jects for their deſtruction."‡

NOT

* SEE *Cæſar*'s ſpeech *de bell. Catil.*

† ORAT. 24. And in orat 29. he mentions the faction only as the cauſe why theſe illegal puniſhments ſhou'd diſpleaſe.

‡ LIB. 3. The country in *Europe*, wherein I have obſerv'd the factions to be moſt violent and party hatred the ſtrongeſt, is *Ireland*. This goes ſo far as to cut off even the moſt common intercourſe of civilities betwixt the proteſtants and catholics. Their cruel in-

ſur-

NOT to mention *Dionyſius* * the elder, who is computed to have butcher'd in cold blood above 10,000 of his fellow citizens; nor *Agathocles*, † *Nabis*, ‡ and others, ſtill more bloody than he; the tranſactions, even in free governments, were extremely violent and deſtructive. At *Athens*, the thirty tyrants and the nobles, in a twelvemonth, murder'd, without trial, about 1200 of the people, and baniſh'd above the half of the citizens that remain'd.§ In *Argos*, near the ſame time, the people kill'd 1200 of the nobles; and afterwards their own demagogues, becauſe they had refus'd to carry their proſecutions farther.‖ The people alſo in *Corcyra* kill'd 1500 of the nobles and baniſh'd a thouſand.¶ Theſe numbers will appear the more ſurprizing, if we conſider the extreme ſmallneſs of theſe

ſurrections, and the ſevere revenges which they have taken of each other, are the cauſes of this mutual ill-will, which is the chief ſource of diſorder, poverty, and depopulation in that country. The *Greek* factions, I imagine, to have been inflam'd ſtill to a higher degree of rage: The revolutions being commonly more frequent, and the maxims of aſſaſſination much more avow'd and acknowledg'd.

* *Plut. de virt. et fort. Alex.*

† *Diod. Sic.* lib. 18, 19. ‡ *Tit. Liv.* lib. 31, 33, 34.

§ *Diod. Sic.* lib. 14. *Iſocrates* ſays there were only 5000 baniſh'd. He makes the number of thoſe kill'd amount to 1500. *Areop. Æſchines, contra Cteſi.* aſſigns preciſely the ſame number. *Seneca* (*de tranq. anim.* cap. 5.) ſays 1300.

‖ *Diod. Sic.* lib. 15. ¶ *Diod Sic.* lib. 13.

theſe ſtates: But all antient hiſtory is full of ſuch inſtances.*

When *Alexander* order'd all the exiles to be reſtor'd, thro' all the cities; it was found that the whole

* We ſhall mention from *Diod. Siculus* alone a few, which paſt in the courſe of ſixty years during the moſt ſhining age of *Greece*. There were baniſh'd from *Sybaris* 500 of the nobles and their partizans, lib. 12. p. 77. *ex edit. Rhodomanni*. Of *Chians* 600 citizens baniſh'd, lib. 13. p. 189. At *Epheſus*, 340 kill'd, 1000 baniſh'd, lib. 13. p. 223. Of *Cyrenians*, 500 nobles kill'd; all the reſt baniſh'd, lib. 14. p. 263. The *Corinthians* kill'd 120, baniſh'd 500, lib. 14. p. 304. *Phœbidas* the *Spartan* baniſh'd 300 *Bœotians*, lib. 15. p. 342. Upon the fall of the *Lacedemonians*, Democracies were reſtor'd in many cities, and ſevere vengeance taken of the nobles, after the *Greek* manner. But matters did not end there. For the baniſh'd nobles, returning in many places, butcher'd their adverſaries at *Phialæ*, in *Corinth*, in *Megara*, in *Phliaſia*. In this laſt place, they kill'd 300 of the people; but theſe again revolting, kill'd above 600 of the nobles and baniſh'd the reſt, lib. 15. p. 357. In *Arcadia* 1400 baniſh'd, beſides many kill'd. The baniſh'd retir'd to *Sparta* and to *Pallantium*: The latter deliver'd up to their countrymen, and all kill'd, lib. 15. p. 373. Of the baniſh'd from *Argos* and *Thebes*, there were 500 in the *Spartan* army, *id.* p. 374. Here is a detail of the moſt remarkable of *Agathocles*' cruelties from the ſame author. The people before his uſurpation had baniſh'd 600 nobles, lib. 19. p. 655. Afterwards, that tyrant, in concurrence with the people, kill'd 4000 nobles and baniſh'd 6000, *id.* p. 657. He kill'd 4000 people at *Gela*, *id.* p. 741. By *Agathocles*' brother 8000 baniſh'd from *Syracuſe*, lib. 20. p. 757. The inhabitants of *Ægeſta*, to the number of 40,000 were kill'd, man, woman, and child, and with tortures, for the ſake of their money, *id.* p. 802. All the relations, *viz.* father, brother, children, grandfather of his *Libyan* army kill'd, *id.* p. 803. He kill'd 7000 exiles after capitulation, *id.*

whole amounted to 20,000 men;* the remains probably of ſtill greater ſlaughters and maſſacres. What an aſtoniſhing multitude in ſo narrow a country as antient *Greece!* And what domeſtic confuſion, jealouſy, partiality, revenge, heart-burnings, muſt tear thoſe cities, where factions were wrought up to ſuch a degree of fury and deſpair?

'TWOU'D be eaſier, ſays *Iſocrates* to *Philip*, to raiſe an army in *Greece* at preſent from the vagabonds than from the cities.

EVEN where affairs came not to ſuch extremities (which they fail'd not to do almoſt in every city twice or thrice every century) property was render'd very precarious by the maxims of antient government. *Xenophon*, in the banquet of *Socrates*, gives us a very natural, unaffected deſcription of the tyranny of the *Athenian* people. "In my po-
"verty, (ſays *Charmides*,) I am much more hap-
"py than ever I was during my riches; as much
"as it is happier to be in ſecurity than in ter-
"rors, free than a ſlave, to receive than to pay
"court, to be truſted than ſuſpected. Formerly
"I was oblig'd to careſs every informer: Some
"impoſition was continually laid upon me; and
"it was never allow'd me to travel or be abſent
"from

*id.* p. 816. 'Tis to be remarkt that *Agathocles* was a man of great ſenſe and courage.

* *Diod. Sic.* lib. 18.

" from the city. At preſent, when I am poor, I " look big and threaten others. The rich are a- " fraid of me, and ſhow me every kind of civility " and reſpect; and I am become a kind of tyrant " in the city."*

In one of the pleadings of *Lyſias*, † the orator very coolly ſpeaks of it, by the bye, as a maxim of the *Athenian* people, that, whenever they wanted money, they put to death ſome of the rich citizens as well as ſtrangers, for the ſake of the forfeiture. In mentioning this, he ſeems to have no intention of blaming them; ſtill leſs, of provoking them, who were his audience and judges.

Whether a man was a citizen or a ſtranger amongſt that people, it ſeems indeed requiſite, either that he ſhou'd impoveriſh himſelf, or the people wou'd impoveriſh him, and perhaps kill him into the bargain. The orator laſt mention'd gives a pleaſant account of an eſtate laid out in the public ſervice;‡ that is, above the third of it, in raree-ſhows and figur'd dances.

I need

* Page 885. *ex edit. Leuncl.* † Orat. 29. *in Nicom.*

‡ In order to recommend his client to the favour of the people, he enumerates all the ſums he had expended. When χωρηγῶ 30 minas: Upon a chorus of men 20 minas; εἰσπυρριχίσασις 8 minas; ἀνδράσι χορηγῶν 50 minas; κυκλίκῳ χορῷ 3 minas: Seven times trierarch, where he ſpent 6 talents: Taxes, once

I NEED not inſiſt on the *Greek* tyrannies, which were altogether horrible. Even the mixt monarchies, by which moſt of the antient ſtates of *Greece* were govern'd, before the introduction of republics, were very unſettled. Scarce any city, but *Athens*, ſays *Iſocrates*, could ſhow a ſucceſſion of kings, for four or five generations *.

BESIDES many other obvious reaſons for the inſtability of antient monarchies, the equal diviſion of property amongſt the brothers in private families,

once 30 minas; another time 40; γυμνασιαρχων, 12 minas; χωρηγω παιδικω χωρω 15 minas; κωμωδοις χορηγων 18 minas; πυρριχισταις ανηνεσις 7 minas; ιππεσι αμιλλομενω 15 minas; αρχηθεωρω 30 minas. In the whole 10 talents 38 minas: An immenſe ſum for an *Athenian* fortune, and what alone wou'd be eſteem'd great riches. Orat. 20. 'Tis true, he ſays, the law did not oblige abſolutely to be at ſo much expence, not above a fourth. But without the favour of the people, no body was ſo much as ſafe; and this was the only way to gain it. See farther orat. 24. *de pop. ſtatu.* In another place, he introduces a ſpeaker, who ſays that he had ſpent his whole fortune, and an immenſe one, eighty talents, for the people. Orat. 25. *de prob. Evandri.* The μισθοικοι or ſtrangers find, ſays he, if they do not contribute largely enough to the people's fancy, that they have reaſon to repent. Orat. 30. *contra Phil.* You may ſee with what care *Demoſthenes* diſplays his expences of this nature, when he pleads for himſelf *de corona.* And how he exaggerates *Midias'* ſtingineſs in this particular, in his accuſation of that criminal. All this, by the bye, is a mark of a very iniquitous judicature: And yet the *Athenians* valu'd themſelves on having the moſt legal and regular adminiſtration of any people in *Greece.*

* *Panath.*

milies, by a neceſſary conſequence, muſt contribute to unſettle and diſturb the ſtate. The univerſal preference given to the elder in modern governments, tho' it increaſes the inequality of fortunes, has, however, this good effect, that it accuſtoms men to the ſame idea of public ſucceſſion, and cuts off all claim and pretenſion of the younger.

THE new ſettled colony of *Heraclea*, falling immediately into factions, apply'd to *Sparta*, who ſent *Heripidas* with full authority to quiet their diſſenſions. This man, not provok'd by any oppoſition, not inflam'd by party rage, knew no better expedient than immediately putting to death about 500 of the citizens †. A ſtrong proof how deeply rooted theſe violent maxims of government were throughout all *Greece*.

IF ſuch was the diſpoſition of mens minds amongſt that refin'd people, what may be expected in the commonwealths of *Italy*, *Afric*, *Spain*, and *Gaul*, which were denominated barbarous? Why otherways did the *Greeks* ſo much value themſelves on their humanity, gentleneſs and moderation above all other nations? This reaſoning ſeems very natural: But unluckily the hiſtory of the *Roman* commonwealth, in its earlier times, if we give credit to the receiv'd accounts, ſtands againſt us. No blood was ever ſhed in any ſedition at *Rome*,

† *Diod. Sic.* lib. 14.

*Rome*, 'till the murder of the *Gracchi*. *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* ‡, obſerving the ſingular humanity of the *Roman* people in this reſpect, makes uſe of it as an argument that they were originally of *Grecian* extraction: Whence we may conclude, that the factions and revolutions in the barbarous republics were more violent than even thoſe of *Greece* above mention'd.

If the *Romans* were ſo late in coming to blows, they made ample compenſation after they had once enter'd upon the bloody ſcene; and *Appian*'s hiſtory of their civil wars contains the moſt frightful picture of maſſacres, proſcriptions and forfeitures, that ever was preſented to the world. What pleaſes moſt in that hiſtorian is, that he ſeems to feel a proper reſentment of theſe barbarous proceedings; and talks not with that provoking coolneſs and indifference, which cuſtom had produc'd in many of the *Greek* hiſtorians. ¶



‡ Lib. 1.

¶ The authorities cited above are all hiſtorians, orators, and philoſophers, whoſe teſtimony is unqueſtioned. 'Tis dangerous to rely upon writers, who deal in ridicule and ſatire. What will poſterity, for inſtance, infer from this paſſage of Dr. *Swift*? "I told him, that in the kingdom of *Tribnia (Britain)* by the "Natives call'd *Langdon, (London)* where I had ſojourned ſome "time in my travels, the bulk of the people conſiſt, in a man-"ner, wholly of diſcoverers, witneſſes, informers, accuſers, "proſecutors, evidences, ſwearers, together with their ſeveral "ſubſervient and ſubaltern inſtruments, all under the colours, "the

THE maxims of antient politics contain, in general, ſo little humanity and moderation, that it ſeems ſuperfluous to give any particular reaſon for the violences committed at any particular period. Yet I cannot forbear obſerving, that the laws, in the latter ages of the *Roman* commonwealth, were ſo abſurdly contriv'd, that they oblig'd the heads of parties to have recourſe to theſe extremities. All capital puniſhments were aboliſh'd: However criminal, or what is more, however dangerous any citizen might be, he cou'd not regularly be puniſh'd otherways than by baniſhment: And it became neceſſary, in the revolutions of party, to draw the ſword of private vengeance; nor was it eaſy, when laws were once violated, to ſet bounds to theſe ſanguinary proceedings. Had *Brutus* himſelf prevail'd over the *triumvirate*, cou'd he, in common prudence, have allow'd *Octavius* and

" the conduct, and pay of miniſters of ſtate and their deputies. " The plots in that kingdom are uſually the workmanſhip of " thoſe perſons, *&c.*" *Gulliver's travels.* Such a repreſentation might ſuit the government of *Athens*; but not that of *England*, which is a prodigy, even in modern times, for humanity, juſtice and liberty. Yet the doctor's ſatire, tho' carry'd to extremes, as is uſual with him, even beyond other ſatirical writers, did not altogether want an object. The biſhop of *Rocheſter*, who was his friend and of the ſame party, had been baniſh'd a little before by a bill of attainder, with great juſtice, but without ſuch a proof as was legal, or according to the ſtrict forms of common law.

and *Anthony* to live, and have contented himſelf with baniſhing them to *Rhodes* or *Marſeilles*, where they might ſtill have plotted new commotions and rebellions? His executing *C. Antonius*, brother to the *triumvir*, ſhows evidently his ſenſe of the matter. Did not *Cicero*, with the approbation of all the wiſe and virtuous of *Rome*, arbitrarily put to death *Catiline*'s aſſociates, contrary to law, and without any trial or form of proceſs? And if he moderated his executions, did it not proceed, either from the clemency of his temper or the conjunctures of the times? A wretched ſecurity in a government, which pretends to laws and liberty.

THUS, one extreme produces another. In the ſame manner as exceſſive ſeverity in the laws is apt to beget great relaxation in their execution; ſo their exceſſive lenity naturally engenders cruelty and barbarity. 'Tis dangerous to force us, in any caſe, to uſe freedom with their ſacred regulations and preſcriptions.

ONE general cauſe of the diſorders, ſo frequent in all antient governments, ſeems to have conſiſted in the great difficulty of eſtabliſhing any ariſtocracy in thoſe ages, and the perpetual diſcontents and ſeditions of the people, whenever even the meaneſt and moſt beggarly were excluded from the legiſlature and from public offices. The very quality

of

of *freeman* gave ſuch a rank, being oppos'd to that of *ſlave*, that it ſeem'd to intitle the poſſeſſor to every power and privilege of the commonwealth. *Solon*'s † laws excluded no freeman from votes or elections, but confin'd ſome magiſtracies to a particular *cenſus*; yet were the people never ſatisfy'd 'till thoſe laws were repeal'd. By the treaty with *Antipater* ‡, no *Athenian* had a vote, whoſe *cenſus* was leſs than 2000 *drachmas* (about 60 *l. Sterl.*) And tho' ſuch a government wou'd to us appear ſufficiently democratical, it was ſo diſagreeable to that people, that above two thirds immediately deſerted their country ¶. *Caſſander* reduc'd that *cenſus* to the half .·.; yet ſtill the government was conſider'd as an oligarchical tyranny, and the effect of foreign violence.

*Servius Tullius*'s () laws ſeem very equal and reaſonable, by fixing the power in proportion to the property; Yet the *Roman* people cou'd never be brought quietly to ſubmit to them.

In thoſe days, there was no medium betwixt a ſevere, jealous ariſtocracy, over diſcontented ſubjects; and a turbulent, factious, tyrannical democracy.

But

† *Plutarch. in vita Solon.* ‡ *Diod. Sic.* lib. 18 ¶ *Id. ibid.* .·. *Id, ibid.* () *Tit. Liv.* lib. 1. cap. 43.

BUT *thirdly*, there are many other circumſtances, in which antient nations ſeem inferior to the modern, both for the happineſs and encreaſe of mankind. Trade, manufactures, induſtry were no where, in former ages, ſo flouriſhing as they are at preſent, in *Europe*. The only garb of the antients, both for males and females, ſeems to have been a kind of flannel, which they wore commonly white or grey, and which they ſcour'd, as often as it grew dirty. *Tyre*, which carry'd on, after *Carthage*, the greateſt commerce of any city in the *Mediterranean*, before it was deſtroyed by *Alexander*, was no mighty city, if we credit *Arrian*'s account of its inhabitants †. *Athens* is commonly ſuppos'd to have been a trading city; but it was as populous before the *Median* war, as at any time after it, according to *Herodotus* ‡; and yet its commerce, at that time, was ſo inconſiderable, that, as the ſame hiſtorian obſerves ¶, even the neighbouring coaſts of *Aſia* were as little frequented by the *Greeks* as the pillars of *Hercules*: For beyond theſe, he conceiv'd nothing.

GREAT intereſt of money and great profits of trade are an infallible indication, that induſtry and com-

† LIB. 2. There were 8000 kill'd during the ſiege; and the whole captives amounted to 30,000: *Diodorus Siculus* lib. 17. ſays only 13,000: But he accounts for this ſmall number by ſaying that the *Tyrians* had ſent away beforehand part of their wives and children to *Carthage*.

‡ LIB. 5. he makes the number of the citizens amount to 30,000. ¶ ib. 5.

commerce are but in their infancy. We read in *Lyſias* ∴ of 100 *per cent.* profit made on a cargo of two talents, ſent to no greater diſtance than from *Athens* to the *Adriatic*: Nor is this mention'd as an inſtance of exorbitant profit. *Antidorus*, ſays *Demoſthenes* (), pay'd three talents and a half for a houſe, which he let at a talent a year: And the orator blames his own tutors for not employing his money to like advantage. My fortune, ſays he, in eleven years minority, ought to have been tripled. The value of 20 of the ſlaves, left by his father, he computes at 40 minas; and the yearly profit of their labour at twelve []. The moſt moderate intereſt at *Athens* (for there was higher :-: often pay'd) was 12 *per cent.* *; and that pay'd monthly. Not to inſiſt upon the exorbitant intereſt of 34 *per cent.* to which the vaſt ſums diſtributed in elections had rais'd money † at *Rome*, we find, that *Verres*, before that factious period, ſtated 24 *per cent.* for money, which he left in the publicans hands. And tho' *Cicero* exclaims againſt this article, it is not on account of the extravagant uſury; but becauſe it had never been cuſtomary to ſtate any intereſt on ſuch occaſions ‡. Intereſt, indeed, ſunk at *Rome*, after the ſettlement of the empire:

∴ *Orat.* 33. *adverſ. Diagit.* () *Contra Aphob.* p. 25. *ex edit Aldi.* [] Id. *ibid.* p. 19. :-: Id. *ibid.* * Id. *ibid.* and *Æſchines* contra *Cteſiph.* † *Epiſt. ad Attic.* lib. 5. epiſt. 21. ‡ *Contra Verr. orat.* 3.

empire: But it never remain'd any conſiderable time, ſo low as in the commercial ſtates of modern ages*.

AMONGST the other inconveniencies, which the *Athenians* felt from the fortifying *Decelia* by the *Lacedemonians*, it is repreſented by *Thucydides*† as one of the moſt conſiderable, that they cou'd not bring over their corn from *Eubœa* by land, paſſing by *Oropus*, but were oblig'd to embark it, and to ſail about the promontory of *Sunium*. A ſurpriſing inſtance of the imperfection of antient navigation: For the water carriage is not here above double the land.

I DO not remember any paſſage in any antient author, wherein the growth of any city is aſcrib'd to the eſtabliſhment of a manufacture. The commerce, which is ſaid to flouriſh, is chiefly the exchange of thoſe commodities, for which different ſoils and climates were ſuited. The ſale of wine and oil into *Africa*, according to *Diodorus Siculus*‡, was the foundation of the riches of *Agrigentum*. The ſituation of the city of *Sybaris*, according to the ſame author(), was the cauſe of its immenſe populouſneſs; being built near the two rivers, *Crathys* and *Sybaris*. But theſe two rivers, we may obſerve, are not navigable; and cou'd only produce ſome fertile vallies for agriculture and husbandry;

* SEE diſcourſe IV. † LIB. 7.
‡ LIB 13. () LIB. 12.

bandry; an advantage ſo inconſiderable, that a modern writer wou'd ſcarcely have taken notice of it.

THE barbarity of the antient tyrants, along with the extreme love of liberty, which animated thoſe ages, muſt have baniſh'd every merchant and manufacturer, and have quite depopulated the ſtate, had it ſubſiſted upon induſtry and commerce. While the cruel and ſuſpicious *Dionyſius* was carrying on his butcheries, who, that was not detain'd by his landed property, and cou'd have carry'd along with him any art or skill to procure a ſubſiſtence in other countries, wou'd have remain'd expos'd to ſuch implacable barbarity? The perſecutions of *Philip* the II. and *Lewis* the XIV. fill'd all *Europe* with the manufacturers of *Flanders* and of *France*.

I GRANT, that agriculture is the ſpecies of induſtry, which is chiefly requiſite to the ſubſiſtence of multitudes of people; and it is poſſible, that this induſtry may flouriſh, even where manufactures and other arts are unknown or neglected. *Swiſſerland* is at preſent a very remarkable inſtance; where we find, at once, the moſt skilful husbandmen and the moſt bungling tradeſmen, that are to be met with in all *Europe*. That agriculture flouriſh'd mightily in *Greece* and *Italy*, at leaſt in ſome parts of them, and at ſome periods, we have reaſon

ſon to preſume: And whether the mechanical arts had reach'd the ſame degree of perfection may not be eſteem'd ſo material; eſpecially, if we conſider the great equality in the antient republics, where each family was oblig'd to cultivate, with the greateſt care and induſtry, its own little field, in order to its ſubſiſtence.

BUT is it juſt reaſoning, becauſe agriculture may, in ſome inſtances, flouriſh without trade or manufactures, to conclude that, in any great extent of country, and for any great tract of time, it wou'd ſubſiſt alone? The moſt natural way, ſurely, of encouraging husbandry, is firſt to excite other kinds of induſtry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of ſuch goods as may contribute to his pleaſure and enjoyment. This method is infallible and univerſal; and as it prevails more in modern governments than in the antient, it affords a preſumption of the ſuperior populouſneſs of the former.

EVERY man, ſays *Xenophon*, * may be a farmer: No art or ſkill is requiſite: All conſiſts in the induſtry and attention to the execution. A ſtrong proof, as *Columella* hints, that agriculture was but little known in the age of *Xenophon*.

ALL our latter improvements and refinements; have they operated nothing towards the eaſy ſub-



* *Oecon.*

ſiſtence of men, and conſequently towards their propagation and encreaſe? Our ſuperior ſkill in mechanics, the diſcovery of new worlds, by which commerce has been ſo much enlarg'd, the eſtabliſhment of poſts, and the uſe of bills of exchange; theſe ſeem all extremely uſeful to the encouragement of art, induſtry, and populouſneſs. Were we to ſtrike off theſe, what a check wou'd we give to every kind of buſineſs and labour, and what multitudes of families wou'd immediately periſh from want and hunger? And it ſeems not probable, that we cou'd ſupply the place of theſe new inventions by any other regulation or inſtitution.

HAVE we reaſon to think, that the police of antient ſtates was any way comparable to that of modern, or that men had then equal ſecurity, either at home, or in their journeys by land or water? I queſtion not, but every impartial examiner wou'd give us the preference in this particular.*

THUS upon comparing the whole, it ſeems impoſſible to aſſign any juſt reaſon, why the world ſhou'd have been more populous in antient than in modern times. The equality of property, amongſt the antients, liberty, and the ſmall diviſions of their ſtates, were indeed favourable to the propagation of mankind: But their wars were more bloody and deſtructive; their governments more

* SEE eſſays moral and political, eſſay XV.

more factious and unſettl'd; commerce and manufactures more feeble and languiſhing; and the general police more looſe and irregular. Theſe latter diſadvantages ſeem to form a ſufficient counter-balance to the former advantages; and rather favour the oppoſite opinion to that which commonly prevails with regard to this ſubject.

But there is no reaſoning, it may be ſaid, againſt matter of fact. If it appear, that the world was then more populous than at preſent, we may be aſſur'd, that our conjectures are falſe, and that we have overlook'd ſome material circumſtance in the compariſon. This I readily own: All our preceding reaſonings, I acknowledge to be mere trifling, or, at leaſt, ſmall ſkirmiſhes and frivolous rencounters, that decide nothing. But unluckily the main combat, where we compare facts, cannot be render'd much more deciſive. The facts deliver'd by antient authors are either ſo uncertain or ſo imperfect as to afford us nothing deciſive in this matter. How indeed cou'd it be otherwiſe? The very facts, which we muſt oppoſe to them, in computing the greatneſs of modern ſtates, are far from being either certain or compleat. Many grounds of calculation, proceeded on by celebrated writers, are little better than thoſe of the emperor *Heliogabalus*, who form'd an eſtimate of the immenſe greatneſs of *Rome*, from ten thouſand pound

pound weight of cobwebs, which had been found in that city.*

'Tis to be remark'd, that all kinds of numbers are uncertain in antient manuſcripts, and have been ſubject to much greater corruptions than any other part of the text; and that for a very obvious reaſon. Any alteration in other places, commonly affects the ſenſe or grammar, and is more readily perceiv'd by the reader and tranſcriber.

Few enumerations of inhabitants have been made of any tract of country by any antient author of good authority; ſo as to afford us a large enough view for compariſon.

'Tis probable, that there was formerly a good foundation for the numbers of citizens aſſigned to any free city; becauſe they enter'd for a ſhare of the government, and there were exact regiſters kept of them. But as the number of ſlaves is ſeldom mention'd, this leaves us in as great uncertainty as ever, with regard to the populouſneſs even of ſingle cities.

The firſt page of *Thucydides* is, in my opinion, the commencement of real hiſtory. All preceding narrations are ſo intermixt with fable, that philoſophers

* *Ælii Lamprid. in vita Heliog.* cap. 26.

loſophers ought to abandon them, in a great meaſure, to the embelliſhment of poets and orators.*

WITH regard to remote times, the numbers of people aſſign'd are often ridiculous, and loſe all credit and authority. The free citizens of *Sybaris*, able to bear arms, and actually drawn out in battle, were 300,000. They encountred at *Siagra* with 100,000 citizens of *Crotona*, another *Greek* city contiguous to them; and were defeated. This is *Diodorus Siculus*'s ‖ account; and is very ſeriouſly inſiſted on by that hiſtorian. *Strabo* † alſo mentions the ſame number of *Sybarites*.

*Diodorus Siculus* ‡, enumerating the inhabitants of *Agrigentum*, when it was deſtroy'd by the *Carthaginians*, ſays, that they amounted to 20,000 citizens, 200,000 ſtrangers, beſides ſlaves, who, in ſo opulent

* IN general, there is more candour and ſincerity in antient hiſtorians, but leſs exactneſs and care, than in the moderns. Our ſpeculative factions, eſpecially thoſe of religion, throw ſuch an illuſion over our minds, that men ſeem to regard impartiality to their adverſaries and to heretics, as a vice or weakneſs: But the commonneſs of books, by means of printing, has oblig'd modern hiſtorians to be more careful in avoiding contradictions and incongruities. *Diodorus Siculus* is a good writer; but 'tis with pain I ſee his narration contradict, in ſo many particulars, the two moſt authentic pieces of all *Greek* hiſtory, *viz.* *Xenophon*'s expedition, and *Demoſthenes*' orations. *Plutarch* and *Appian* ſeem ſcarce ever to have read *Cicero*'s epiſtles.

‖ LIB. 12. † LIB. 6.

‡ LIB. 13.

pulent a city, as he repreſents it, wou'd probably be, at leaſt, as numerous. We muſt remark, that the women and the children are not included; and that therefore, upon the whole, the city muſt contain near two millions of inhabitants §. And what was the reaſon of ſo immenſe an encreaſe? They were very induſtrious in cultivating the neighbouring fields, not exceeding a ſmall *Engliſh* county; and they traded with their wine and oil to *Africa*, which, at that time, had none of theſe commodities.

*Ptolemy*, ſays *Theocritus* ‡, commands 33,339 cities. I ſuppoſe the ſingularity of the number was the reaſon of aſſigning it. *Diodorus Siculus* * gives three millions of inhabitants to *Ægypt*, a very ſmall number: But then he makes the number of their cities amount to 18,000: An evident contradiction.

He ſays †, the people were formerly ſeven millions. Thus remote times are always moſt envy'd and admir'd.

THAT *Xerxes*'s army was extremely numerous, I can readily believe; both from the great extent of his empire,

§ *Diogenes Laertius (in vita Empedoclis)* ſays, that *Agrigentum* contain'd only 800,000 inhabitants.

‡ IDYLL. 17. * LIB. I. † ID. *ibid.*

empire, and from the fooliſh practice of the Eaſtern nations, of encumbering their camp with a ſuperfluous multitude: But will any reaſonable man cite *Herodotus*'s wonderful narrations as an authority? There is ſomething very rational, I own, in *Lyſias*'s ‡ argument upon this ſubject. Had not *Xerxes*'s army been incredibly numerous, ſays he, he had never made a bridge over the *Helleſpont*: It had been much eaſier to have tranſported his men over ſo ſhort a paſſage, with the numerous ſhipping he was maſter of.

*Polybius* § ſays, that the *Romans*, betwixt the firſt and ſecond *Punic* wars, being threaten'd with an invaſion from the *Gauls*, muſter'd all their own forces, and thoſe of their allies, and found them amount to ſeven hundred thouſand men able to bear arms. A great number ſurely, and which, when join'd to the ſlaves, is probably more than that extent of country affords at preſent †. The enumeration too ſeems to have been made with ſome exactneſs; and *Polybius* gives us the detail of the particulars. But might not the number be magnify'd, in order to encourage the people?

*Diodorus*

‡ *Orat. funebris.* § Lib. 2.

† The country, that ſupply'd this number, was not above a third of *Italy*, *viz.* the pope's dominions, *Tuſcany*, and a part of the kingdom of *Naples*.

*Diodorus Siculus* † makes the ſame enumeration amount to near a million: Theſe variations are ſuſpicious. He plainly too ſuppoſes, that *Italy* in his time was not ſo populous: Another very ſuſpicious circumſtance. For who can believe, that the inhabitants of that country diminiſh'd from the time of the firſt *Punic* war to that of the *triumvirates*?

*Julius Cæſar*, according to *Appian* §, encounter'd four millions of *Gauls*, kill'd one million, and took another priſoner *. Suppoſing the numbers of the enemy's army and of the kill'd cou'd be exactly aſſign'd, which never is poſſible; how cou'd it be known how often the ſame man return'd into the armies, or how diſtinguiſh the new from the old levy'd ſoldiers? No attention ought ever to be given to ſuch looſe, exaggerated calculations; eſpecially where the author tells us not the mediums, upon which the calculations were form'd.

*Paterculus* ‡ makes the number kill'd by *Cæſar* amount only to 400,000: A much more probable account, and more eaſily reconcil'd to the hiſtory of

† Lib. 2. § *Celtica.*

* *Plutarch (in vita Cæſ.)* makes the number that *Cæſar* fought with amount only to 3 millions. *Julian (in Cæſaribus)* to 2.

‡ Lib. 2. cap. 47.

of theſe wars, given by that conqueror himſelf in his commentaries.

One wou'd imagine, that every circumſtance of the life and actions of *Dionyſius* the elder might be regarded as authentic, and free from all fabulous exaggerations; both becauſe he liv'd at a time when letters flouriſh'd moſt in *Greece*, and becauſe his chief hiſtorian was *Philiſtus*, a man allow'd to be of great genius, and who was a courtier and miniſter of that prince. But can we admit, that he had a ſtanding army of 100,000 foot, 10,000 horſe, and a fleet of 400 gallies ?† Theſe, we may obſerve, were mercenary forces, and ſubſiſted upon their pay, like our armies in *Europe*. For the citizens were all diſarm'd; and when *Dion* afterwards invaded *Sicily*, and call'd on his countrymen to vindicate their liberty, he was oblig'd to bring arms along with him, which he diſtributed among thoſe who join'd him.* In a ſtate, where agriculture alone flouriſhes, there may be many inhabitants; and if theſe be all arm'd and diſciplin'd, a great force may be call'd out upon occaſion: But great numbers of mercenary troops can never be maintain'd, without either trade and manufactures, or very extenſive dominions. The United Provinces never were maſters of ſuch a force by ſea and land, as that which is ſaid to belong to *Dionyſius*; yet they poſſeſs as large a territory, per-



† *Diod. Sic.* lib. 2. * *Plutarch, in vita Dionis.*

fectly well cultivated, and have infinitely more reſources from their commerce and induſtry. *Diodorus Siculus* allows, that, even in his time, the army of *Dionyſius* appear'd incredible; that is, as I interpret it, it was entirely a fiction, and the opinion aroſe from the exaggerated flattery of the courtiers, and perhaps from the vanity and policy of the tyrant himſelf.

THE critical art may very juſtly be ſuſpected of temerity, when it pretends to correct or diſpute the plain teſtimony of antient hiſtorians by any probable or analogical reaſonings: Yet the licence of authors upon all ſubjects, particularly with regard to numbers, is ſo great, that we ought ſtill to retain a kind of doubt or reſerve, whenever the facts advanc'd depart, in the leaſt, from the common bounds of nature and experience. I ſhall give an inſtance with regard to modern hiſtory. Sir *William Temple* tells us, in his memoirs, that, having a free converſation with *Charles* the II, he took the opportunity of repreſenting to that monarch the impoſſibility of introducing into this iſland the religion and government of *France*, chiefly on account of the great force, requiſite to ſubdue the ſpirit and liberty of ſo brave a people. "The "*Romans*, ſays he, were forc'd to keep up 12 legi- "ons for that purpoſe" (a great abſurdity *) "and "*Crom-*

* *Strabo*, lib. 4. ſays that one legion would be ſufficient, with a few cavalry; but the *Romans* commonly kept up ſomewhat a greater

"*Cromwell* left an army of near eighty thouſand "men." Muſt not this laſt fact be regarded as unqueſtion'd by future critics, when they find it aſſerted by a wiſe and learned miniſter of ſtate, contemporary to the fact, and who addreſt his diſcourſe, upon an ungrateful ſubject, to a great monarch, who was alſo contemporary, and who himſelf broke thoſe very forces about fourteen years before. Yet by the moſt undoubted authority, we may inſiſt, that *Cromwell*'s army, when he died, did not amount to half the number here mention'd.

'Tis a very uſual fallacy to conſider all the ages of antiquity as one period, and to compute the numbers contain'd in the great cities mention'd by antient authors, as if theſe cities had been all contemporary. The *Greek* colonies flouriſh'd extremely in *Sicily*, during the age of *Alexander*: But in *Auguſtus*'s time they were ſo decay'd, that almoſt all the product of that fertile iſland was conſum'd in *Italy*.*

Let us now examine the numbers of inhabitants aſſign'd to particular cities in antiquity; and omitting the numbers of *Nineveh*, *Babylon*, and the *Egyptian Thebes*, let us confine ourſelves to the ſphere

greater force in this iſland; which they never took pains entirely to ſubdue.

* *Strabo*. lib. 6.

ſphere of real hiſtory, to the *Grecian* and *Roman* empires. I muſt own, the more I conſider this ſubject, the more am I inclin'd to ſcepticiſm, with regard to the great populouſneſs aſcrib'd to antient times.

*Athens* is ſaid by ‖ *Plato* to be a very great city; and it was ſurely the greateſt of all the *Greek* * cities, excepting *Syracuſe*, which was nearly about the ſame ſize in *Thucydides*'s † time, and afterwards encreas'd beyond it. For *Cicero* ‡ mentions it as the greateſt of all the *Greek* cities in his time; not comprehending, I ſuppoſe, either *Antioch* or *Alexandria* under that denomination. *Athenæus* § ſays, that by the enumeration of *Demetrius Phalereus* there were in *Athens* 21,000 citizens, 10,000 ſtrangers, and 400,000 ſlaves. This number is very much inſiſted on, by thoſe whoſe opinion I call in queſtion, and is eſteem'd a fundamental fact to their purpoſe: But in my opinion there is no point of criticiſm more certain, than that *Athenæus*, and *Cteſicles*, whom he cites, are here miſtaken,

‖ *Apolog. Socr.*

* *Argos* ſeems alſo to have been a great city: For *Lyſias* contents himſelf with ſaying that it did not exceed *Athens*. Orat. 34.

† Lib. 6. ſee alſo *Plutarch. in vita Niciæ.*

‡ *Orat. contra Verrem*, lib. 4. cap. 52. *Strabo*, lib. 6. ſays it was 22 miles in compaſs. But then we are to conſider, that it contain'd two harbours within it; one of which was a very large one; and might be regarded as a kind of bay.

§ Lib. 6. cap. 20.

taken, and that the number of ſlaves is augmented by a whole cypher, and ought not to be regarded as more than 40,000.

*Firſt.* WHEN the number of citizens is ſaid to be 21,000 by *Athenæus*, ‖ men of full age are only underſtood. For (1) *Herodotus* * ſays, that *Ariſtagoras*, embaſſador from the *Ionians*, found it harder to deceive one *Spartan* than 30,000 *Athenians*; meaning, in a looſe way, the whole ſtate, ſuppos'd in one popular aſſembly, excluding the women and children. (2) *Thucydides* † ſays, that making allowances for all the abſentees in the fleet, army, garriſons, and for people employ'd in their private affairs, the *Athenian* aſſembly never roſe to five thouſand. (3) The forces enumerated by the ſame hiſtorian‡, being all citizens, and amounting to 13,000 heavy arm'd infantry, prove the ſame method of calculation; as alſo the whole tenor of the *Greek* hiſtorians, who always underſtand men of full age, when they aſſign the number of citizens in any republic. Now theſe being but the fourth of the inhabitants, the free *Athenians* were by this account 84,000; the ſtrangers 40,000; and the ſlaves, calculating by the ſmaller number, and allowing that they marry'd and pro-

‖ *Demoſthenes* aſſigns 20,000. *contra Ariſtog.*

* LIB. 5. † LIB. 8.

‡ LIB. 2. *Diodorus Siculus*'s account perfectly agrees, lib. 12.

propagated at the ſame rate with freemen, were 160,000: And the whole inhabitants 284,000: A large enough number ſurely. The other number 1,720,000 makes *Athens* larger than *London* and *Paris* united.

*Secondly.* THERE were but 10,000 houſes in *Athens*.*

*Thirdly.* THO' the extent of the walls, as given us by *Thucydides* be great,† (*viz.* 18 miles, beſide the ſea-coaſt) yet *Xenophon* ‡ ſays, there was much waſte ground within the walls. They ſeem indeed to have join'd four diſtinct and ſeparate cities §.

*Fourthly.* No inſurrection of the ſlaves, or ſuſpicion of inſurrection ever mention'd by hiſtorians; except one commotion of the miners.‖

*Fifthly.*

* *Xenophon. mem.* lib. 2. † LIB. 2. ‡ *De ratione red.*

§ We are to obſerve, that when *Dionyſius Halycarnaſſæus* ſays, that if we regard the antient walls of *Rome*, the extent of the city will not appear greater than that of *Athens*; he muſt mean the *Acropolis* or high town only. No antient author ever ſpeaks of the *Piræum*, *Phalerus*, and *Micnychia* as the ſame with *Athens*. Much leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that *Dionyſius* wou'd conſider the matter in that light, after the walls of *Cimon* and *Pericles* were deſtroy'd, and *Athens* was entirely ſeparated from theſe other towns. This obſervation deſtroys all *Voſſius*'s reaſonings, and introduces common ſenſe into theſe calculations.

‖ *Athen.* lib. 6.

*Fifthly.* THE *Athenians* treatment of their ſlaves is ſaid by *Xenophon* * and *Demoſthenes* † and *Plautus* ‡ to have been extremely gentle and indulgent: Which cou'd never have been the caſe, had the diſproportion been twenty to one. The diſproportion is not ſo great in any of our colonies; and yet we are oblig'd to exerciſe a very rigorous, military government over the Negroes.

*Sixthly.* No man is ever eſteem'd rich for poſſeſſing what may be reckon'd an equal diſtribution of property in any country, or even triple or quadruple that wealth. Thus every perſon in *England* is computed by ſome to ſpend ſix pence a day: Yet is he eſteem'd but poor that has five times that ſum. Now *Timarchus* is ſaid by *Æſchines* ‖ to have been left in eaſy circumſtances; but he was maſter only of 10 ſlaves employ'd in manufactures. *Lyſias* and his brother, two ſtrangers, were proſcrib'd by the thirty for their great riches; tho' they had but 60 a piece.§ *Demoſthenes* was left very rich by his father; yet he had no more than 52 ſlaves.() His work-houſe, of 20 cabinet makers, is ſaid to be a very conſiderable manufactory.⸸

*Seventhly.* DURING the *Decelian* war, as the *Greek* hiſtorians call it, 20,000 ſlaves deſerted, and brought

* *De rep. Athen.* † *Philip.* 3. ‡ *Sticho.*
‖ *Contra Timarch.* § *Orat.* 11.
() *Contra Aphob.* ⸸ *Ibid.*

brought the *Athenians* to great diſtreſs, as we learn from *Thucydides*.* This could not have happen'd, had they been only the twentieth part. The beſt ſlaves wou'd not deſert.

*Eighthly*. *Xenophon* † propoſes a ſcheme for entertaining by the public 10,000 ſlaves: And that ſo great a number may poſſibly be ſupported, any one will be convinc'd, ſays he, who conſiders the numbers we had before the *Decelian* war. A way of ſpeaking altogether incompatible with the larger number of *Athenæus*.

*Ninthly*. THE whole *cenſus* of the ſtate of *Athens* was leſs than 6000 talents. And tho' numbers in antient manuſcripts be often ſuſpected by critics, yet this is unexceptionable; both becauſe *Demoſthenes*,‡ who gives it, gives alſo the detail, which checks him, and becauſe *Polybius* § aſſigns the ſame number, and reaſons upon it. Now the moſt vulgar ſlave cou'd yield by his labour an *obolus* a day, over and above his maintenance; as we learn from *Xenophon*,‖ who ſays that *Nicias*'s overſeer paid his maſter ſo much for ſlaves, whom he employ'd in digging of mines; and alſo kept up the number of ſlaves. If you will take the pains to eſtimate an *obolus* a day, and the ſlaves at 400,000, computing only at 4 years purchaſe, you will find the ſum above 12,000 talents; even tho' allowance be

* LIB. 7. † *De rat. red.*
‡ *De claſſibus*. § LIB. 2. cap. 62. ‖ *De rat. red.*

be made for the great number of holy-days in *Athens*. Beſides, many of the ſlaves wou'd have a much greater value from their art. The loweſt that *Demoſthenes* * eſtimates any of his father's ſlaves is two minas a-head. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is a little difficult, I confeſs, to reconcile even the number of 40,000 ſlaves with the *cenſus* of 6000 talents.

*Tenthly. Chios* is ſaid by *Thucydides* † to contain more ſlaves, than any *Greek* city except *Sparta*. *Sparta*, then, had more than *Athens*, in proportion to the number of citizens. The *Spartans* were 9000 in the town; 30,000 in the country.‡ The male ſlaves, then, of full age, muſt have been more than 780,000: The whole more than 3,120,000. A number impoſſible to be maintain'd in a narrow, barren country, ſuch as *Laconia*, which had no trade. Had the *Helotes* been ſo very numerous, the murder of 2000 mention'd by *Thucydides*, § wou'd have irritated them, without weakening them.

Beſides, we are to conſider, that the number, aſſign'd by *Athenæus*, ‖ whatever it is, comprehends all the inhabitants of *Attica*, as well as thoſe of *Athens*. The *Athenians* affected much a coun-



* *Contra Aphobum.*

† Lib. 8. ‡ *Plutarch. in vita Lycurg.* § Lib. 4.

‖ The ſame author affirms that *Corinth* had once 460,000 ſlaves, *Ægina* 470,000. But the foregoing arguments hold ſtrong-

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try life, as we learn from *Thucydides*; * and when they were all chas'd into town, by the invaſion of their territory during the *Peloponneſian* war, the city was not able to contain them, and they were oblig'd to lye in the porticos, temples, and even ſtreets, for want of lodging.†

THE ſame remark is to be extended to all the other *Greek* cities; and when the number of the citizens is aſſign'd, we muſt always underſtand it of the inhabitants of the neighbouring country, as well as of the city. Yet even with this allowance, it muſt be confeſt, that *Greece* was a populous country, and much exceeded what we cou'd imagine of ſo narrow a territory, naturally not very fertile, and which drew no ſupplies of corn from other places. For excepting *Athens*, which traded to *Pontus* for that commodity, the other cities ſeem to have ſubſiſted chiefly from their neighbouring territory.‡

*Rhodes*

er againſt theſe facts. 'Tis however remarkable, that *Athenæus* cites ſo great an authority as *Ariſtotle* for this laſt fact: And the ſcholiaſt on *Pindar* mentions the ſame number of ſlaves in *Ægina*.

* LIB. 2. † *Id. ibid.*

‡ *Demoſt. contra Lept.* The *Athenians* brought yearly from *Pontus* 400,000 medimni or buſhels of corn, as appear'd from the cuſtom-houſe books. And at that time they imported little corn from any other place. This by the bye is a ſtrong proof, that there is ſome great miſtake in the foregoing paſſage of *Athenæus*.

For

*Rhodes* is well known to have been a city of extenſive commerce, and of great fame and ſplendor; yet it contain'd only 6000 citizens able to bear arms, when it was beſieg'd by *Demetrius*.*

*Thebes* was always one of the capital cities of *Greece*:† But the number of its citizens exceeded not thoſe of *Rhodes*.‡ *Phliaſia* is ſaid to be a ſmall city by *Xenophon*;§ yet we find, that it contain'd 6000 citizens.¶ I pretend not to reconcile theſe two facts.

*Mantinæa* was equal to any city in *Arcadia*:‖ Conſequently it was equal to *Megalopolis*, which was 50 ſtadia, or 6 miles and a quarter in circumference.* But *Mantinæa* had only 3000 citizens.† The *Greek* cities, therefore, contain'd often fields and gardens, along with the houſes; and we cannot judge of them by the extent of their walls. *Athens* contain'd no more than 10,000 houſes; yet its

For *Attica* itſelf was ſo barren in corn, that it produc'd not enough even to maintain the peaſants. *Tit. Livii* lib. 43. cap. 6. *Lucian*, in his *navigium ſive vota*, ſays, that a ſhip, which, by the dimenſions he gives, ſeems to have been about the ſize of our third rates, carry'd as much corn as wou'd maintain all *Attica* for a twelvemonth. But perhaps *Athens* was decay'd at that time; and beſides, it is not ſafe to truſt ſuch looſe rhetorical calculations.

* *Diod. Sic.* lib. 20. † *Iſoc. paneg.*
‡ *Diod Sic.* lib. 15 and 17. § *Hiſt. Græc.* lib. 7.
¶ *Id.* lib. 7. ‖ *Polyb.* lib. 2. * *Polyb.* lib. 9. cap. 20.
† *Lyſias*, orat. 34.

its walls, with the ſea coaſt, were above 20 miles in extent. *Syracuſe* was 22 miles in circumference; yet was ſcarce ever ſpoke of by the antients as more populous than *Athens*. *Babylon* was a ſquare of 15 miles or 60 miles in circuit; but it contain'd large cultivated fields and incloſures, as we learn from *Pliny*. Tho' *Aurelian's* wall was 50 miles in circumference;* the circuit of all the 13 diviſions of *Rome*, taken a-part, according to *Publius Victor*, was only about 43 miles. When an enemy invaded the country, the whole inhabitants retir'd within the walls of the antient cities, along with their cattle, and furniture, and inſtruments of husbandry. And the great height, to which the walls were rais'd, enabled a ſmall number to defend them with facility.

*Sparta*, ſays *Xenophon*,† is one of the cities of *Greece*, that has the feweſt inhabitants. Yet *Polybius*‡ ſays it was 48 ſtadia in circumference, and was round.

ALL the *Ætolians* able to bear arms in *Antipater's* time were but ten thouſand men.§

*Polybius* ‖ tells us, that the *Achæan* league might, without any inconvenience, march 30 or 40,000 men;

* *Vopiſcus in vita Aurel.*

† *De rep. Laced.* This paſſage is not eaſily reconcil'd with that of *Plutarch* above, who ſays, that *Sparta* had 9000 citizens.

‡ *Polyb.* lib. 9. cap. 20. § *Diod. Sic.* lib. 18. ‖ *Legat.*

men; and this account ſeems very probable. For that league comprehended the greateſt part of *Peloponneſus*. Yet *Pauſanias*,* ſpeaking of the ſame period, ſays, that all the *Achæans* able to bear arms, even when ſeveral manumitted ſlaves were join'd to them, did not amount to fifteen thouſand.

THE *Theſſalians*, till their final conqueſt by the *Romans*, were, in all ages, turbulent, factious, ſeditious, diſorderly.† 'Tis not therefore natural to ſuppoſe, that that part of *Greece* abounded much in people.

THE whole inhabitants of *Epirus*, of all ages, ſexes and conditions, who were ſold by *Paulus Æmilius*, amounted only to 150,000.‡ Yet *Epirus* might be double the extent of *Yorkſhire*.‖

WE

* *In Achaicis.*

† *Tit. Liv.* lib. 34. cap. 51. *Plato in Critone.*

‡ *Tit. Liv.* lib. 45. cap. 34.

‖ A LATE *French* writer, in his *obſervations on the Greeks*, has remark'd, that *Philip* of *Macedon*, being declar'd captain general of the *Greeks*, wou'd have been back'd by the force of 230,000 of that nation in his intended expedition againſt *Perſia*. This number comprehends, I ſuppoſe, all the free citizens, throughout all the cities; but the authority, on which that computation is founded, has, I own, eſcap'd either my memory or reading; and that writer, tho' otherwiſe very ingenious, has given into a bad practice, of delivering a great deal of erudition, without one citation. But ſuppoſing, that that enumeration cou'd be juſtify'd by good authority from antiquity, we may eſtabliſh the following computation. The free *Greeks* of all ages and ſexes were 920,000:

The

WE may now conſider the numbers of people in *Rome*, and *Italy*, and collect all the lights afforded us by ſcatter'd paſſages in antient authors. We ſhall find, upon the whole, a great difficulty in fixing any opinion on that head; and no reaſon to ſupport thoſe exaggerated calculations, ſo much inſiſted on by modern writers.

*Dionyſius Halycarnaſſeus* * ſays, that the antient walls of *Rome* were nearly of the ſame compaſs with thoſe of *Athens*, but that the ſuburbs ran out to a great extent; and it was difficult to tell, where the town ended or the country begun. In ſome places of *Rome*, it appears from the ſame author,† from *Juvenal*,‡ and from other antient writers,‖ that the houſes were high, and families liv'd in ſeparate

The ſlaves, computing them by the number of *Athenian* ſlaves as above, who ſeldom marry'd or had families, were double the male citizens of full age, *viz.* 460,000. And the whole inhabitants of antient *Greece* about one million, three hundred and eighty thouſand. No mighty number, nor much exceeding what may be found at preſent in *Scotland*, a country of nearly the ſame extent, and which is very indifferently peopled.

* LIB. 4. † LIB. 10. ‡ SATYR. 3. l. 269, 270.

‖ *Strabo* lib. 5. ſays, that the emperor *Auguſtus* prohibited the raiſing houſes higher than 70 foot. In another paſſage, *lib.* 16. he ſpeaks of the houſes of *Rome* as remarkably high. See alſo to the ſame purpoſe *Vitruvius* lib. 2. cap. 8. *Ariſtides* the ſophiſt, in his oration εις Ρωμην, ſays that *Rome* conſiſted of cities on the the top of cities, and that if one were to ſpread it out and unfold it, it wou'd cover the whole ſurface of *Italy*. Where an author indulges himſelf in ſuch extravagant declamations, and gives ſo much

parate ſtories, one above another: But 'tis probable, theſe were only the poorer citizens, and only in ſome few ſtreets. If we may judge from the younger *Pliny*'s * account of his houſe, and from *Bartoli's* plans of antient buildings, the men of quality had very ſpacious palaces; and their buildings were like the *Chineſe* houſes at this day, where each apartment is ſeparate from the reſt, and riſes no higher than a ſingle ſtory. To which, if we add, that the *Roman* nobility much affected very extenſive porticos and even woods † in town; we may perhaps allow *Voſſius* (tho' there is no manner of reaſon for it) to read the famous paſſage of the elder *Pliny* ‡ his own way, without admitting the

much into the hyperbolical ſtile, one knows not how far he muſt be reduc'd. But this reaſoning ſeems natural: If *Rome* was built in ſo ſcatter'd a manner as *Dionyſius* ſays, and ran ſo much into the country, there muſt have been very few ſtreets, where the houſes were rais'd ſo high. 'Tis onlyf or want of ground, that any body builds in that inconvenient manner.

* Lib. 2. epiſt. 16. lib. 5. epiſt. 6. 'Tis true, *Pliny* there deſcribes a country-houſe: But ſince that was the idea the antients form'd of a magnificent and convenient building, the great men wou'd certainly build the ſame way in town. *In laxitatem ruris excurrunt*, ſays *Seneca* of the rich and voluptuous. Epiſt. 114. *Valerius Maximus*, lib. 4. cap. 4. ſpeaking of *Cincinnatus*'s field of 4 acres, ſays, *Anguſte ſe habitare nunc putat, cujus domus tantum patet quantum Cincinnati rura patuerant.* To the ſame purpoſe, ſee lib. 36. cap. 15. alſo lib. 18. cap. 2.

† Vitruv. lib. 5. cap. 11. *Tacit. annal.* lib. 11. cap. 3. *Sueton. in vita Octav.* cap. 72. *&c.*

‡ *Mœnia ejus (Romæ) collegere ambitu imperatoribus, cenſoribuſque Veſpaſianis, A. U. C.* 828. *paſs. xiii. MCC. complexa mon-*

*tes*

*tes ſeptem, ipſa dividitur in regiones quatuordecim, compita earum 265. Ejuſdem ſpatii menſura, currente a milliario in capite Rom. Fori ſtatuto, ad ſingulas portas, quæ ſunt hodie numero 37, ita ut duodecim portæ ſemel numerentur, prætereanturque ex veteribus ſeptem, quæ eſſe deſierunt, efficit paſſuum per directum 30775. Ad extrema vero tectorum cum caſtris prætoriis ab eodem milliario, per vicos omnium viarum, menſura collegit paulo amplius ſeptuaginta millia paſſuum. Quo ſi quis altitudinem tectorum addat, dignam profecto æſtimationem concipiat, fateaturque nullius urbis magnitudinem in toto orbe potuiſſe ei comparari. Plin. lib. 3. cap. 5.*

All the beſt manuſcripts of *Pliny* read the paſſage as here cited, and fix the compaſs of the walls of *Rome* to be 13 miles. The only queſtion is, what *Pliny* means by 30775 paces, and how that number was form'd. The manner, in which I conceive it, is this. *Rome* was a ſemicircular area of 13 miles circumference. The *Forum* and conſequently the *Milliarium*, we know, was ſituated on the Banks of the *Tyber*, and near the center of the circle or upon the diameter of the ſemicircular area. Tho' there were 37 gates to *Rome*, yet only twelve of them had ſtreight ſtreets, leading from them to the *Milliarium*. *Pliny*, therefore, having aſſign'd the circumference of *Rome*, and knowing that that alone was not ſufficient to give in a juſt notion of its ſurface, uſes this farther method. He ſuppoſes all the ſtreets, leading from the *Milliarium* to the 12 gates, to be laid together into one ſtreight line, and ſuppoſes we run along that line, ſo as to count each gate once: In which caſe, he ſays, that the whole line is 30775 paces: Or in other words, that each ſtreet or radius of the ſemicircular area is upon an average two miles and a half; and the whole length of *Rome* is 5 miles, and its breadth about half as much, beſide the ſcatter'd ſuburbs.

*Pere Hardouin* underſtands this paſſage in the ſame manner; with regard to the laying together the ſeveral ſtreets of *Rome* into one line, in order to compoſe 30775 paces: But then he ſuppoſes that ſtreets led from the *Milliarium* to every gate, and that no ſtreet exceeded 800 paces in length. But (1) a ſemicircular area, whoſe radius was only 800 paces, cou'd never have a circumference near 13 miles, the compaſs of *Rome* as aſſign'd by *Pliny*. A radius of two miles and a half forms very nearly that cir-

circumference. (2) There is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing a city ſo built as to have ſtreets running to its center from every gate in its circumference. Theſe ſtreets muſt interfere as they approach. (3) This diminiſhes too much from the greatneſs of antient *Rome*, and reduces that city below even *Briſtol* or *Rotterdam*.

The ſenſe which *Voſſius* in his *obſervationes variæ* puts on this paſſage of *Pliny*, errs widely in the other extreme. One manuſcript, of no authority, inſtead of 13 miles, has aſſign'd 30 miles for the compaſs of the walls of *Rome*. And *Voſſius* underſtands this only of the curvilinear part of the circumference; ſuppoſing, that, as the *Tyber* form'd the diameter, there were no walls built on that ſide. But (1) this reading is allow'd contrary to almoſt all the manuſcripts. (2) Why ſhou'd *Pliny*, a conciſe writer, repeat the compaſs of the walls of *Rome* in two ſucceſſive ſentences? (3) Why repeat it with ſo ſenſible a variation? (4) What is the meaning of *Pliny*'s mentioning twice the *Milliarium*, if a a line was meaſur'd, that had no dependence on the *Milliarium*? (5) *Aurelian*'s wall is ſaid by *Vopiſcus* to have been drawn *laxiore ambitu*, and to have comprehended all the buildings and ſuburbs on the north-ſide of the *Tyber*; yet its compaſs was only 50 miles, and even here critics ſuſpect ſome miſtake or corruption in the text. It is not probable that *Rome* wou'd diminiſh from *Auguſtus* to *Aurelian*. It remain'd ſtill the capital of the ſame empire; and none of the civil wars, in that long period, except the tumults on the death of *Maximus* and *Balbinus*, ever affected the city. *Caracalla* is ſaid by *Aurelius Victor* to have encreas'd *Rome*. (6) There are no remains of antient buildings, which mark any ſuch greatneſs of *Rome*. *Voſſius*'s reply to this objection ſeems abſurd, that the rubbiſh wou'd ſink 60 or 70 foot below ground. It appears from *Spartian (in vita Severi)* that the five mile ſtone *in via Lavicana* was out of the city. (7) *Olympiodorus* and *Publius Victor* fix the number of houſes in *Rome* to be betwixt forty and fifty thouſand. (8) The very extravagance of the conſequences, drawn by this critic, as well as *Lipſius*, if they be neceſſary, deſtroys the foundation on which they are grounded: That *Rome* contain'd 14 millions of inhabitants; while the whole kingdom of *France* contains only five, according to his computation, *&c.*

own way, without admitting the extravagant conſequences he draws from it.

THE number of citizens, who receiv'd corn by the public diſtribution in *Auguſtus*'s time,* were 200,000. This one wou'd eſteem a pretty certain ground of calculation: Yet is it attended with ſuch circumſtances as throw us back into doubt and uncertainty.

Did the poorer citizens only receive the diſtribution? It was calculated, to be ſure, chiefly for their benefit. But it appears from a paſſage of *Cicero*,† that the rich might alſo take their portion, and that it was eſteem'd no reproach in them to apply for it.

To whom was the corn given; whether only to heads of families, or to every man, woman and child? The portion every month was five *modii* to each‡ (about $\frac{5}{6}$ of a buſhel.) This was too little for a family, and too much for an individual.

A

THE only objection to the ſenſe, which we have affix'd above to the paſſage of *Pliny*, ſeems to lye in this, that *Pliny*, after mentioning the 37 gates of *Rome*, aſſigns only a reaſon for ſuppreſſing the ſeven old ones, and ſays nothing of the 18 gates, the ſtreets leading from which, terminated, according to my opinion, before they reach'd the Forum. But as *Pliny* was writing to the *Romans*, who perfectly knew the diſpoſition of the ſtreets, it is not ſtrange he ſhou'd take a circumſtance for granted, which was ſo familiar to every body. Perhaps too, many of theſe gates led to wharfs upon the river.

* *Ex monument. Ancyr.* † *Tuſc. quæſt.* lib. 3. cap. 48.

‡ *Licinius apud Salluſt. hiſt. frag.* lib. 3.

A very accurate antiquarian, † therefore, infers, that it was given to every man of full years: But he allows the matter to be uncertain.

WAS it ſtrictly enquir'd, whether the claimant liv'd within the precincts of *Rome*, or was it ſufficient, that he preſented himſelf at the monthly diſtribution? This laſt ſeems more probable.‡

WERE there no falſe claimants? We are told,* that *Cæſar* ſtruck off at once 170,000, who had crept in without a juſt title; and it is very little probable, that he remedy'd all abuſes.

BUT laſtly, what proportion of ſlaves muſt we aſſign to theſe citizens? This is the moſt material queſtion; and the moſt uncertain. 'Tis very doubtful, whether *Athens* can be eſtabliſh'd as a rule for *Rome*. Perhaps the *Athenians* had more ſlaves, becauſe they employ'd them in manufactures, for which a capital city, like *Rome*, ſeems not ſo proper. Perhaps, on the other hand, the *Romans* had more ſlaves, on account of their ſuperior luxury and riches.

THERE were exact bills of mortality kept in *Rome*; but no antient author has given us the num-

† *Nicolaus Hortenſius de re frumentaria Roman.*

‡ Not to take the people too much from their buſineſs, *Auguſtus* ordain'd the diſtribution of corn to be made only thrice a year: But the people finding the monthly diſtributions more convenient (as preſerving, I ſuppoſe, a more regular oeconomy in their family) deſir'd to have them reſtor'd. *Sueton. Auguſt.* cap. 40. Had not ſome of the people come from ſome diſtance for their corn, *Auguſtus*'s precaution ſeems ſuperfluous.

* *Sueton. in Jul.* cap. 41.

number of burials, except *Suetonius*,* who tells us, that in one ſeaſon, there were 30,000 names carry'd to the temple of *Libitina*: But this was during a plague; which can afford no certain foundation for any inference.

THE public corn, tho' diſtributed only to 200,000 citizens, affected very conſiderably the whole agriculture of *Italy*:‡ A fact no way reconcileable to ſome modern exaggerations with regard to the inhabitants of that country.

THE beſt ground of conjecture I can find, concerning the greatneſs of antient *Rome* is this: We are told by *Herodian*,† that *Antioch* and *Alexandria* were very little inferior to *Rome*. It appears from *Diodorus Siculus*,§ that one ſtraight ſtreet of *Alexandria*, reaching from port to port, was five miles long; and as *Alexandria* was much more extended in length than breadth, it ſeems to have been a city nearly of the bulk of *Paris*;‖ and *Rome* might be about the ſize of *London*.

THERE

* *In vita Neronis.* † *Sueton. Aug.* cap. 42.

‡ LIB. 4. cap. 5. § LIB. 17.

‖ *Quintus Curtius* ſays its walls were only ten miles in circumference, when founded by *Alexander*, lib. 4. cap. 8. *Strabo*, who had travel'd to *Alexandria* as well as *Diodorus Siculus*, ſays it was ſcarce four miles long, and in moſt places about a mile broad, lib. 17. *Pliny* ſays it reſembled a *Macedonian* caſſock ſtretching out in the corners, lib. 5. cap. 10. Notwithſtanding this bulk of *Alexandria*, which ſeems but moderate, *Diodorus Siculus* ſpeaking of its circuit as drawn by *Alexander* (which it never exceeded, as we learn from *Ammianus Marcellinus*, lib. 22. cap. 16.) ſays it was μεγεθες διαφεροντα, *extremely great*, *ibid.* The reaſon, which he aſ-

ſigns

THERE liv'd in *Alexandria* in *Diodorus Siculus*'s time,* 300,000 free people, comprehending, I ſuppoſe, women and children.† But what number of ſlaves? Had we any juſt ground to fix theſe at an equal number with the free inhabitants, it wou'd favour the foregoing calculation.

THERE is a paſſage in *Herodian*, which is a little ſurpriſing. He ſays, poſitively and plainly, that the palace of the emperor was as large as all the

ſigns for its ſurpaſſing all cities of the world (for he excepts not *Rome*) is, that it contain'd 300,000 free inhabitants. He alſo mentions the revenues of the kings, *viz.* 6000, as another circumſtance to the ſame purpoſe: No ſuch mighty ſum in our eyes, even tho' we make allowances for the different value of money. What *Strabo* ſays of the neighbouring country means only that it was well peopled οἰκουμενα καλως. Might not one affirm, without any great hyperbole, that the whole banks of the river from *Graveſend* to *Windſor* are one city? This is more than *Strabo* ſays of the banks of the lake *Mareotis* and of the canal to *Canopus*. 'Tis a vulgar ſaying in *Italy*, that the king of *Sardinia* has but one town in *Piedmont*: For it is all a town. *Agrippa* in *Joſephus*, *de bello Judaic.* lib. 2. cap. 16. to make his audience comprehend the exceſſive greatneſs of *Alexandria*, which he endeavours to magnify, deſcribes only the compaſs of the city as drawn by *Alexander*: A clear proof that the bulk of the inhabitants were lodged there, and that the neighbouring country was no more than what might be expected about all great towns, very well cultivated and well peopled.

* LIB. 17.

† He ſays ελευθεροι not πολιται, which muſt have been underſtood of citizens alone, and grown men.

the reſt of the city.‡ This was *Nero*'s golden houſe, which is indeed repreſented by *Suetonius* ‖ and *Pliny** as of an enormous extent; but no power of imagination can make us conceive it to bear any proportion to ſuch a city as *London*.

We may obſerve, had the hiſtorian been relating *Nero*'s extravagance, and had he made uſe of ſuch an expreſſion, it would have had much leſs weight; theſe rhetorical exaggerations being ſo apt to creep into an author's ſtile, even when the moſt chaſte and correct. But 'tis mention'd by *Herodian* only by the bye, in relating the quarrels betwixt *Geta* and *Caracalla*.

It appears from the ſame hiſtorian,† that there was, then, much land uncultivated, and put to no man-

‡ Lib. 4. cap. 1. παση πολεως, *Politian* interprets it *ædibus majoribus etiam reliqua urbe.*

‖ He ſays (in *Nerone*, cap. 30.) that a portico or piazza of it was 3000 feet long; *tanta laxitas ut porticus triplices milliarias haberet.* He cannot mean three miles. For the whole extent of the houſe from the *Palatine* to the *Eſquiline* was not near ſo great. So when *Vopiſc. in Aureliano* mentions a portico in *Salluſt*'s gardens, which he calls *porticus milliarenſis*, it muſt be underſtood of a thouſand feet. So alſo *Horace*;

*Nulla decempedis*
*Metata privatis opacam*
*Porticus excipiebat Arcton.* Lib. 2. ode 15.

So alſo in lib. 1. ſatyre 8.

*Mille pedes in fronte, trecentos cippus in agrum*
*Hic dabat.*

* Lib. 36. cap. 15. *Bis vidimus urbem totam cingi domibus principum, Caii ac Neronis.* † Lib. 2. cap. 15.

manner of uſe; and he aſcribes it as a great praiſe to *Pertinax*, that he allow'd every one to take ſuch land, either in *Italy* or elſewhere, and cultivate it as he pleas'd, without paying any taxes. *Lands uncultivated and put to no manner of uſe*! This is not heard of in any part of Chriſtendom; except perhaps, in ſome remote parts of *Hungary*, as I have been inform'd. And it ſurely correſponds very ill with that idea of the extreme populouſneſs of antiquity, ſo much inſiſted on.

We learn from *Vopiſcus*, * that there was in *Etruria* much fertile land uncultivated; which the emperor, *Aurelian*, intended to convert into vineyards, in order to furniſh the *Roman* people with a gratuitous diſtribution of wine: A very proper expedient to diſpeople ſtill farther that capital and all the neighbouring territories.

It may not be amiſs to take notice of the account, which *Polybius* † gives of the great herds of ſwine to be met with in *Tuſcany* and *Lombardy*, as well as in *Greece*, and of the method of feeding them which was then practis'd. "There are "great herds of ſwine, (ſays he) throughout all "*Italy*, particularly, in former times, thro' *Etru*-"*ria* and *Ciſalpine Gaul*. And a herd frequently "contains a thouſand or more ſwine. When one of "theſe

* *In Aurelian.* cap. 48.

† Lib. 12. cap. 2.

" theſe herds in feeding meets with another, they " mix together; and the ſwine-herds have no o- " ther expedients to ſeparate them than to go to " different quarters, where they found their horn; " and theſe animals, being accuſtom'd to that ſig- " nal, run immediately each to the horn of his " own keeper. Whereas in *Greece*, if the herds " of ſwine happen to mix in the foreſts, he, who " has the greateſt flock, takes cunningly the op- " portunity of driving all away. And thieves are " very apt to purloin the ſtraggling hogs, which " have wander'd to a great diſtance from their " keeper, in ſearch of food."

MAY we not infer from this account, that the North of *Italy* was then much leſs peopled, and worſe cultivated than at preſent? How cou'd theſe vaſt herds be fed in a country, ſo thick of enclo- ſures, ſo improv'd by agriculture, ſo divided by farms, ſo planted with vines and corn intermingled together? I muſt confeſs, that *Polybius*'s relation has more the air of that oeconomy, which is to be met with in our *American* colonies, than the management of an *European* country.

WE meet with a reflection in *Ariſtotle*'s † e- thics, which ſeems to me unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, and by proving too much in favour of our

† LIB. 9. cap. 10. His expreſſion is ἀνθρωπος not πολιτης, inhabitant not citizen.

our preſent reaſoning may be thought really to prove nothing. That philoſopher, treating of friendſhip, and obſerving, that that relation ought neither to be contracted to a very few, nor extended over a great multitude, illuſtrates his opinion by the following argument. "In like manner, (ſays "he,) as a city cannot ſubſiſt, if it either have ſo "few inhabitants as ten, or ſo many as a hundred "thouſand; ſo is there a mediocrity requir'd in "the number of friends; and you deſtroy the eſ-"ſence of friendſhip by running into either ex-"treme." What! Impoſſible, that a city can contain a hundred thouſand inhabitants! Had *Ariſtotle* never ſeen, nor heard of a city that was near ſo populous? This, I muſt own, paſſes my comprehenſion.

*Pliny** tells us, that *Seleucia*, the ſeat of the *Greek* empire in the Eaſt, was reported to contain 600,000 people. *Carthage* is ſaid by *Strabo*† to have contain'd 700,000. The inhabitants of *Pekin* are not much more numerous. *London*, *Paris*, and *Conſtantinople* may admit of nearly the ſame computation; at leaſt, the two latter cities do not exceed it. *Rome*, *Alexandria*, *Antioch* we have already ſpoke of. From the experience of paſt and preſent ages, one might conjecture, that there is a kind of impoſſibility in the nature of



* Lib. 6. cap. 28. † Lib. 17.

things, that any city cou'd ever riſe much beyond this proportion. Whether the grandeur of a city be founded on commerce or on empire, there ſeem to be invincible obſtacles, which prevent its farther progreſs. The ſeats of vaſt monarchies, by introducing extravagant luxury, irregular expence, idleneſs, dependence, and falſe ideas of rank and ſuperiority, are improper for commerce. Extenſive commerce checks itſelf, by raiſing the price of all labour and commodities. When a great court engages the attendance of a numerous nobility, poſſeſt of over-grown fortunes, the middling gentry remain in their provincial towns, where they can make a figure on a moderate income. And if the dominions of a ſtate arrive at an enormous ſize, there neceſſarily ariſe many capitals, in the remoter provinces; whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair, for education, fortune, and amuſement.* *London*, by uniting extenſive commerce and middling empire, has, perhaps, arriv'd at a greatneſs, which no city will ever be able to exceed.

CHUSE *Dover* or *Calais* for a center: Draw a circle of two hundred miles radius: You comprehend *London*, *Paris*, the *Netherlands*, the *United Pro-*

* Such were *Alexandria*, *Antioch*, *Carthage*, *Epheſus*, *Lyons*, &c. in the *Roman* empire. Such are even *Bourdeaux*, *Tholouſe*, *Dijon*, *Rennes*, *Rouen*, *Aix*, &c. in *France*, *Dublin*, *Edinburgh*, *York* in the *Britiſh* dominions.

*Provinces*, and ſome of the beſt cultivated counties of *France* and *England*. It may ſafely, I think, be affirm'd, that no ſpot of ground can be found, in antiquity, of equal extent, which contain'd near ſo many great and populous cities, and was ſo ſtockt with riches and inhabitants. To balance, in both periods, the ſtates, which poſſeſt moſt art, knowledge, civility and the beſt police, ſeems the trueſt method of compariſon.

'Tis an obſervation of *L'Abbe du Bos*,† that *Italy* is warmer at preſent than it was in antient times. "The annals of *Rome* tell us, (ſays he) "that in the year 480. *ab U. C.* the winter was "ſo ſevere that it deſtroy'd the trees. The *Tyber* "froze in *Rome*, and the ground was cover'd with "ſnow for forty days. When *Juvenal* * deſcribes "a ſuperſtitious woman, he repreſents her as "breaking the ice of the *Tyber*, that ſhe may per-"form her ablutions.

"*Hybernum fracta glacie deſcendet in amnem,*
"*Ter matutino Tyberi mergetur.*

"He ſpeaks of that river's freezing as a common "event. Many paſſages of *Horace* ſuppoſe the "ſtreets of *Rome* full of ſnow and ice. We ſhou'd "have more certainty with regard to this point, "had the antients known the uſe of thermome-"ters: But their writers, without intending it, "give

† Vol. 2. ſect. 16.
* Sat. 6.

"give us information, ſufficient to convince us, "that the winters are now much more temperate "at *Rome* than formerly. At preſent, the *Tyber* "no more freezes at *Rome* than the *Nile* at *Cairo*. "The *Romans* eſteem the winter very rigorous, if "the ſnow lyes two days, and if one ſees for eight "and forty hours a few ſmall icicles hang from a "fountain that has a North expoſition."

THE obſervation of this ingenious critic may be extended to other *European* climates. Who cou'd diſcover the mild climate of *France* in *Diodorus Siculus*'s* deſcription of *Gaul*? "As it is a Nort-"hern climate, (ſays he) it is infeſted with cold "to an extreme degree. In cloudy weather, in-"ſtead of rain, there fall great ſnows; and in clear "weather it there freezes ſo exceſſive hard, that "the rivers acquire bridges of their own ſub-"ſtance, over which, not only ſingle travellers "may paſs, but large armies, accompany'd with "all their baggage and loaded waggons. And there "being many rivers in *Gaul*, the *Rhone*, the *Rhine*, "*&c.* almoſt all of them are froze over; and 'tis "uſual, in order to prevent falling, to cover the "ice with chaff and ſtraw, at the places where "the road paſſes."

NORTH of the *Cevennes*, ſays *Strabo*,† *Gaul* produces not figs and olives: And the vines, that have been planted, bear not grapes, that will ripen.

*Ovid*

* LIB. 4. † LIB. 4.

*Ovid* poſitively maintains, with all the ſerious affirmation of proſe, that the *Euxine* ſea froze every winter in his time; and he appeals to *Roman* governors, whom he names, for the truth of his aſſertion.‡ This never happens at preſent in the latitude of *Tomi*, whither *Ovid* was baniſh'd. All the complaints of the ſame poet ſeem to mark a rigour of the ſeaſons, which is ſcarce experienc'd at preſent in *Petersburg* or *Stockholm*.

*Tournefort*, a *Provencal*, who had travel'd into the ſame countries, obſerves that there is not a finer climate in the world: And he aſſerts that nothing but *Ovid*'s melancholy cou'd have given him ſuch diſmal ideas of it. But the facts, mention'd by that poet, are too circumſtantiate to bear any ſuch interpretation.

*Polybius* * ſays, that the climate in *Arcadia* was very cold, and the air moiſt.

"*Italy*,† (ſays *Varro*,) is the moſt temperate "climate in *Europe*. The inland parts" (*Gaul*, *Germany*, and *Pannonio*, no doubt) "have almoſt "perpetual winter."

THE Northern parts of *Spain*, according to *Strabo*,‖ are but ill inhabited, becauſe of the great cold.

AL-

‡ *Triſt.* lib. 3. eleg. 9. *De ponto*, lib. 4. eleg. 7, 9, 10.
* LIB. 4. cap. 21. † LIB. 1. cap. 2. ‖ LIB. 3.

ALLOWING, therefore, this remark to be juſt, that *Europe* is become warmer than formerly; how can we account for it? Plainly, by no other method, but by ſuppoſing, that the land is at preſent much better cultivated, and that the woods are clear'd, which formerly threw a ſhade upon the earth, and kept the rays of the ſun from penetrating to it. Our Northern colonies in *America* become more temperate, in proportion as the woods are fell'd;* but in general, every one may remark, that cold ſtill makes itſelf much more ſeverely felt, both in North and South *America*, than in places under the ſame latitude in *Europe*.

*Saſerna*, cited by *Columella*,† affirm'd, that the diſpoſition of the heavens was alter'd before his time, and that the air had become much milder and warmer; as appears hence, ſays he, that many places now abound with vineyards and olive plantations, which formerly, by reaſon of the rigour of the climate, cou'd raiſe none of theſe productions. Such a change, if real, will be allow'd an evident ſign of the better cultivation and peopling of countries

* THE warm Southern alſo become more healthful: And 'tis remarkable, that in the *Spaniſh* hiſtories of the firſt diſcovery and conqueſt of theſe countries they appear to have been very healthful; being then well peopled and cultivated. No account of the ſickneſs or decay of *Cortes*'s or *Pizzarro*'s ſmall armies.

† LIB. I. cap. I.

tries before the age of *Saſerna*;‖ and if it be continu'd to the preſent times, is a proof, that theſe advantages have been continually encreaſing throughout this part of the world.

LET us now caſt our eye over all the countries, that were the ſcene of antient and modern hiſtory, and compare their paſt and preſent ſituation. We ſhall not, perhaps, find ſuch foundation for the complaint of the preſent emptineſs and deſolation of the world. *Ægypt* is repreſented by *Maillet*, to whom we owe the beſt account of it, as extremely populous; tho' he eſteems the number of its inhabitants to be diminiſh'd. *Syria* and the leſſer *Aſia*, as well as the coaſt of *Barbary*, I can readily own, to be very deſart in compariſon of their antient condition. The depopulation of *Greece* is alſo very obvious; but whether the country now call'd *Turky* in *Europe* may not, in general, contain as many inhabitants as during the flouriſhing period of *Greece* may be a little doubtful. The *Thracians* ſeem, then, to have liv'd like the *Tartars* at preſent, by paſturage and plunder:* The *Getes* were ſtill more unciviliz'd:† And the *Illyrians* were no better.‡ Theſe occupy nine tenths of that country: And tho' the police and government of

‖ HE ſeems to have liv'd about the time of the younger *Africanus*, *id. ib.*

* *Xenoph. exp.* lib. 7. *Polyb.* lib. 4. cap. 45.

† *Ovid. paſſim*, &c. *Strabo*, lib. 7. ‡ *Polyb.* lib. 2. cap. 12.

of the *Turks* be not very favourable to induſtry and propagation; yet it preſerves, at leaſt, peace and order amongſt the inhabitants; and is preferable to that barbarous, unſettled condition, in which they antiently liv'd.

*Poland* and *Muſcovy* in *Europe* are not very populous; but are certainly much more ſo than the antient *Sarmatia* and *Scythia*; where no husbandry or agriculture was ever heard of, and paſturage was the ſole art, by which the people were maintain'd. The like obſervation may be extended to *Denmark* and *Sweden*. No one ought to eſteem the immenſe ſwarms of people, that formerly came from the North, and over-ran all *Europe*, to be any objection to this opinion. Where a whole nation, or even half of it, remove their ſeat; 'tis eaſy to imagine what a prodigious multitude they muſt form; with what deſperate courage they muſt make their attacks; and how the terror they ſtrike into the invaded nations, will make theſe magnify, in their imagination, both the courage and multitude of the invaders. *Scotland* is neither extenſive nor populous; but were the half of its inhabitants to ſeek a new habitation, they wou'd form a colony as large as the *Teutons* and *Cimbri*, and wou'd ſhake all *Europe*; ſuppoſing it in no better a condition for defence than formerly.

*Germany* has ſurely at preſent twenty times more inhabitants than in antient times, when they cultivated

tivated no ground, and each tribe valu'd itſelf on the extenſive deſolation which it ſpread around, as we learn from *Cæſar* * and *Tacitus* † and *Strabo*.‡ A proof that the diviſion into ſmall republics will not alone render a nation populous, unleſs attended with the ſpirit of peace, order, and induſtry.

THE barbarous condition of *Britain* in former times is well known, and the thinneſs of its inhabitants may eaſily be conjectur'd, both from their barbarity, and from a circumſtance mention'd by *Herodian*,‖ that all *Britain* was marſhy, even in *Severus*'s time, after the *Romans* had been fully ſettled in it above a whole century.

'TIS not eaſily imagin'd, that the *Gauls* were antiently much more advanc'd in the arts of life than their Northern neighbours; ſince they travel'd to this iſland for their education in the myſteries of the religion and philoſophy of the *Druids*.§ I cannot, therefore, think, that *Gaul* was then near ſo populous as *France* is at preſent.

WERE we to believe, indeed, and join together the teſtimony of *Appian* and that of *Diodorus Siculus*, we muſt admit an incredible populouſneſs in *Gaul*. The former hiſtorian ¶ ſays, that there



* *De bello Gallico*, lib. 6.

† *De moribus Germ.* ‡ LIB. 7. ‖ LIB 3. cap. 47.

§ *Cæſar de bello Gallico*, lib. 6. *Strabo*, lib. 7. ſays the *Gauls* were not much more improv'd than the *Germans*.

¶ *Celt.* pars 1.

were 400 nations in that country; the latter affirms * that the largeſt of the *Gallic* nations conſiſted of 200,000 men, beſides women and children, and the leaſt of 50,000. Calculating, therefore, at a medium, we muſt admit of near 200 millions of people, in a country, which we eſteem populous at preſent, tho' ſuppos'd to contain little more than 20.† Such calculations, therefore, by their extravagance loſe all manner of authority. We may obſerve, that that equality of property, to which the populouſneſs of antiquity may be aſcrib'd, had no place amongſt the *Gauls*.‡ Their inteſtine wars alſo, before *Cæſar*'s time, were almoſt perpetual.‖ And *Strabo* § obſerves, that tho' all *Gaul* was cultivated, yet it was not cultivated with any ſkill or care; the genius of the inhabitants leading them leſs to arts than arms, till their ſlavery to *Rome* produc'd peace among themſelves.

*Cæſar* ¶ enumerates very particularly the great forces, which were levy'd in *Belgium*, to oppoſe his conqueſts; and makes them amount to 208,000. Theſe were not the whole people able to bear arms in *Belgium*: For the ſame hiſtorian tells us, that the *Bellovaci* cou'd have brought a hundred thouſand men into the field, tho' they engag'd only for ſixty. Taking the whole, therefore, in this proportion

* Lib. 5.

† Antient *Gaul* was more extenſive than modern *France*.

‡ *Cæſar de bello Gallico*, lib. 6. ‖ *Id. ibid.* § Lib. 4.

¶ *De bello Gallico*, lib. 2.

portion of ten to ſix, the ſum of fighting men in all the ſtates of *Belgium* was above half a million; the whole inhabitants two millions. And *Belgium* being about the fourth of *Gaul*, that country might contain eight millions, which is not above the third of its preſent inhabitants.*

THE antient *Helvetia* was 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth, according to *Cæſar*;† yet contain'd only 360,000 inhabitants. The canton of *Berne* alone, has, at preſent, as many people.

AFTER this computation of *Appian* and *Diodorus Siculus*, I know not if I dare ſay, that the modern *Dutch* are more numerous than the antient *Batavi*.

*Spain* is decay'd from what it was three centuries ago; but if we ſtep backward two thouſand years,

* IT appears from *Cæſar*'s account, that the *Gauls* had no domeſtic ſlaves. The whole common people were indeed a kind of ſlaves to the nobility, as the people of *Poland* are at this day: And a nobleman of *Gaul* had ſometimes ten thouſand clients or dependants of this kind; nor can we doubt, that the armies were compos'd of the people as well as of the nobility: An army of 100,000 noblemen from a very ſmall ſtate is incredible. The fighting men amongſt the *Helvetii* were the fourth part of the whole inhabitants; a clear proof, that all the males of military age bore arms. See *Cæſar de bello Gall.* lib. 1.

We may remark, that the numbers in *Cæſar*'s commentaries can be more depended on than thoſe of any other antient author; becauſe of the *Greek* tranſlation, which ſtill remains, and which checks the original.

† *De bello Gallico*, lib. 1.

years, and conſider the reſtleſs, turbulent, unſettl'd condition of its inhabitants, we may probably be inclin'd to think, that it is now much more populous. Many *Spaniards* kill'd themſelves when depriv'd of their arms by the *Romans*.* It appears from *Plutarch* † that robbery and plunder were eſteem'd honourable amongſt the *Spaniards*. *Hirtius* ‡ repreſents in the ſame light the ſituation of that country in *Cæſar*'s time; and he ſays, that every man was oblig'd to live in caſtles and wall'd towns for his ſecurity. 'Twas not till their final conqueſt under *Auguſtus*, that theſe diſorders were repreſt.‖ The account, which *Strabo* § and *Juſtin* ¶ give of *Spain*, correſponds exactly with thoſe above mention'd. How much, therefore, muſt it diminiſh from our idea of the populouſneſs of antiquity, when we find, that *Cicero*, comparing *Italy*, *Afric*, *Gaul*, *Greece*, and *Spain*, mentions the great number of inhabitants, as the peculiar circumſtance which render'd that latter country formidable.†

*Italy*,

* *Titi Livii* lib. 34. cap. 17. † *In vita Marii.*
‡ *De bello Hiſp.* ‖ *Vell. Pater.* lib. 2. ſect. 90.
§ Lib. 3. ¶ Lib. 44.

† *Nec numero Hiſpanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipſo hujus gentis, ac terræ domeſtico nativoque ſenſu, Italos ipſos ac Latinos ---- ſuperavimus. De haruſp. reſp.* cap. 9. The diſorders of *Spain* ſeem to have been almoſt proverbial. *Nec impacatos a tergo horrebis Iberos. Virg. Georg.* lib. 3. The *Iberi* are here plainly taken, by a poetical figure, for robbers in general.

*Italy*, 'tis probable, however, has decay'd: But how many great cities does it ſtill contain; *Venice*, *Genoa*, *Pavia*, *Turin*, *Milan*, *Naples*, *Florence*, *Leghorn*, which either ſubſiſted not in antient times, or were then very inconſiderable? If we reflect on this, we ſhall not be apt to carry matters to ſo great an extreme as uſual, with regard to this ſubject.

WHEN the *Roman* authors complain, that *Italy*, which formerly exported corn, became dependent on all the provinces for its daily bread, they never aſcribe this alteration to the encreaſe of its inhabitants, but to the neglect of tillage and agriculture.* A natural effect of that pernicious practice of importing corn, in order to diſtribute it *gratis* among the *Roman* citizens, and a very bad means of multiplying the inhabitants of any country.† The *ſportula*, ſo much talk'd of by *Martial* and *Juvenal*, being preſents regularly made by the great lords to their ſmaller clients, muſt have had a like tendency to produce idleneſs, debauchery, and a continual decay amongſt the people.

WERE

* *Varro de re ruſtica.* lib. 2. præf. *Columella* præf. *Suston. Auguſt.* cap. 42.

† THO' the obſervation of *L'Abbé du Bos* ſhou'd be admitted, that *Italy* is now warmer than in former times, the conſequence may not be neceſſary, that it is more populous or better cultivated.

WERE I to aſſign a period, when I imagine this part of the world might poſſibly contain more inhabitants than at preſent, I ſhou'd pitch upon the age of *Trajan* and the *Antonines*; the great extent of the *Roman* empire being then civiliz'd and cultivated, ſettled almoſt in a profound peace both foreign and domeſtic, and living under the ſame regular police and government.* But we are told, that

ed. If the other countries of *Europe* were more ſavage and woody, the cold winds, that blow'd from them, might affect the climate of *Italy*.

* THE inhabitants of *Marſeilles* loſt not their great ſuperiority over the *Gauls* in commerce and the mechanic arts, till the *Roman* dominion turn'd the latter from arms to agriculture and civil life. See *Strabo*, lib. 4. That author, in ſeveral places, repeats the obſervation concerning the improvement, ariſing from the *Roman* arts and civility: And he liv'd at the time, when the change was new, and wou'd be more ſenſible. So alſo *Pliny*, *Quis enim non, communicato orbe terrarum, majeſtate Romani imperii, profeciſſe vitam putet, commercio rerum ac ſocietate feſtæ pacis, omniaque etiam, quæ occulta antea fuerant, in promiſcuo uſu facta.* lib. 14. proem, *Numine deûm electa* (ſpeaking of *Italy*) *quæ cœlum ipſum clarius faceret, ſparſa congregaret imperia, rituſque molliret, et tot populorum diſcordes, feraſque linguas ſermonis commercio contraheret ad colloquia, et humanitatem homini daret; breviterque, una cunctarum gentium in toto orbe patria fieret*, lib. 2. cap. 5. Nothing can be ſtronger to this purpoſe than the following paſſage from *Tertullian*, who liv'd about the age of *Severus*. *Certe quidem ipſe orbis in promptu eſt, cultior de die et inſtructior priſtino. Omnia jam pervia, omnia nota, omnia negotioſa. Solitudines famoſas retro fundi amœniſſimi obliteraverunt, ſilvas arva domuerunt, feras pecora fugaverunt, arenæ ſeruntur, ſaxa panguntur, paludes eliquantur, tantæ urbes, quantæ non eaſæ quondam. Jam nec inſulæ horrent, nec ſcopuli terrent; ubique*

*domus*

that all extenſive governments, eſpecially abſolute monarchies, are deſtructive to population, and contain

*domus, ubique populus, ubique reſpublica, ubique vita. Summum teſtimonium frequentiæ humanæ, oneroſi ſumus mundo, vix nobis elementa ſufficiunt; et neceſſitates arctiores, et querelæ apud omnes, dum jam nos natura non ſuſtinet. De anima*, cap. 30. The air of rhetoric and declamation, which appears in this paſſage, diminiſhes ſomewhat from its authority, but does not entirely deſtroy it. A man of violent imagination, ſuch as *Tertullian*, augments every thing equally; and for that reaſon his comparative judgments are the moſt to be depended on. The ſame remark may be extended to the following paſſage of *Ariſtides* the ſophiſt, who liv'd in the age of *Adrian*. *The whole world*, ſays he, addreſſing himſelf to the *Romans*, *ſeems to keep one holiday; and mankind, laying aſide the ſwords they formerly wore, now betake themſelves to feaſting and to joy. The cities, forgetting their antient contentions, preſerve only one emulation, which ſhall embelliſh itſelf moſt by every art and ornament. Theatres every where ariſe, amphitheatres, porticos, aqueducts, temples, ſchools, academies; and one may ſafely pronounce, that the ſinking world has been again rais'd by your auſpicious empire. Nor have cities alone receiv'd an encreaſe of ornament and beauty; but the whole earth, like a garden or paradiſe, is cultivated and adorn'd. Inſomuch that ſuch of mankind as are plac'd out of the limits of your empire (who are but few) ſeem to merit our ſimpathy and compaſſion.*

Tis remarkable, that tho' *Diodorus Siculus* makes the whole inhabitants of *Ægypt*, when conquer'd by the *Romans*, amount only to three millions; yet *Joſephus, de bello Jud.* lib. 2. cap. 16. ſays, that its inhabitants, excluding thoſe of *Alexandria*, were ſeven millions and a half, in the reign of *Nero*: And he expreſsly ſays, that he drew this account from the books of the *Roman* publicans, who levy'd the poll tax. *Strabo*, lib. 17. praiſes the ſuperior police of the *Romans* with regard to the finances of *Ægypt*, above that of its former monarchs: And no part of adminiſtration is more eſſential to the happineſs of a people. Yet we read in *Athenæus*, (lib. 1. cap. 25.) who flouriſh'd during the reign of the *Antonines*, that the town *Mareia*, near *Alexandria*, which

tain a ſecret vice and poiſon, which deſtroy the effect of all theſe promiſing appearances.* To confirm this, there is a paſſage, cited from *Plutarch*,† which being ſomewhat ſingular, we ſhall here examine it.

THAT author, endeavouring to account for the ſilence of many of the oracles, ſays, that it may be aſcribed to the preſent deſolation of the world, proceeding from former wars and factions; which common calamity, he adds, has fallen heavier upon *Greece* than on any other country; inſomuch, that the whole cou'd ſcarce at preſent furniſh out three thouſand warriors, which, in the time of the *Median* war, were ſupply'd by the ſingle city of *Megara*. The gods, therefore, who affect works of dignity and importance, have ſuppreſt many of their oracles, and deign not to uſe ſo many interpreters of their will to ſo diminutive a people.

I MUST confeſs, that this paſſage contains ſo many difficulties, that I know not what to make of it. You may obſerve, that *Plutarch* aſſigns for a cauſe of

which was formerly a large city, had dwindled into a village. This is not, properly ſpeaking, a contradiction. *Suidas (Auguſt.)* ſays that the emperor *Auguſtus*, having number'd the whole *Roman* empire, found it contain'd only 4,101,017 men (ανδρες) There is here ſurely ſome great miſtake, either in the author or tranſcriber. But this authority, feeble as it is, may be ſufficient to counterbalance the exaggerated accounts of *Herodotus* and *Diodorus Siculus* with regard to more early times.

* *L'Eſprit des loix*, livre 23. chap. 19. † *De orac. defectu.*

of the decay of mankind, not the extenſive dominion of the *Romans*, but the former wars and factions of the ſeveral nations; all which were quieted by the *Roman* arms. *Plutarch*'s reaſoning, therefore, is directly contrary to the inference, which is drawn from the fact he advances.

*Polybius* ſuppoſes, that *Greece* had become more proſperous and flouriſhing after the eſtabliſhment of the *Roman* yoke;* and tho' that hiſtorian wrote before theſe conquerors had degenerated, from being the patrons, to be the plunderers of mankind; yet as we find from *Tacitus* † that the ſeverity of the emperors afterwards corrected the licence of the governors, we have no reaſon to think that extenſive monarchy ſo deſtructive, as it is often repreſented.

We learn from *Strabo*,‡ that the *Romans*, from their regard to the *Greeks*, maintain'd, to his time, moſt of the privileges and liberties of that celebrat-



* Lib. 2. cap. 62. It may perhaps be imagin'd, that *Polybius*, being dependent on *Rome*, wou'd naturally extol the *Roman* dominion. But in the *firſt* place, *Polybius*, tho' one ſees ſometimes inſtances of his caution, diſcovers no ſymptoms of flattery. *Secondly*, This opinion is only deliver'd in a ſingle ſtroke, by the bye, while he is intent upon another ſubject; and 'tis allow'd, if there be any ſuſpicion of an author's inſincerity, that theſe oblique propoſitions diſcover his real opinion better than his more formal and direct aſſertions.

† *Annal.* lib. 1. cap. 2. ‡ Lib. 8. & 9.

ed nation; and *Nero* afterwards rather encreas'd them.* How therefore can we imagine, that the *Roman* yoke was ſo burthenſome over that part of the world? The oppreſſion of the proconſuls was check'd; and the magiſtracies in *Greece* being all beſtow'd in the ſeveral cities, by the free votes of the people, there was no great neceſſity for the competitors to attend the emperor's court. If great numbers went to ſeek their fortunes in *Rome*, and advance themſelves by learning or eloquence, the commodities of their native country, many of them wou'd return with the fortunes they had made, and thereby enrich the *Grecian* commonwealths.

BUT *Plutarch* ſays, that the general depopulation had been more ſenſibly felt in *Greece* than in any other country. How is this reconcileable to its ſuperior privileges and advantages?

BESIDES, this paſſage, by proving too much, really proves nothing. *Only three thouſand men able to bear arms in all Greece*! Who can admit ſo ſtrange a propoſition; eſpecially, if we conſider the great numbers of *Greek* cities, whoſe names ſtill remain in hiſtory, and which are mention'd by writers long after the age of *Plutarch*? There are there ſurely ten times more people at preſent, when there ſcarce remains a city in all the bounds of

* *Plutarch. De his qui ſero a Numine puniuntur.*

of antient *Greece*. That country is ſtill tolerably cultivated, and furniſhes a ſure ſupply of corn, in caſe of any ſcarcity in *Spain*, *Italy* or the South of *France*.

We muſt obſerve, that the antient frugality of the *Greeks*, and their equality of property, ſtill ſubſiſted during the age of *Plutarch*; as appears from *Lucian*.* Nor is there any ground to imagine, that that country was poſſeſt by a few maſters, and a great number of ſlaves.

'Tis probable, indeed, that military diſcipline, being entirely uſeleſs, was extremely neglected in *Greece* after the eſtabliſhment of the *Roman* empire; and if theſe commonwealths, formerly ſo warlike and ambitious, maintain'd each of them a ſmall city guard, to prevent mobbiſh diſorders, 'tis all they had occaſion for: And theſe, perhaps, did not amount to three thouſand men, throughout all *Greece*. I own, that if *Plutarch* had this fact in his eye, he is here guilty of a very groſs paralogiſm, and aſſigns cauſes no way proportion'd to the effects. But is it ſo great a prodigy, that an author ſhou'd fall into a miſtake of this nature?†

But

* *De mercede conductis.*

† I muſt confeſs, that that diſcourſe of *Plutarch* concerning the ſilence of the oracles is in general of ſo odd a texture, and ſo unlike his other productions, that one is at a loſs what judgment to

BUT whatever force may remain in this paſſage of *Plutarch*, we ſhall endeavour to counter-balance it by as remarkable a paſſage in *Diodorus Siculus*, where the hiſtorian, after mentioning *Ninus*'s army of 1,700,000 foot and 200,000 horſe, endeavours to ſupport the credibility of this account, by ſome poſterior facts; and adds, that we muſt not form a notion of the antient populouſneſs of

to form of it. 'Tis wrote in dialogue, which is a method of compoſition, that *Plutarch* commonly little affects. The perſonages he introduces advance very wild, abſurd, and contradictory opinions, more like the viſionary ſyſtems of *Plato* than the ſolid ſenſe of *Plutarch*. There runs alſo thro' the whole an air of ſuperſtition and credulity, which reſembles very little the ſpirit, that appears in the other philoſophical compoſitions of that author. For 'tis remarkable, that tho' *Plutarch* be an hiſtorian as ſuperſtitious as *Herodotus* or *Livy*, yet there is ſcarcely, in all antiquity, a philoſopher leſs ſuperſtitious, excepting *Cicero* and *Lucian*. I muſt, therefore, confeſs, that a paſſage of *Plutarch*, cited from this diſcourſe, has much leſs authority with me, than if it had been found in moſt of his other compoſitions.

THERE is only one other diſcourſe of *Plutarch* liable to like objections, *viz.* that *concerning thoſe whoſe puniſhment is delay'd by the Deity*. It is alſo wrote in dialogue, contains like ſuperſtitious, wild viſions, and ſeems to have been chiefly compos'd in rivalſhip to *Plato*, particularly his laſt book, *de republica*.

AND here I cannot but obſerve, that Monſ. *Fontenelle*, a writer eminent for candour, ſeems to have departed a little from his uſual character, when he endeavours to throw a ridicule upon *Plutarch* on account of paſſages to be met with in this dialogue concerning oracles. The abſurdities here put into the mouths of the ſeveral perſonages are not to be aſcrib'd to *Plutarch*. He makes them refute each other; and in general, he ſeems to intend the ridiculing of thoſe very opinions, which *Fontenelle* wou'd ridicule him for maintaining. See *Hiſtoire des Oracles*.

of mankind from the preſent emptineſs and depopulation, which is ſpread over the world.† Thus an author, who liv'd at that very period of antiquity, which is repreſented as moſt populous,‡ complains of the deſolation, which then prevail'd, gives the preference to former times, and has recourſe to antient fables as a foundation for his opinion. The humour of blaming the preſent, and admiring the paſt, is ſtrongly rooted in human nature, and has an influence, even on perſons, endu'd with the profoundeſt judgment and moſt extenſive learning.

† Lib. 2.

‡ He was contemporary with *Cæſar* and *Auguſtus*.

DIS-

# DISCOURSE XI.

## *Of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.*

I SUPPOSE, that a member of parliament, in the reign of king *William* or queen *Anne*, while the eſtabliſhment of the *proteſtant ſucceſſion* was yet uncertain, were deliberating concerning the party he wou'd chuſe in that important queſtion, and weighing, with impartiality, the advantages and diſadvantages on each ſide. I believe the following particulars wou'd have enter'd into his conſideration.

HE wou'd eaſily perceive the great advantages, reſulting from the reſtoration of the *Stuart* family; by which we ſhou'd preſerve the ſucceſſion clear and undiſputed, free from a pretender, with ſuch a ſpecious title as that of blood, which, with the multitude, is always the claim, the ſtrongeſt, and moſt eaſily comprehended. 'Tis in vain to ſay, as many have done, that the queſtion with regard to *governors*, independent of *government*, is frivolous, and little worth diſputing, much leſs fighting about. The generality of mankind never will enter into theſe ſentiments; and 'tis much happier, I believe, for ſociety, that they do not, but continue in their natural prejudices and prepoſſeſſions. How cou'd

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ſtability be preſerv'd in any monarchical government (which, tho', perhaps, not the beſt, is, and always has been the moſt common of any) unleſs men had ſo paſſionate a regard for the true heir of their royal family; and even tho' weak in underſtanding, or infirm in years, gave him ſo great a preference above perſons, the moſt accompliſh'd in ſhining talents, or celebrated for great atchievements? Wou'd not every popular leader put in his claim at every vacancy, or even without any vacancy; and the kingdom become the theatre of perpetual wars and convulſions? The condition of the *Roman* empire, ſurely, was not, in this reſpect, much to be envy'd; nor is that of the *Eaſtern* nations, who pay little regard to the title of their ſovereigns, but ſacrifice them, every day, to the caprice or momentary humour of the populace or ſoldiery. 'Tis but a fooliſh wiſdom, which is ſo carefully diſplay'd, in undervaluing princes, and placing them on a level with the meaneſt of mankind. To be ſure, an anatomiſt finds no more in the greateſt monarch than in the loweſt peaſant or day-labourer; and a moraliſt may, perhaps, frequently find leſs. But what do all theſe reflections tend to? We, all of us, ſtill retain theſe prejudices in favour of birth and family; and neither in our ſerious occupations, nor moſt careleſs amuſements, can we ever get entirely rid of them. A tragedy, that wou'd repreſent the adventures of common ſailors, or porters, or even of private gentle-

gentlemen, wou'd preſently diſguſt us; but one, that introduces kings and princes, acquires in our eyes an air of importance and dignity. Or ſhou'd a man be able, by his ſuperior wiſdom, to get entirely above ſuch prepoſſeſſions, he wou'd ſoon, by means of the ſame wiſdom, again bring himſelf down to them; for the ſake of ſociety, whoſe welfare he wou'd perceive to be intimately connected with them. Far from endeavouring to undeceive the people in this particular, he wou'd cheriſh and foſter ſuch ſentiments of reverence to their princes; as requiſite to preſerve a due ſubordination in ſociety. And tho' the lives of twenty thouſand men be often ſacrific'd to maintain a king in poſſeſſion of his throne, or preſerve the right of ſucceſſion undiſturbed, he entertains no indignation at the loſs; on pretence that every individual of theſe was, perhaps, in himſelf, as valuable as the prince he ſerv'd. He conſiders the conſequences of violating the hereditary right of kings: Conſequences, which may be felt for many centuries; while the loſs of ſeveral thouſand men brings ſo little prejudice to a large kingdom, that it may not be perceiv'd a few years afterwards.

THE advantages of the *Hanover* ſucceſſion are of an oppoſite nature, and ariſe from this very circumſtance, that it violates hereditary right, and places on the throne a prince, to whom birth gave no title to that dignity. 'Tis evident to any one,

who conſiders the hiſtory of this iſland, that the privileges of the people have, during the two laſt centuries, been continually upon the encreaſe, by the diviſion of the church lands, by the alienations of the barons eſtates, by the progreſs of trade, and above all, by the happineſs of our ſituation, which, for a long time, gave us ſufficient ſecurity, without any ſtanding army or military eſtabliſhment. On the contrary, public liberty has, almoſt in every other nation of *Europe*, been, during the ſame period, extremely upon the decline; while the people were diſguſted at the hardſhips of the old *Gothic* militia, and choſe rather to entruſt their prince with mercenary armies, which he eaſily turn'd againſt themſelves. 'Twas nothing extraordinary, therefore, that ſome of our *Britiſh* ſovereigns miſtook the nature of the conſtitution, and genius of the people; and as they embrac'd all the favourable precedents left them by their anceſtors, they over-look'd all thoſe, which were contrary, and which ſuppos'd a limitation in our government. They were encourag'd in this miſtake, by the example of all the neighbouring princes, who, bearing the ſame title or appellation, and being adorn'd with the ſame enſigns of authority, naturally led them to claim the ſame powers and prerogatives.*

The

* It appears from the ſpeeches, and proclamations, and whole train of king *James* the I.'s actions, as well as his ſon's, that they conſider'd the *Engliſh* government as a ſimple monarchy, and never

The flattery of courtiers farther blinded them; and above all, that of the clergy, who from ſeveral paſſages of their *ſcripture*, and theſe wreſted too, had erected a regular and avow'd ſyſtem of tyranny

ver imagin'd that any conſiderable part of their ſubjects entertain'd a contrary idea. This made them diſcover their pretenſions, without preparing any force to ſupport them; and even without reſerve or diſguiſe, which are always employ'd by thoſe, who enter upon any new project, or endeavour to innovate in any government. King *James* told his parliament plainly, when they meddled in ſtate affairs, *Ne ſutor ultra crepidam.* He us'd alſo, at his table, in promiſcuous companies, to advance his notions, in a manner ſtill more undiſguis'd: As we may learn from a ſtory told in the life of Mr. *Waller*, and which that poet us'd frequently to repeat. When Mr. *Waller* was young, he had the curioſity to go to court; and he ſtood in the circle, and ſaw king *James* dine, where, amongſt other company, there ſat at table two biſhops. The king, openly and aloud, propos'd this queſtion, *Whether he might not take his ſubjects money, when he had occaſion for it, without all this formality of parliament.* The one biſhop readily replied, *God forbid you ſhou'd not: For you are the breath of our noſtrils.* The other biſhop declin'd anſwering, and ſaid he was not skill'd in parliamentary caſes: But upon the king's urging him, and ſaying he wou'd admit of no evaſion, his lordſhip replied very pleaſantly, *Why then, I think your majeſty may lawfully take my brother's money: For he offers it.* In Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s preface to the hiſtory of the world, there is this remarkable paſſage. Philip *the II. by ſtrong hand and main force, attempted to make himſelf, not only an* abſolute monarch *over the* Netherlands, *like unto the kings and ſovereigns of* England *and* France; *but* Turk-like *to tread under his feet all their natural and fundamental laws, privileges and antient rights. Spenſer*, ſpeaking of ſome grants of the *Engliſh* kings to the *Iriſh* corporations, ſays, "All which, tho', "at the time of their firſt grant, they were tolerable, and per-"haps reaſonable, yet now are moſt unreaſonable and inconve-"nient.

tyranny and deſpotic power. The only method of deſtroying, at once, all theſe exorbitant claims and pretenſions was to depart from the true hereditary line, and chuſe a prince, who, being plainly a creature of the public, and receiving the crown on conditions, expreſt and avow'd, found his authority eſtabliſh'd on the ſame bottom with the privileges of the people. By electing him in the royal line, we cut off all hopes of ambitious ſubjects, who might, in future emergencies, diſturb the government by their cabals and pretenſions: By rendering the crown hereditary in his family, we avoided all the inconveniencies of elective monarchy: And by excluding the lineal heir, we ſecur'd all our conſtitutional limitations, and render'd our government uniform and of a piece. The people cheriſh monarchy, becauſe protected by it: The monarch favours liberty, becauſe created by it. And thus every advantage is obtain'd by the new eſtabliſhment, as far as human ſkill and wiſdom can extend itſelf.

THESE

" nient. But all theſe will eaſily be cut off with the ſuperior " power of her majeſty's prerogative, againſt which her own " grants are not to be pleaded or enforc'd." *State of Ireland*, page 1537, Edit. 1706.

As theſe were very common, tho' not, perhaps, the univerſal notions of the times, the two firſt princes of the houſe of *Stuart* were the more excuſable for their miſtake. And *Rapin*, the moſt judicious of hiſtorians, ſeems ſometimes to treat them with too much ſeverity upon account of it.

THESE are the ſeparate advantages of fixing the ſucceſſion, either in the houſe of *Stuart*, or in that of *Hanover*. There are alſo diſadvantages in each eſtabliſhment, which an impartial patriot wou'd ponder and examine, in order to form a juſt judgment upon the whole.

THE diſadvantages of the proteſtant ſucceſſion conſiſt in the foreign dominions, which are poſſeſt by the princes of the *Hanover* line, and which, it might be ſuppos'd, wou'd engage us in the intrigues and wars of the continent, and loſe us, in ſome meaſure, the ineſtimable advantage we poſſeſs, of being ſurrounded and guarded by the ſea, which we command. The diſadvantages of recalling the abdicated family conſiſt chiefly in their religion, which is more prejudicial to ſociety than that eſtabliſh'd amongſt us, is contrary to it, and affords no toleration or peace or ſecurity to any other religion.

IT appears to me, that all theſe advantages and diſadvantages are allow'd on both ſides; at leaſt, by every one, who is at all ſuſceptible of argument or reaſoning. No ſubject, however loyal, pretends to deny, that the diſputed title and foreign dominions of the preſent royal family are a loſs; nor is there any partizan of the *Stuart* family, but will confeſs, that the claim of hereditary, indefeaſible right, and the *Roman* catholick religion are alſo diſ-

ad-

advantages in that family. It belongs, therefore, to a philoſopher alone, who is of neither party, to put all theſe circumſtances in the ſcale, and aſſign to each of them its proper poize and influence. Such an one will readily, at firſt, acknowledge, that all political queſtions are infinitely complicated; and that there ſcarce ever occurs, in any deliberation, a choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. Conſequences, mix'd and vary'd, may be foreſeen to flow from every meaſure: And many conſequences, unforeſeen, do always, in fact, reſult from it. Heſitation, and reſerve, and ſuſpence are, therefore, the only ſentiments he brings to this eſſay or trial. Or if he indulges any paſſion, 'tis that of deriſion and ridicule againſt the ignorant multitude, who are always clamorous and dogmatical, even in the niceſt queſtions, of which, from want of temper, perhaps ſtill more than of underſtanding, they are altogether unfit judges.

BUT to ſay ſomething more determinate on this head; the following reflections will, I hope, ſhow the temper, if not the underſtanding of a philoſopher.

WERE we to judge merely by firſt appearance, and by paſt experience, we muſt allow, that the advantages of a parliamentary title in the houſe of *Hanover* are much greater than thoſe of an undiſputed hereditary title in the houſe of *Stuart*; and that

that our fathers acted wiſely in preferring the former to the latter. So long as the houſe of *Stuart* reign'd in *Britain*, which, with ſome interruptions, was above 80 years, the government was kept in a continual fever, by the contentions betwixt the privileges of the people and the prerogatives of the crown. If arms were dropt, the noiſe of diſputes continu'd: Or if theſe were ſilenc'd, jealouſy ſtill corroded the heart, and threw the nation into an unnatural ferment and diſorder. And while we were thus occupy'd in domeſtic contentions, a foreign power, dangerous, if not fatal, to public liberty, erected itſelf in *Europe*, without any oppoſition from us, and even ſometimes with our aſſiſtance.

But within theſe laſt ſixty years, when a parliamentary eſtabliſhment has taken place; whatever factions may have prevail'd either amongſt the people or in public aſſemblies; the whole force of our conſtitution has always fallen to one ſide, and an uninterrupted harmony has been preſerv'd betwixt our princes and our parliaments. Public liberty, with internal peace and order, has flouriſh'd, almoſt without interruption: Trade and manufactures and agriculture have encreas'd: The arts and ſciences and philoſophy have been cultivated: Even religious parties have been neceſſitated to lay aſide their mutual rancour: And the glory of the nation has ſpread itſelf all over *Europe*; while we

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ſtand the bulwark againſt oppreſſion, and the great antagoniſt of that power, which threatens every people with conqueſt and ſubjection. So long and ſo glorious a period no nation almoſt can boaſt of; nor is there another inſtance, in the whole hiſtory of mankind, that ſo many millions of people have, during ſuch a ſpace of time, been held together, in a manner ſo free, ſo rational, and ſo ſuitable to the dignity of human nature.

But tho' this recent inſtance ſeems clearly to decide in favour of the preſent eſtabliſhment, there are ſome circumſtances to be thrown into the other ſcale; and 'tis dangerous to regulate our judgment by one event or example.

We have had two rebellions during the flouriſhing period above mention'd; beſides plots and conſpiracies without number. And if none of theſe have produc'd any very fatal event, we may aſcribe our eſcape chiefly to the narrow genius of thoſe princes, who diſputed our eſtabliſhment; and may eſteem ourſelves ſo far fortunate. But the claims of the baniſh'd family, I fear, are not yet antiquated; and who can foretel, that their future attempts will produce no greater diſorder?

The diſputes betwixt privilege and prerogative may eaſily be compos'd by laws, and votes, and conferences, and conceſſions; where there is tolerable

able temper or prudence on both ſides, or on either ſide. Amongſt contending titles, the queſtion can only be determin'd by the ſword, and by devaſtation, and by civil war.

A PRINCE, who fills the throne with a diſputed title dares not arm his ſubjects; the only method of ſecuring a people fully, both againſt domeſtic oppreſſion and foreign conqueſt.

NOTWITHSTANDING all our riches and renown, what a critical eſcape did we lately make, from dangers, which were owing not ſo much to bad conduct and ill ſucceſs in war, as to the pernicious practice of mortgaging our finances, and the ſtill more pernicious maxim of never paying off our incumbrances. Such fatal meaſures cou'd never have been embrac'd, had it not been to ſecure a precarious eſtabliſhment.*

BUT to convince us, that an hereditary title is to be embrac'd rather than a parliamentary one, which is not ſupported by any other views or motives; a man needs only tranſport himſelf back to the æra of the reſtoration, and ſuppoſe, that he had had a ſeat in that parliament, which recall'd the royal family, and put a period to the greateſt diſ-



* THOSE who conſider how univerſal this pernicious practice of funding has become all over *Europe* may perhaps diſpute this laſt opinion. But we lay under leſs neceſſity than other ſtates.

orders that ever arose from the opposite pretensions of prince and people. What wou'd have been thought of one, that had propos'd, at that time, to set aside *Charles* the second, and settle the crown on the duke of *York* or *Glouceſter*; merely, in order to exclude the high claims of their father and grandfather? Wou'd not such an one have been regarded as a very extravagant projector, who lov'd dangerous remedies, and cou'd tamper and play with a government and national constitution, like a quack with a sickly patient?

The advantages, which result from a parliamentary title, preferably to an hereditary one, tho' they are great, are too refin'd ever to enter into the conception of the vulgar. The bulk of mankind wou'd never allow them to be sufficient for committing what wou'd be regarded as an injustice to the prince. They must be supported by some gross, popular, and familiar topics; and wise men, tho' convinc'd of their force, wou'd reject them, in compliance with the weakness and prejudices of the people. An encroaching tyrant or deluded bigot alone, by his misconduct, is able to enrage the nation, and render practicable what was always, perhaps, desirable.

In reality, the reason assign'd by the nation for excluding the race of *Stuart*, and so many other branches of the royal family, is not on account of their

their hereditary title (which however juſt in itſelf, wou'd, to vulgar apprehenſions, have appear'd altogether abſurd) but on account of their religion: Which leads us to compare the diſadvantages above mention'd of each eſtabliſhment.

I CONFESS, that, conſidering the matter in general, it were rather to be wiſh'd, that our prince had no foreign dominions, and cou'd confine all his attention to the government of this iſland. For not to mention ſome real inconveniencies, that may reſult from territories on the continent; they afford ſuch a handle for calumny and defamation, as is greedily ſeiz'd by the people, who are always diſpos'd to think ill of their ſuperiors. It muſt, however, be acknowledg'd, that *Hanover* is, perhaps, the ſpot of ground in *Europe* the leaſt inconvenient for a king of *Britain*. It lyes in the heart of *Germany*, at a diſtance from the great powers, which are our natural rivals: It is protected by the laws of the empire, as well as by the arms of its own ſovereign: And it ſerves only to connect us more cloſely with the houſe of *Auſtria*, which is our natural ally.

IN the laſt war, it has been of ſervice to us, by furniſhing us with a conſiderable body of auxiliary troops, the braveſt and moſt faithful in the world. The elector of *Hanover* is the only conſiderable prince in the empire, who has drove no ſeparate end,

end, and has rais'd up no ſtale pretenſions, during the late commotions of *Europe*; but has acted, all along, with the dignity of a king of *Britain*. And ever ſince the acceſſion of that family, 'twou'd be difficult to ſhow any harm we have ever receiv'd from the electoral dominions, except that ſhort diſguſt in 1718, with *Charles* the twelfth, who, regulating himſelf by maxims very different from thoſe of other princes, made a perſonal quarrel of every public injury.

THE religious perſuaſion of the houſe of *Stuart* is an inconvenience of a much deeper dye, and wou'd threaten us with much more diſmal conſequences. The *Roman* catholic religion, with its huge train of prieſts and friers, is vaſtly more expenſive than ours: Even tho' unaccompany'd with its natural attendants of inquiſitors and ſtakes and gibbets, it is leſs tolerating: And not contented with dividing the ſacerdotal from the regal office, (which muſt be prejudicial to any ſtate) it beſtows the former on a foreigner, who has always a ſeparate, and may often have an oppoſite intereſt to that of the public.

BUT were this religion ever ſo advantageous to ſociety, it is contrary to that which is eſtabliſh'd among us, and which is likely to keep poſſeſſion, for a long time, of the minds of the people. And tho' it is much to be hop'd, that the progreſs of rea-

ſon

ſon and philoſophy will, by degrees, abate the virulent acrimony of oppoſite religions all over *Europe*; yet the ſpirit of moderation has, as yet, made too ſlow advances to be entirely truſted. The conduct of the *Saxon* family, where the ſame perſon can be a catholic king and a proteſtant elector, is, perhaps, the firſt inſtance, in modern times, of ſo reaſonable and prudent a behaviour. And the gradual progreſs of the catholic ſuperſtition does, even there, prognoſticate a ſpeedy alteration: After which, 'tis juſtly to be apprehended, that perſecutions will put a ſpeedy period to the proteſtant religion in the place of its nativity.

THUS, upon the whole, the advantages of the ſettlement in the family of *Stuart*, which frees us from a diſputed title, ſeem to bear ſome proportion with thoſe of the ſettlement in the family of *Hanover*, which frees us from the claims of prerogative: But at the ſame time, its diſadvantages, by placing on the throne a *Roman* catholic, are much greater than thoſe of the other eſtabliſhment, in ſettling the crown on a foreign prince. What party an impartial patriot, in the reign of king *William* or queen *Anne*, wou'd have choſen amidſt theſe oppoſite views, may, perhaps, to ſome appear hard to determine. For my part, I eſteem liberty ſo invaluable a bleſſing in ſociety, that whatever favours its progreſs and ſecurity, can ſcarce be

be too fondly cheriſh'd by every one, who is a lover of human kind.

BUT, the ſettlement in the houſe of *Hanover* has actually taken place. The princes of that family, without intrigue, without cabal, without ſollicitation on their part, have been call'd to mount our throne, by the united voice of the whole legiſlative body. They have, ſince their acceſſion, diſplay'd, in all their actions, the utmoſt mildneſs, equity, and regard to the laws and conſtitution. Our own miniſters, our own parliaments, ourſelves have govern'd us; and if aught ill has befallen us, we can only blame fortune or ourſelves. What a reproach muſt we become amongſt nations, if, diſguſted with a ſettlement ſo deliberately made, and whoſe conditions have been ſo religiouſly obſerv'd, we ſhou'd throw every thing again into confuſion; and by our levity and rebellious diſpoſition, prove ourſelves totally unfit for any ſtate but that of abſolute ſlavery and ſubjection?

THE greateſt inconvenience attending a diſputed title is, that it brings us in danger of civil wars and rebellions. What wiſe man, to avoid this inconvenience, wou'd run directly upon a civil war and rebellion? Not to mention, that ſo long poſſeſſion, ſecur'd by ſo many laws, muſt, e're this time, in the apprehenſion of a great part of the nation, have begot a title in the houſe of *Hanover*,

*ver*, independent of their preſent poſſeſſion: So that now we ſhou'd not even, by a revolution, obtain the end, of avoiding a diſputed title.

No revolution, made by national forces, will ever be able, without ſome other great neceſſity, to aboliſh our debts and incumbrances, in which the intereſt of ſo many perſons is concern'd. And a revolution, made by foreign forces, is a conqueſt: A calamity, with which the precarious balance of power very nearly threatens us, and which our civil diſſenſions are likely, above all other circumces, to bring ſuddenly upon us.

# DISCOURSE XII.

## *Idea of a perfect Commonwealth.*

OF all mankind, there are none ſo pernicious as political projectors, if they have power; nor ſo ridiculous, if they want it: As on the other hand, a wiſe politician is the moſt beneficial character in nature, if accompany'd with authority, and the moſt innocent, and not altogether uſeleſs, even if depriv'd of it. 'Tis not with forms of government, as with other artificial contrivances; where an old engine may be rejected, if we can diſcover another more accurate and commodious, or where trials may ſafely be made, even tho' the ſucceſs be doubtful. An eſtabliſh'd government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumſtance of its being eſtabliſh'd; the bulk of mankind being govern'd by authority, not reaſon, and never attributing authority to any thing, that has not the recommendation of antiquity. To tamper, therefore, in this affair, or try projects, merely upon the credit of ſuppos'd argument and philoſophy, can never be the part of a wiſe magiſtrate, who will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age; and tho' he may attempt ſome improvement for the public good, yet will he adjuſt his innovations, as much as poſſible, to the antient fabric, and pre-

ſerve entire the chief pillars and ſupports of the conſtitution.

THE mathematicians in *Europe* have been much divided concerning that figure of a ſhip, which is the moſt commodious for ſailing; and *Huygens*, who at laſt fixt this controverſy, is juſtly thought to have oblig'd the learned, as well as commercial world; tho' *Columbus* had ſail'd to *America*, and Sir *Francis Drake* made the tour of the world, without any ſuch diſcovery. As one form of government muſt be allow'd more perfect than another, independent of the manners and humours of particular men; Why may we not enquire what is the moſt perfect of all, tho' the common botcht and inaccurate governments ſeem to ſerve the purpoſes of ſociety, and tho' it be not ſo eaſy to eſtabliſh a new government as to build a veſſel upon a new plan? The ſubject is ſurely the moſt worthy curioſity, of any the wit of man can poſſibly deviſe. And who knows, if this controverſy were fixt by the univerſal conſent of the learned, but in ſome future age an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a diſſolution of the old governments, or the combination of men to form a new one, in ſome diſtant part of the world? In all caſes, it muſt be advantageous to know what is moſt perfect in the kind, that we may be able to bring any real conſtitution or form of government as near it as poſſible, by

ſuch

ſuch gentle alterations and innovations, as may not give too great diſturbance to ſociety.

ALL I pretend to in the preſent eſſay is to revive this ſubject of ſpeculation; and therefore I ſhall deliver my ſentiments in as few words as poſſible. A long diſſertation on that head wou'd not, I apprehend, be very acceptable to the public, who will be apt to regard ſuch diſquiſitions, both as uſeleſs and chimerical.

ALL plans of government, which ſuppoſe great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly imaginary. Of this nature, are the republic of *Plato*, and the *Utopia* of Sir *Thomas More*. The *Oceana* is the only valuable model of a commonwealth, that has yet been offer'd to the public.

THE chief defects of the *Oceana* ſeem to be theſe. *Firſt*, Its rotation is inconvenient, by throwing men, of whatever ability, by intervals, out of public employments. *Secondly*, Its *Agrarian* is impracticable. Men will ſoon learn the art, which was practis'd in antient *Rome*, of concealing their poſſeſſions under other peoples names; till at laſt, the abuſe will become ſo common, that they will throw off, even the appearance of reſtraint. *Thirdly*, The *Oceana* provides not a ſufficient ſecurity for liberty or the redreſs of grievances. The ſenate muſt propoſe, and the people conſent; by which means,

means, the ſenate have not only a negative upon the people, but what is of infinitely greater conſequence, their negative goes before the votes of the people. Were the king's negative of the ſame nature in the *Engliſh* conſtitution, and cou'd he prevent any bill from coming into parliament, he wou'd be an abſolute monarch. As his negative follows the votes of the houſes, it is of little conſequence: Such a difference is there in the manner of placing the ſame thing. When a popular bill has been debated in the two houſes, is brought to maturity, all its conveniencies and inconveniencies weigh'd and balanc'd; if afterwards it be preſented for the royal aſſent, few princes will venture to reject the unanimous deſire of the people. But cou'd the king cruſh a diſagreeable bill in embryo (as was the caſe, for ſome time in the *Scotch* parliament, by means of the lords of the articles) the *Britiſh* government wou'd have no balance, nor wou'd grievances ever be redreſt: And 'tis certain, that exorbitant power proceeds not, in any government, from new laws, ſo much as from neglecting to remedy the abuſes, which frequently riſe upon the old ones. A government, ſays *Machiavel*, muſt often be brought back to its original principles. It appears, then, that in the *Oceana* the whole legiſlature may be ſaid to reſt in the ſenate; which *Harrington* wou'd own to be an inconvenient form of government; eſpecially after the *Agrarian* is aboliſh'd.

HERE

HERE is a form of government, to which I cannot, in theory, diſcover any conſiderable objection. Let *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, or any territory of equal extent, be divided into 100 counties, and each county into 100 pariſhes, making in all 10,000. If the country, purpos'd to be erected into a commonwealth, be of more narrow extent, we may diminiſh the number of counties, but never bring them below thirty. If it be of greater extent, 'twere better to enlarge the pariſhes, or throw more pariſhes into a county, than encreaſe the number of counties.

LET all the freeholders in the country pariſhes, and thoſe who pay ſcot and lot in the town pariſhes, meet annually in the pariſh church, and chuſe by ballot ſome freeholder of the county for their member, whom we ſhall call the county *repreſentative*.

LET the 100 county repreſentatives, two days after their election, meet in the county town, and chuſe by ballot, from their own body, ten county *magiſtrates*, and one *ſenator*. There are, therefore, in the whole commonwealth, 100 ſenators, 1100 county magiſtrates, and 10,000 county repreſentatives. For we ſhall beſtow on all ſenators the authority of county magiſtrates, and on all county magiſtrates the authority of county repreſentatives.

LET

LET the ſenators meet in the capital, and be endow'd with the whole executive power of the commonwealth, the power of peace and war, of giving orders to generals, admirals, and ambaſſadors; and in ſhort, all the prerogatives of a *Britiſh* king, except his negative.

LET the county repreſentatives meet in their particular counties, and poſſeſs the whole legiſlative power of the commonwealth; the greateſt number of counties deciding the queſtion, and where theſe are equal, let the ſenate have the caſting vote.

EVERY new law muſt firſt be debated in the ſenate; and tho' rejected by it, if ten ſenators inſiſt and proteſt, it muſt be ſent down to the counties. The ſenate may join to the copy of the law, their reaſons for receiving or rejecting it.

BECAUSE it would be troubleſome to aſſemble the whole county repreſentatives for every trivial law, that may be requiſite, the ſenate have their choice of ſending down the law either to the county magiſtrates or county repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates, tho' the law be referr'd to them, may, if they pleaſe, call the repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination.

WHETHER the law be referr'd by the ſenate to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, a copy of it, and of the ſenate's reaſons muſt be ſent to every

every repreſentative eight days before the day appointed for the aſſembling in order to deliberate concerning it. And tho' the determination be, by the ſenate, referr'd to the magiſtrates, if five repreſentatives of the county order the magiſtrates to aſſemble the whole court of repreſentatives, and ſubmit the affair to their determination, they muſt obey.

EITHER the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives may give, to the ſenator of the county, the copy of a law to be propos'd to the ſenate; and if five counties concur in the ſame order, the law, tho' refus'd by the ſenate, muſt come either to the county magiſtrates or repreſentatives, as is contain'd in the order of the five counties.

ANY twenty counties, by a vote either of their magiſtrates or repreſentatives, may throw any man out of all public offices for a year. Thirty counties for three years.

THE ſenate has a power of throwing out any member or number of members of its own body, not to be re-elected for that year. The ſenate cannot throw out twice in a year the ſenator of the ſame county.

THE power of the old ſenate continues for three weeks after the annual election of the county repreſentatives. Then all the new ſenators are ſhut up in a conclave, like the cardinals; and by an intricate

cate ballot, ſuch as that of *Venice* or *Malta*, they chuſe the following magiſtrates; a protector, who repreſents the dignity of the commonwealth, and preſides in the ſenate; two ſecretaries of ſtate; theſe ſix councils, a council of ſtate, a council of religion and learning, a council of trade, a council of laws, a council of war, a council of the admiralty; each council conſiſting of five perſons: Along with ſix commiſſioners of the treaſury and a chief commiſſioner. All theſe muſt be ſenators. The ſenate alſo names all the ambaſſadors to foreign courts, who may either be ſenators or not.

THE ſenate may continue any or all of theſe, but muſt re-elect them every year.

THE protector and two ſecretaries have ſeſſion and ſuffrage in the council of ſtate. The buſineſs of that council is all foreign politics. The council of ſtate has ſeſſion and ſuffrage in all the other councils.

THE council of religion and learning inſpects the univerſities and clergy. That of trade inſpects every thing that may affect commerce. That of laws inſpects all the abuſes of laws by the inferior magiſtrates, and examines what improvements may be made of the municipal law. That of war inſpects the militia and its diſcipline, magazines, ſtores, *&c.* and when the republic is in war, examines into the proper orders for generals. The council of admiralty has the ſame power with regard

gard to the navy, along with the nomination of the captains and all inferior officers.

NONE of theſe councils can give orders themſelves, except where they receive ſuch powers from the ſenate. In other caſes, they muſt communicate every thing to the ſenate.

WHEN the ſenate is under adjournment, any of the councils may aſſemble it before the day appointed for its meeting.

BESIDES theſe councils or courts, there is another call'd the court of *competitors*, which is thus conſtituted. If any candidates for the office of ſenator have more votes than a third of the repreſentatives, that candidate, which has moſt votes, next to the ſenator elected, becomes incapable for one year of all public offices, even of being a magiſtrate or repreſentative: But he takes his ſeat in the court of competitors. Here then is a court, which may ſometimes conſiſt of a hundred members; ſometimes have no members at all; and by that means, be for a year aboliſh'd.

THE court of competitors has no power in the commonwealth. It has only the inſpection of public accounts, and the accuſing any man before the ſenate. If the ſenate acquit him, the court of competitors may, if they pleaſe, appeal to the people, either magiſtrates or repreſentatives. Upon that appeal, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives meet on the day appointed by the court of compe-

titors, and chuſe in each county three perſons; from which number every ſenator is excluded. Theſe to the number of 300 meet in the capital, and bring the perſon accus'd to a new trial.

The court of competitors may propoſe any law to the ſenate; and if refus'd may appeal to the people, that is to the magiſtrates or repreſentatives, who examine it in their counties. Every ſenator, who is thrown out of the ſenate by a vote of the court, takes his ſeat in the court of competitors.

THE ſenate poſſeſſes all the judicative authority of the houſe of lords, that is, all the appeals from the inferior courts. It likewiſe nominates the lord chancellor, and all the officers of the law.

EVERY county is a kind of republic within itſelf, and the repreſentatives may make county laws; which have no authority 'till three months after they are voted. A copy of the law is ſent to the ſenate, and to every other county. The ſenate or any ſingle county may, at any time, annul any law of another county.

THE repreſentatives have all the authority of the *Britiſh* juſtices of the peace in trials, commitments, *&c.*

THE magiſtrates have the nomination of all the officers of the revenue in each county. All cauſes with regard to the revenue are appeal'd ultimately

to

to the magiſtrates. They paſs the accompts of all the officers; but muſt have all their own accompts examin'd and paſt at the end of the year by the repreſentatives.

THE magiſtrates name rectors or miniſters to all the pariſhes.

THE presbyterian government is eſtabliſh'd; and the higheſt eccleſiaſtical court is an aſſembly or ſynod of all the presbyters of the county. The magiſtrates may take any cauſe from this court, and determine it themſelves.

THE magiſtrates may try, and depoſe or ſuſpend any presbyter.

THE militia is eſtabliſh'd in imitation of that in *Swiſſerland*, which being well known, we ſhall not inſiſt upon it. 'Twill only be proper to make this addition, that an army of 20,000 be annually drawn out by rotation, paid and encamp'd during ſix weeks in ſummer; that the duty of a camp may not be altogether unknown.

THE magiſtrates nominate all the colonels and downwards. The ſenate all upwards. During war, the general nominates the colonel and downwards, and his commiſſion is good for a twelvemonth. But after that it muſt be confirm'd by the magiſtrates of the county, to which the regiment belongs. The magiſtrates may break any officer in the county regiment. And the ſenate may do the ſame to any officer in the ſervice. If the magiſtrates

giſtrates do not think proper to confirm the general's choice, they may nominate another officer in the place of him they reject.

ALL crimes are try'd within the county by the magiſtrates and a jury. But the ſenate can ſtop any trial, and bring it before themſelves.

ANY county may indict any man before the ſenate, for any crime.

THE protector, the two ſecretaries, the council of ſtate, with any five more that the ſenate appoints, on extraordinary emergencies, are poſſeſt of *dictatorial* power for ſix months.

THE protector may pardon any perſon condemn'd by the inferior courts.

IN time of war, no officer of the army, that is in the field, can have any civil office in the commonwealth.

THE capital, which we ſhall call *London*, may be allow'd four members in the ſenate. It may therefore be divided into four counties. The repreſentatives of each of theſe chuſe one ſenator, and ten magiſtrates. There are therefore in the city four ſenators, forty four magiſtrates, and four hundred repreſentatives. The magiſtrates have the ſame authority as in the counties. The repreſentatives alſo have the ſame authority; but they never meet in one general court: They give their votes

votes in their particular county or diviſion of hundreds.

When they enact any city law, the greateſt number of counties or diviſions determines the matter. And where theſe are equal, the magiſtrates have the caſting vote.

The magiſtrates chuſe the mayor, ſheriff, recorder and other officers of the city.

In the commonwealth, no repreſentative, magiſtrate, or ſenator, as ſuch, has any ſalary. The protector, ſecretaries, councils, and ambaſſadors have ſalaries.

The firſt year in every century is ſet apart to correct all inequalities, which time may have produc'd in the repreſentation. This muſt be done by the legiſlature.

The following political aphoriſms may explain the reaſon of theſe orders.

The lower ſort of people and ſmall proprietors are good enough judges of one not very diſtant from them in rank or habitation; and therefore, in their parochial meetings, will probably chuſe the beſt or nearly the beſt repreſentative: But they are wholly unfit for county meetings, and for electing into the higher offices of the republic. Their ignorance gives the grandees an opportunity of deceiving them.

TEN thouſand, even tho' they were not annually elected, are a large enough baſis for any free government. 'Tis true, the nobles in *Poland* are more than 10,000, and yet theſe oppreſs the people. But as power continues there always in the ſame perſons and families, this makes them, in a manner, a different nation from the people. Beſides, the nobles are there united under a few heads of families.

ALL free governments muſt conſiſt of two councils, a leſs and a greater, or in other words, of a ſenate and people. The people, as *Harrington* obſerves, wou'd want wiſdom, without the ſenate: The ſenate, without the people, wou'd want honeſty.

A LARGE aſſembly of 1000, for inſtance, to repreſent the people, if allow'd to debate, wou'd fall into diſorder. If not allow'd to debate, the ſenate has a negative upon them, and the worſt kind of negative, that before reſolution.

HERE therefore is an inconvenience which no government has yet fully remedy'd, but which is the eaſieſt to be remedy'd in the world. If the people debate, all is confuſion: If they do not debate, they can only reſolve; and then the ſenate carves for them. Divide the people into many ſeparate bodies; and then they may debate with ſafety,

ſafety, and every inconvenience ſeems to be prevented.

CARDINAL *de Retz* ſays, that all numerous aſſemblies, however compos'd, are mere mob, and ſway'd in their debates by the leaſt motive. This we find confirm'd by daily experience. When an abſurdity ſtrikes a member, he conveys it to his neighbour, and ſo on, till the whole be infected. Separate this great body; and tho' every member be only of middling ſenſe, 'tis not probable, that any thing but reaſon can prevail over the whole. Influence and example being remov'd, good ſenſe will always get the better of bad among a number of people, Good ſenſe is one thing: But follies are numberleſs; and every man has a different one. The only way of making a people wiſe is to keep them from uniting into large aſſemblies.

THERE are two things to be guarded againſt in every *ſenate:* Its combination and its diviſion. Its combination is moſt dangerous; and againſt this inconvenience we have provided the following remedies. 1, The great dependence of the ſenators on the people by annual elections; and that not by an undiſtinguiſhing rabble, like the *Engliſh* electors, but by men of fortune and education. 2, The ſmall power they are allow'd. They have few offices to diſpoſe of. Almoſt all are given by the magiſtrates in the counties. 3, The court of com-

competitors, which being compos'd of men that are their rivals, next to them in intereſt, and uneaſy in their preſent ſituation, will be ſure to take all advantages againſt them.

THE diviſion of the ſenate is prevented, 1, By the ſmallneſs of their number. 2, As faction ſuppoſes a combination to a ſeparate intereſt, it is prevented by their dependence on the people. 3, They have a power of expelling any factious member. 'Tis true, when another member of the ſame ſpirit comes from the county, they have no power of expelling him: Nor is it fit they ſhou'd; for that ſhows the humour to be in the people, and probably ariſes from ſome ill conduct in public affairs. 4, Almoſt any man, in a ſenate ſo regularly choſen by the people, may be ſuppos'd fit for any civil office. 'Twou'd be proper, therefore, for the ſenate to form ſome *general* reſolutions with regard to the diſpoſing of offices among the members: Which reſolutions wou'd not confine them in critical times, when extraordinary parts on the one hand, or extraordinary ſtupidity on the other, appears in any ſenator; but yet they wou'd be ſufficient to prevent brigue and faction, by making the diſpoſal of the offices a thing of courſe. For inſtance; let it be a reſolution, that no man ſhall enjoy any office, till he has ſat four years in the ſenate: That, except ambaſſadors, no man ſhall be in office two years following: That no

no man ſhall attain the higher offices but thro' the lower; That no man ſhall be protector twice, *&c.* The ſenate of *Venice* govern themſelves by ſuch reſolutions.

In foreign politics the intereſt of the ſenate can ſcarc eever be divided from that of the people; and therefore 'tis fit to make the ſenate abſolute with regard to them; otherwiſe there cou'd be no ſecrecy nor refin'd policy. Beſides, without money, no alliance can be executed; and the ſenate is ſtill ſufficiently dependent. Not to mention, that the legiſlative power being always ſuperior to the executive, the magiſtrates or repreſentatives may interpoſe, whenever they think proper.

The chief ſupport of the *Britiſh* government is the oppoſition of intereſts; but that, tho' in the main ſerviceable, breeds endleſs factions. In the foregoing plan, it does all the good without any of the harm. The *competitors* have no power of controlling the ſenate: They have only the power of accuſing, and appealing to the people.

'Tis neceſſary, likewiſe, to prevent both combination and diviſion in the thouſand magiſtrates. This is done ſufficiently by the ſeparation of places and intereſts.

But leſt that ſhou'd not be enough, their dependence on the 10,000 for their elections, ſerves to the ſame purpoſe.

NOR is that all: For the 10,000 may reſume the power, whenever they pleaſe; and not only when they all pleaſe, but when any five of a hundred pleaſe, which will happen upon the very firſt ſuſpicion of a ſeparate intereſt.

THE 10,000 are too large a body either to unite or divide, except when they meet in one place, and fall under the guidance of ambitious leaders. Not to mention their annual election, by almoſt the whole body of the people.

A SMALL commonwealth is the happieſt government in the world, within itſelf; becauſe every thing lyes under the eye of the rulers: But it may be ſubdu'd by great force from without. This ſcheme ſeems to have all the advantages both of a great and a little commonwealth.

EVERY county law may be anull'd either by the ſenate or another county; becauſe that ſhows an oppoſition of intereſts: In which caſe, no part ought to decide for itſelf. The matter muſt be referr'd to the whole, which will beſt determine what agrees with general intereſt.

AS to the clergy and militia, the reaſons of theſe orders are obvious. Without the dependence of the clergy on the civil magiſtrate, and without a militia, 'tis folly to think any free government will ever have ſecurity or ſtability.

IN

In many governments, the inferior magiſtrates have no rewards but what ariſe from their ambition, vanity, or public ſpirit. The ſalaries of the *French* judges amount not to the intereſt of the ſums they pay for their offices. The *Dutch* burgo-maſters have little more immediate profit than the *Engliſh* juſtices of peace, or the members of the houſe of commons formerly. But leſt any ſhou'd ſuſpect that this wou'd beget negligence in the adminiſtration, (which is little to be fear'd conſidering the natural ambition of mankind) let the magiſtrates have competent ſalaries. The ſenators have acceſs to ſo many honourable and lucrative offices, that their attendance needs not be bought. There is little attendance requir'd of the repreſentatives.

That the foregoing plan of government is practicable, no one can doubt, who conſiders the reſemblance it bears to the commonwealth of the United provinces, formerly one of the wiſeſt and moſt renown'd governments, that ever was in the world. The alterations in the preſent ſcheme are all evidently to the better. 1, The repreſentation is more equal. 2, The unlimited power of the burgo-maſters in the towns, which forms a perfect ariſtocracy in the *Dutch* commonwealth, is corrected by a well temper'd democracy, in giving to the people the annual election of the county-

ty repreſentatives. 3, The negative, which every province and town has upon the whole body of the *Dutch* republic, with regard to alliances, peace and war, and the impoſition of taxes, is here remov'd. 4, The counties, in the preſent plan, are not ſo independent of each other, nor do they form ſeparate bodies ſo much as the ſeven provinces; where the jealouſy and envy of the ſmaller provinces and towns againſt the greater, particularly *Holland* and *Amſterdam*, have frequently diſturb'd the government. 5, Larger powers, tho' of the ſafeſt kind, are entruſted to the ſenate than the States General poſſeſs; by which means, the former may become more expeditious, and ſecret in their reſolutions, than 'tis poſſible for the latter.

THE chief alterations, that cou'd be made on the *Britiſh* government, in order to bring it to the moſt perfect model of limited monarchy, ſeem to be the following. *Firſt*, The plan of the republican parliament ought to be reſtor'd, by making the repreſentation equal, and by allowing none to vote in the county elections who poſſeſs not a hundred a year. *Secondly*, As ſuch a houſe of commons wou'd be too weighty for a frail houſe of lords, like the preſent, the biſhops and *Scotch* peers ought to be remov'd, whoſe behaviour, *in former parliaments*, deſtroy'd entirely the authority of that houſe: The number of the upper houſe ought to be rais'd to three or four hundred: Their ſeats not he-

hereditary, but during life: They ought to have the election of their own members; and no commoner ſhou'd be allow'd to refuſe a ſeat, that was offer'd him. By this means, the houſe of lords wou'd conſiſt entirely of the men of chief credit, ability, and intereſt of the nation; and every turbulent leader in the houſe of commons might be taken off, and connected in intereſt with the houſe of peers. Such an ariſtocracy wou'd be an excellent barrier both to the monarchy and againſt it. At preſent, the balance of our government depends, in ſome meaſure, on the ability and behaviour of the ſovereign; which are variable and uncertain circumſtances.

I ALLOW, that this plan of limited monarchy, however corrected, is ſtill liable to three great inconveniencies. *Firſt*, It removes not entirely, tho' it may ſoften, the parties of *court* and *country*. *Secondly*, The king's perſonal character muſt ſtill have a great influence on the government. *Thirdly*, The ſword is in the hands of a ſingle perſon, who will always neglect to diſcipline the militia, in order to have a pretext for keeping up a ſtanding army. 'Tis evident, that this is a mortal diſtemper in the *Britiſh* government, of which it muſt at laſt inevitably periſh. I muſt, however, confeſs, that *Sweden* ſeems, in ſome meaſure, to have remedy'd this inconvenience, and to have a militia, along with its limited monarchy, as well as a ſtand-

ſtanding army, which is leſs dangerous than the *Britiſh*.

We ſhall conclude this ſubject with obſerving the falſhood of the common opinion, that no large ſtate, ſuch as *France* or *Britain*, cou'd ever be modell'd into a commonwealth, but that ſuch a form of government can only take place in a city or ſmall territory. The contrary ſeems evident. Tho' 'tis more difficult to form a republican government in an extenſive country than in a city; there is more facility, when once it is form'd, of preſerving it ſteady and uniform, without tumult and faction, in the former than in the latter. 'Tis not eaſy, for the diſtant parts of a large ſtate to combine in any plan of free government; but they eaſily conſpire in the eſteem and reverence for a ſingle perſon, who, by means of this popular favour, may ſeize the power, and forcing the more obſtinate to ſubmit, may eſtabliſh a monarchical government. On the other hand, a city readily concurs in the ſame notions of government, the natural equality of property favours liberty, and the nearneſs of habitation enables the citizens mutually to aſſiſt each other. Even under abſolute princes, the ſubordinate government of cities is commonly republican; while that of counties and provinces is monarchical. But theſe ſame circumſtances, which facilitate the erection of commonwealths in cities, render their conſtitution more frail and uncertain. Democracies

cies are turbulent. For however the people may be ſeparated or divided into ſmall parties, either in their votes or elections; their near habitation in a city will always make the force of popular tides and currents very ſenſible. Ariſtocracies are better adapted for peace and order, and accordingly were moſt admired by antient writers; but they are jealous and oppreſſive. In a large government, which is modell'd with maſterly ſkill, there is compaſs and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the firſt elections or firſt concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magiſtrates, who direct all the motions. At the ſame time, the parts are ſo diſtant and remote, that 'tis very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or paſſion, to hurry them into any meaſures againſt the public intereſt.

'Tis needleſs to enquire whether ſuch a government wou'd be immortal. I allow the juſtneſs of the poet's exclamation on the endleſs projects of human race, *Man and for ever!* The world itſelf probably is not immortal. Such conſuming plagues may ariſe as wou'd leave even a perfect government a weak prey to its neighbours. We know not, how far enthuſiaſm, or other extraordinary motions of the human mind, may tranſport men, to the neglect of all order and public good. Where difference of intereſt is remov'd, whimſical and unaccountable factions often ariſe, from perſonal fa-

favour or enmity. Perhaps, ruſt may grow to the ſprings of the moſt accurate political machine, and diſorder its motions. Laſtly, extenſive conqueſts when purſu'd, muſt be the ruin of every free government, and of the more perfect governments ſooner than of the imperfect; becauſe of the very advantages, which the former poſſeſs above the latter. And tho' ſuch a ſtate ought to eſtabliſh a fundamental law againſt conqueſts: Yet republics have ambition as well as individuals, and preſent intereſt makes men forgetful of their poſterity. 'Tis a ſufficient incitement to human endeavours, that ſuch a government wou'd flouriſh for many ages; without pretending to beſtow on any work of man, that immortality, which the Almighty ſeems to have refus'd to his own productions.

*FINIS.*

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM